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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1950s, various Marxist political economists have confirmed the empirical actuality of 
the ‘law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’. While the present thesis contributes to the 
burgeoning body of empirical literature that has substantiated Marx’s law, it differs from many 
of them in the underlying theoretic-methodological specifications guiding how the data provided 
in the national accounts should be translated for purposes of empirical research. Informed by a 
theoretical, methodological and empirical survey of the relevant literature, this thesis engages in 
a value-theoretical re-specification of Marx’s fundamental value-ratios for purposes of ‘testing’ 
Marx’s most crucial historical forecasts in relation to the concrete post-war evolution of the 
global epicentre of “advanced” capitalism: the US economy. It suggests some innovative 
methods of measuring ‘systemically necessary unproductive labour’, the ‘composition of output’ 
and economic growth alongside Marx’s fundamental value-ratios: namely, the rate of surplus 
value, the organic composition of capital and the average rate of profit. It also proposes a unique 
normalizing procedure for distinguishing between components of financial profit resting on 
surplus-value production from ‘fictitious’ components deriving from relations of credit/debt. 
This ‘normalization procedure’ permits a more realistic assessment of the amount of actual 
surplus-value transferred to finance, and therewith a more accurate calculation of the average 
rate of profit for the social capital as a whole in the “era of fictitious capital.” In sum, the 
empirical results disclose a long-term tendency for a rising composition of capital to exert a 
downward pressure on the average rate of profit – a tendency that has been offset in the 
neoliberal era to some extent by a rising rate of surplus-value (exploitation) and by a 
proliferation of fictitious capital imputed in the national accounts. Accordingly, this study 
confirms the empirical actuality of Marx’s most crucial historical forecasts – most notably, his 
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law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall – while also revealing the systemic roots of the 
deepening malaise of the US economy and of world capitalism as a whole. 
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There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the 
fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous 
summits.  
 – Karl Marx (1867) 
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Introduction 
 
If you substitute platforms for textile mills, machine learning for steam engines, Twitter for 
the telegraph, you have exactly the same dynamics as existed 150 [170] years ago – when 
Karl Marx [and Frederick Engels were] scribbling the Communist Manifesto.  
– Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, The Independent (April 2018) 
 
Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a 
society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the 
sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether-world whom he has 
called up by his spells.  
 – Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (January 1848) 
 
While the above passage may perhaps be from Marx and Engels’ most famous work, I would 
argue that it is not from their most vital. The latter is undoubtedly the three volumes of Capital – 
Marx’s magnum opus – where he elaborated his most important contribution to political 
economy: his theory of surplus-value. Although the last two volumes were compiled 
posthumously by his long-time collaborator and friend, Frederick Engels, Capital is Karl Marx’s 
paramount work: the objective of which is the disclosure of capitalism’s inner laws of motion.2 
Today, the great majority of philosophers and social scientists seem increasingly ignorant 
of those fundamental laws of motion. The mainstream economic current (the ‘bourgeois 
economics’ that Marx would have deemed vulgar) openly denies the existence of such laws, for 
their main scholarly purpose is to prove that capitalism can indeed last forever. In fact, the 
purpose today of a great deal of philosophy, sociology and economics of all kinds is to attest to 
capitalism’s permanence. But nothing lasts forever.  
                                                          
2 As opposed to natural laws, or even so-called iron laws of development, which claim to be predictive and 
irrefutable, socio-economic ‘laws of motion’ to Marx were never predictive but dialectical and therefore wholly 
relational. Specifically, a law in this sense is a tendency exhibiting influence (‘great power’) over its 
countertendencies. In turn, such laws govern capitalism’s intrinsic self-movement (its internal dynamics) and 
therefore act as the primary object of study for not only Marx, but for a plethora of socialists alike. See Freeman 
2015. 
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Most exemplary of this service is the neo-classical school and its marginal utility theory, 
whose scholarship arose as a negation to the analytical arsenal of the classical school of Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx. Pioneered by the bourgeois economists of the late 19th 
century, Carl Menger, Alfred Marshall and Léon Walras, the neo-classical school adheres to a 
marginalist theory of value according to which the “value” of an object or service (a commodity) 
is treated as synonymous with the ‘price’ it yields under the conditions of a “free” and 
competitive market (i.e., ‘value/price’ exists as a psychological relation determined by the 
marginal utility of a thing to the would-be consumer).3 The historical and ideological basis of the 
“marginalist revolution” was not only the naturalization of capitalist exchange relations but also 
a refutation of the productionist theory of value of the classical school.4  
Taking a holistic approach, the classical school, at its best, searched for the ‘social 
substance’ out of which ‘price’ emerges, adopting the analytical standpoint of commodity 
production as a whole rather than the ‘individual commodity’. Contrary to the vulgar 
subjectivism of the marginalists, the goal of production was understood to be profit; and hence, 
‘value’ was seen as arising from the production of commodities, not through the exchange of 
commodities. The classical school, therefore, regarded ‘price’ as something corresponding to a 
determinate magnitude of ‘value’ rooted in production and the social division of labour. ‘Value’ 
existed as an objective social substance while money functioned as the universal representation 
of that substance (commodity exchange-value).5 In turn, the sphere of exchange is simply the 
                                                          
3 Smith 2018, p. 70.  
4 Paul Samuelson’s fusion of Marshallian economic theory with that of Keynesian theory – the “neoclassical 
synthesis” as it is often understood – compels me to group together both the neoclassical marginalists and the 
Keynesians as the “mainstream” current (that is, both upholding 1. a form of Say’s law and marginalism and 2. the 
Smithian ‘price trinity’) who either fall on the “demand-side” (heterodox) or the “supply-side” (orthodox) on the 
problems of a capitalist economy. Contrary to these “bourgeois” positions of vulgar subjectivism and price trinities 
is Marx’s socialist position, the only consistent theory of labour value.  
5 Dobb 1973; Heilbroner 1998.  
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outward-facing reality of capitalism wherein economic values, in the form of market prices, are 
actually manifested.6 At this level of analytical abstraction, internally driven economic ‘laws’ 
govern the production of value as well as the distribution of incomes to different classes, while 
revenues accrue to economic actors on the basis of ownership rights. 
Consider the intellectual journey of the revered heterodox economist, Robert Heilbroner, 
who at first refused to look beyond the realm of exchange but eventually realized that exchange 
only represented capitalism’s superficial outward facing reality.7 What concerned him later in his 
life was what had concerned the classical economists – capitalism’s inner essence – the 
‘netherworld in whose grip the capitalist enterprises are caught’ irrespective of their intentions, 
those laws of motion that so many other economists ignore.8 Heilbroner understood that while 
exchange plays a necessary role, it was production and profit at the macro-level that were the 
key variables to laying bare the laws of motion of modern capitalism.  
The marginalist school, divorced from reality as it is, remains at a level of abstraction 
incompatible with a productionist theory of value. When consumption is heralded as the goal of 
production, economic science becomes a science of consumer psychology, one that focuses on 
the point of exchange rather than the point of creation.9 In turn, such upside down “science” 
treats the surface appearance of a commodity’s value (the ‘market-price’) as its essence, while its 
actual social value (its ‘price of production’) is treated as some mysterious and unfathomable 
entity – an entity purely visceral in nature. Through this inversion, a scientific inquiry that 
reflects real social processes is subordinated to a science of personal enrichment and greed, and it 
                                                          
6 Clarke 1982, p. 173. 
7 Heilbroner 1985.   
8 Heilbroner, quoted in Shaikh 2004, p. 2.  
9 Marginalism holds that economic actors make completely informed and rational decisions in the face of perpetual 
scarcity. This myopic presupposition is cemented deep in this perspective and effectively destroys any possibility of 
grasping the totality of the ‘sum of interrelations’ within which individuals endeavor to live.   
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is in this vein that the profit-centered gluttony of capitalist production is transformed into an 
innate attribute of human nature. 10 In his Ph.D. dissertation, Ian Wright makes the point 
eloquently:  
To borrow Marx’s arresting phrase, “every child knows” that marks on a 
ruler measure distance, or a thermometer’s mercury column measures 
temperature, or a clock’s hands represent time. And inquisitive minds, 
before they are socialised to stop worrying about such things, naturally 
ask the value question and enquire about the nature of the numbers they 
find stamped upon the goods they buy and the tokens they carry in their 
pockets. But unlike rulers, thermometers or clocks, few adults have a 
clear and distinct idea of the semantics of monetary phenomena, 
including economists. We therefore disappoint our children. Economic 
science once grappled with the value question but has subsequently 
educated itself to stop asking it. Yet monetary phenomena, from the 
humble penny to the most esoteric financial instruments, control our 
lives in the most fundamental, pervasive and intimate manner. I [Ian 
Wright—JW] believe the value question is therefore important, both 
within economics and the social sciences generally, because economic 
value is ubiquitous yet remains something of a mystery.11 
 
When consumption (exchange) is the sole concern of economic inquiry, there is no need 
to look beyond the surface appearance of the commodity-form because, formulated in prices,  
this is what we (as consumers) directly experience.12 However, the aim of science – that is, the 
penetration of the apparent regularities of observable phenomena to produce generalizable 
conclusions in order to prompt historical foresight – requires precisely the opposite. Indeed, to 
penetrate the “bourgeois veil” of fetishisms, to grasp those internally driven dynamics of the 
modern capitalist system, the ‘value question’ from the standpoint of society as a whole must 
then be plumbed.13 
The classical economists, Smith and Ricardo, both believed in the mutual exchange 
                                                          
10 Engels 1996; Shaikh 1978. 
11 Wright 2015, p.12.  
12 Ibid., pp. 11-13. 
13 Ibid.  
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between capital and labour. Smith was forced to abandon his theory of value because he was 
unable to overcome the ambiguities in his ‘trinity formula’, which he used to explain the so-
called original “sources of value” under capitalism.14 In the end, it was only Ricardo and Marx 
that upheld a theory of value verbatim; however, unlike Ricardo, Marx certainly did not believe 
in the beneficial exchange between capital and labour. His understanding was precisely the 
opposite as so-called mutual class relations were actually exploitative class relations.15  
For Ricardo, a commodity ‘carried with it’ to market the value created by the concrete 
labour-time performed in its production, and consequently values and prices remained 
equivalents in theory. On the other hand, Marx was a dialectician, so magnitudes of value 
systematically deviate from those of prices. Accordingly, the value of a commodity was 
determined by socially necessary labour, labour abstracted from the specific concrete forms it 
takes in production – but this is not some pure abstraction, it was a “real abstraction” based on 
real-life processes. What determined the value of an individual commodity, according to 
Ricardo’s labour theory, was the particular quantity of labour-time required for its production. 
However, according to Marx, the value of a commodity is determined by the proportion of social 
labour allocated by society to its production, including the social labour-time expended for 
subsidiary commodities, together functioning as the commodity’s “center of gravity” around 
which its price oscillates based on market ‘forces’.16 
                                                          
14 Smith’s ‘trinity formula’ (O=r+p+w), see below, is really a dualism because the two components of rent and profit 
are one in the same. In actuality, Smith’s formula is: output = w+p, and thus not triadic like Marx’s.  
15 Wright 2014, pp. 21-24. The classical approach to labour value/theory has generated two so-called but 
nevertheless well-know “errors.” 1) Ricardo’s invariable measure; and 2) Marx’s so-called transformation problem. 
However, once properly categorized, according to Wright, these errors go away. The secret here is in the 
differentiation between total labour costs and technical labour costs. According to Wright, once such an 
asymmetrical dual system approach is addressed by surmounting the ‘category-mistake’, so once the distinction is 
made between the total and the technical labour costs, a “new” more general labour theory of value apparently 
emerges.  
16 Marx 1976, pp. 127-30; Mage 1963, p. 9.  
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As Marx put it in a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann in his attempt to clarify his 
understanding of social exchange-value:  
Every child knows that any nation that stopped working, not for a year, 
but let us say, just for a few weeks, would perish. And every child 
knows, too, that the amounts of products corresponding to the differing 
amounts of needs demand differing and quantitatively determined 
amounts of society's aggregate labour. It is SELF-EVIDENT that this 
necessity of the distribution of social labour in specific proportions is 
certainly not abolished by the specific form [capitalist, etc.] of social 
production; it can only change its form of manifestation [waged, labour-
time]. Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only thing that can 
change, under historically differing conditions, is the form in which those 
laws assert themselves. And the form in which this proportional 
distribution of labour asserts itself in a state of society in which the 
interconnection of social labour expresses itself as the private exchange 
of the individual products of labour, is precisely the exchange value of 
these products.17  
 
When the products of labour are produced for the purposes of private exchange, the measure of a 
commodity’s value, upon which exchange is based, becomes the labour-time socially necessary 
for its production. In this sense, value is understood to be a definite quantitative magnitude that 
limits the value available for representation in such phenomenal categories as aggregate prices, 
profits and wages.18 Thus, value springs from and mediates the social relationships specific to the 
capitalist system, a system in which mental and manual labour and the physical means of 
production are joined together in the creation of commodities that are endowed with social value, 
including surplus-value, and appropriated by capitalists for a profit.19 
Marx replaced Smith’s ‘price trinity’ (i.e., output = profits + rent + wages) with his 
value-theoretic formula (in which the total value of output = constant capital + variable capital + 
surplus-value). In contrast to Smith’s formula, Marx’s economic output was determined by a 
                                                          
17 Marx 1988, p. 68 [emphasis mine and in original].  
18 Smith 2010, Appendix One. 
19 Clarke 1982, p. 76. 
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historically specific set of value relations that incorporates a specific mode of class exploitation. 
Surplus-value – the form taken by the surplus product under capitalism – is concealed by the 
wage-form. Working-class wages are equal to the socially necessary labour required for the 
reproduction of the commodity ‘labour-power’, while surplus-value is equal to the value that 
workers produce beyond such waged remuneration. Put differently, surplus-value is equal to the 
aggregate surplus-labour-time performed by workers as a whole above and beyond the cost of 
their own socially determined needs.20 Surplus-value – in its independent forms of (1) profit of 
enterprise, (2) interest and (3) ground or technological rent, as well as (4) the ‘salaries’ paid by 
capitalists to themselves – is distributed and realized in money-form via the “free-market.”21 
Once the value question has been examined on a serious scientific level and once the 
modern class relations of exploitation are grasped, conclusions about socio-economic processes – 
about the work place, money, price, and economic activity as a whole – shift greatly. The 
culmination of Marx’s value-theoretical analysis of the commodity-form, as organized by Engels 
in Capital III, is the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall: the tendency for the 
proportion of the economy devoted to investment in the means of production (constant capital) to 
increase at a faster rate than the employment of productive wage-labour (variable capital) – the 
latter being the sole source of new and surplus-value. Thus, and contrary to Adam Smith’s notion 
of a benificent ‘invisible hand’, the unintended consequence of the historical development of the 
capitalist profit system – its advancement through the introduction of increasingly sophisticated, 
productivity-enhancing and labour-displacing technologies in the methods of commodity 
production, as promoted by market competition – is an overall reduction in the magnitude of 
                                                          
20 Shaikh 1978, p. 227.  
21 Smith 2018; Mage 1963.  
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surplus-value produced (the very lifeblood of the system) relative to the capital advanced.22  
 An understanding of this perennial capitalist law of motion, a law which Marx regarded 
as the ‘most important law of political economy,’ is essential to grasp the intricacies and 
complexities of the evolving social relations of capitalism and to grasp the contradictory 
trajectory of the capitalist system itself.23 At the very least, all of the classical economists 
recognized the reality of periodic falls in the general rate of profit; it was assumed to be a fact – 
the point, however, was to explain its cause and expose its effects. And this is exactly what Marx 
did.24 
The Road Forward: Political Economy, (Critical) Sociology, and Marx 
The disciplinary scope of classical political economy diverges from that of mainstream 
sociology. In response to the emergence of a plethora of pro-socialist economic theories in the 
19th century, the defenders and proponents of the bourgeois status quo endeavoured to separate in 
analysis the economic from the social in its entirety. Sociology’s origin is a product of this 
disciplinary separation between the political, the economical and the social, and broadly 
speaking takes for granted the ‘social basis’ of wealth by somehow looking “beyond” class 
dynamics onto a moral-/normative-plane of sociocultural critique and subsequent (utopian) 
human emancipation. Against this approach, political economy challenges such conceptions of 
the ‘social basis’ of wealth and concentrates its attention on the process of the socio-economic 
production of the material-natural elements of ‘wealth’ and their distribution between 
determinate classes of people.  
Furthermore, political economy in the Marxian tradition fully rejects the separation 
                                                          
22 Marx 1991, p. 331. 
23 Marx 1973.  
24 Freeman 2015, p.2.  
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between the economic and the social and signifies a return to a focus on capitalism as 
fundamental to socio-economic and political inquiry. As defined by Steven M. Buechler, the 
field of critical sociology is at once dedicated to a ‘critical angle of vision’ (which means to be 
critical of the discipline of sociology itself) and to social progress through human 
emancipation.25 From this point of view, I find Marxian political economy vital to the future 
development of – and fully consistent with – the heterogeneous field of critical sociology.  
The so-called “sympathetic” Marxist author and moral philosopher, Peter Singer, draws 
the conclusion that most of Marx and Engels’ “predictions” of the unpromising future of 
capitalism’s historical development are wrong; and that only the work of Marx the philosopher, 
not Marx the scientist or political economist, endures.26 Curiously, the obvious fact that Marx’s 
science is a direct product of his philosophical commitments somehow eludes Singer. Indeed, if 
his philosophical roots endure, as Singer claims, then so too must Marx’s scientific ‘economics’. 
It was precisely Marx’s scientific discoveries, informed by the materialist dialectic and generated 
through his analysis of the commodity-form, that illuminated the “concealed,” inner laws of 
motion of the capitalist mode of production. The scientific work of the ‘Mature Marx’ exists only 
because of the foundational work of the ‘Young Marx’. Contrary to what many critics assert, the 
greater part of what Marx and Engels wrote about capitalism has indeed come to pass. The two 
centuries of capitalist history that have transpired since Marx’s birth has fully confirmed the 
potency of his historical foresight: 
a) The need to constantly revolutionize the methods of commodity production 
through sophisticated technological innovation, whose principal thrust is 
productivity-enhancing and labour-displacing. Overtime, the ratio of investment 
in labour-power increases at a slower pace than investment in the means of 
                                                          
25 Buechler 2015, p. ix.  
26 Singer 2000, p. 100.  
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production, signifying a rise in the ‘organic composition of capital’. This 
accumulation process leads to the increasing centralization of capital at one pole 
of the class structure and increasing misery for the vast majority of the working 
masses at the other.  
b) The subordination of all things to the imperative of private-profit. The unintended 
consequence of market competition engenders a tendency for the formation of an 
economy-wide general rate of profit, one that tends to decline as the organic 
composition of capital increases. Falling profits generate economic crises (such as 
depressions), stagnant wages and high unemployment – the ‘reserve army of 
labour’ as Marx called the phenomenon, which holds down wages so that profits 
can recover.  
c) Recurrent crises of “overproduction” resulting from falling profitability and the 
need for capital to revitalize the latter at the expense of labour. Such crises then 
force capital to expand across the globe in order to find new avenues of 
exploitation and profit by any and all means deemed necessary. 
d) The increasing obsolescence of the nation-state system and the ubiquitous nature 
of capital as ‘self-expanding value’ as well as the creation of a global division of 
labour.  
These forecasts anticipate the central themes addressed in this study.27 By surveying the 
work of dozens of contemporary Marxist and non-Marxist political economists, and following a 
unique theoretical re-specification of Marx’s value categories, this study contributes to the 
growing yet still-arcane body of literature on Marx’s value theory by revealing the power and 
indispensability of a value-theoretical analysis of the present state of advanced financialized 
capitalism in the “post-war” US economy since 1950. I attempt to show that the contradictions of 
advanced financialized capitalism have not only intensified (despite popular opinion to the 
contrary) but have also culminated in the wake of the ‘Great Stagflation’ of the 1970s in a 
                                                          
27 There have been many studies dedicated to affirming the validity of Marx’s forecasts, see: Smith 1984 for the 
Canadian economy and Roberts 2018 for the US and UK economies. For a reference to Marx and Engels’ prognosis 
of capitalism, see Smith (2010, pp. 61-8) and Mandel (1986). 
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qualitatively “depressed” socio-economic environment from the standpoint of the social capital’s 
valorization requirements. 
While the failures of global capitalism over the “post-war” period can be best accounted 
for and explained within Marx’s theoretical framework, it must still be acknowledged that a great 
diversity exists amongst contemporary Marxist economists concerning the methods that should 
be used to operationalize Marx’s variables. In light of this, it is crucial to explore and clarify the 
theoretical and methodological differences that exist as well as compare the empirical results 
obtained by ostensibly Marxian empirical studies in order to better interpret the world. 
Outline of Chapters 
While chapter one serves as introductory by discussing some of the core concepts of Marx’s 
philosophy and value theory, chapters two and three both act as conceptual “blueprints” 
informing my specification of Marx’s variables in the analysis of the US economy. Chapter two 
is most concerned with contentious debates and theoretical problems concerning Marx’s value 
theory, such as the controversial specification of unproductive expenses; chapter three is devoted 
to methodological and interpretive issues regarding the operationalization of Marx’s concepts for 
purposes of empirical research and the subsequent conclusions drawn from which. Finally, 
chapter four presents my empirical findings twofold: 1) ‘testing’ Marx’s forecasts against the 
evolution of the US capitalist economy between 1950 and 2016; and 2) in the holistic diagnosis 
of its relative performance since the Great Stagflation of the 1970s. 
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Chapter 1 
 
To demonstrate the truly social character of Marx’s work and to grasp the full explanatory power 
of his value-theoretical analysis of capitalist commodity production, I must first begin with a 
discussion of the foundations of his philosophical and theoretical perspectives. Contrary to what 
some have claimed, the “Mature Marx” of Capital never departed from his “younger” 
philosophical standpoint.   
The Point of Departure: Marx’s Philosophy28 
There exist three dominant ontological perspectives: 1) philosophical idealism, 2) philosophical 
materialism and 3) philosophical dualism. Materialism and idealism are straightforward 
opposites, for the former holds that ‘all that exists’ is physical matter, while the latter holds that 
consciousness or mind is the source of ‘all that exists’. Dualism straddles both of these, 
suggesting that reality is divided into two distinct realms: the ideal-spiritual and the material-
natural. At the same time, dualism accepts the metaphysical claim of idealism that ideas can exist 
independently of the material and social circumstances that Marx considers their seedbed. 
 Marx’s philosophical materialism is uniquely distinguished by a dialectical-monistic 
view of the reality constituting the human condition – that reality, encompassing natural, social 
and ideal aspects, is a unified totality grounded on a single substance, namely physical matter. In 
this sense, the natural and the social worlds are distinguishable but not separate – forming 
together interrelated elements of a singular material-world subject to incessant change. Just as 
‘subject and object’ as well as ‘material and ideal’ form contradictory unities of opposites, so too 
do the natural and the social. From this perspective, reality is not a “sum of facts” but a 
                                                          
28 See Smith 2014, chapters 3 and 4. 
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“combination of processes.”29 Thus, to paraphrase Marx, it is life that determines consciousness, 
not the other way around.30  
Furthermore, for Marx the examination and understanding of social reality must be 
grounded in history and in practice. The first historical act is the practical act of humans 
producing their means of subsistence. Before things like art, politics, and sports can be pursued, 
people must eat, drink and acquire shelter. Hence, organized and purposive labour constitutes the 
essence of human existence and therefore of social life itself.31 Labour is the basis of culture just 
as material production is the basis of any growing community or civilization; because without 
the former, the social reproduction of the latter is impossible. Over the course of history, social 
life has been organized around specific property forms and relations that govern the distribution 
of material assets in particular ways. The late Marxist sociologist Erik Olin Wright formulates 
the point succinctly: “what you have determines what you have to do to make a living.”32  
In turn, the social relations of production and reproduction characterize social life in the 
sense that social actors are born into definite property relations, or class relations, which 
organize how they live and how they reproduce the conditions of their existence. The specific 
mode in which social production is carried out depends on the historical form of its existence. 
For instance, in today's capitalist economy the Canadian proletarian has little choice but to sell 
his or her labour power in order to subsist. Some argue that such a claim is “reductionist” 
because it implies that the material edifice of a society is the sole determinant of its history and 
of social actors’ activities.33 But this is nonsense. Such a reductionist claim has no place in 
                                                          
29 Mandel 1986 
30 Marx and Engels 1968, p. 37. 
31 Mohun 1996, p. 204.  
32 Wright, cited in Chibber 2011, p. 63.  
33 Eagleton 2011, p. 121. Also, see chapters 5 and 6.  
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Marx’s theory.  
The ‘economic base and superstructure’ metaphor sketched by Marx in one of his shorter 
works, the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, was never meant to 
suggest a one-way street, where the material edifice of a society mechanically dictates all other 
aspects of that society. Rather, the relationship between the base and the superstructure is a 
dialectical one. All the same, and more often than not, social institutions like education and 
politics are determined by economic forces, even as they evince a unique life of their own. It is 
precisely the dialectical points where the base and superstructure meet, concretely and 
conjuncturally, that shape how they mutually influence one another. In fact, it is not Marx’s 
analysis but capitalism itself that is economically reductionist. With very few exceptions, the 
logic of the capitalist system strictly subordinates everything to the appropriation of private 
profit. It is not Marx that preaches ‘production for the sake of production’ and it is not Marx that 
reduces everything to economics – but it is the capitalists that do so. Marx’s actual view of social 
production and its relationship to ‘extra-economic’ facets of social life was much less myopic 
and far more fruitful than they way it is often portrayed today by his critics. Looking to the 
future, he saw individual acts of transforming reality alongside other social beings – rooted not in 
exploitation and greed, but instead in praxis and community – as an artistic expression of social 
life itself.34 
The Materialist Conception of History  
Marx came to his theory of history by studying two influential 19th century thinkers: G.W.F 
Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach.35 Marx believed that Hegel’s dialectic effectively “bridged the 
                                                          
34 Marx 1897.  
35 Hegel’s dialectical idealism is often mistakenly presented as: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. But this latter ‘triad’ 
actually belongs to Fichte, not to Hegel. The triad that most interested Hegel was that of universality, particularity 
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gap” between ‘what is and what ought to be.’ Marx also believed that Feuerbach’s 
‘contemplative materialism’ signalled a significant advancement in philosophical thought at the 
time, even if it was fundamentally ahistorical and static. Marx, therefore, looked to ‘open up’ 
Feuerbach’s static materialism, extending it beyond the critique of religion into a critique of all 
that exists. After all, unlike Feuerbach’s, Marx’s ‘sensuous materialism’ saw that “‘religious 
sentiment’ is itself a social product.”36 Human history was not static but dynamic. And through 
this framework Marx sought to extract the “rational kernel” from the “mystical shell” of Hegel’s 
dialectical-idealism, “turning it right side up.”37 Once the mystical shell was stripped away, what 
remained was its essence, the ‘materialist dialectic’ – better known as historical materialism, its 
scientific counterpart. Marx’s discovery was that history unfolded as a succession of different 
modes of production; successive epochs in ‘the economic formation of society’ can be divided 
into distinct historical periods characterized by economic dynamics rooted in specific relations of 
production and reproduction.38 
The crude “historical materialism” of Stalin naturalized the ‘laws of social development’ 
known to socialists by privileging technical change within a single nation in the effort to justify 
the doctrine of ‘building socialism in one country’. In doing so, such a mechanical perspective 
transformed the economic-base and superstructure relationship into a one-way street, effectively 
reducing the ‘social’ to the ‘natural’ and thereby denying it is humans – ‘real living individuals’ 
– who are the true subjects of history.39 In a letter to Bloch, Engels emphasized that ‘economics’ 
is by no means the only determining factor in the historical process:  
                                                          
and individuality, one that was transformed by Marx into the natural, the social and conscious activity (see Smith 
2014, pp. 129-140).  
36 Marx 1989 [1845]. 
37 Marx 1975, p. 103.  
38 Chibber 2011.  
39 Fine and Saad-Alfredo 2004. 
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According to the materialist view of history, the determining factor in 
history is, in the final analysis, the production and reproduction of actual 
life. More than that was never maintained either by Marx or myself. Now 
if someone distorts this by declaring the economic moment to be the only 
determining factor, [that person] changes that proposition into a 
meaningless, abstract, ridiculous piece of jargon.40 
 
Material conditions may primarily determine human consciousness, yet the material 
conditions themselves are ever-changing throughout history. Through the act of labouring, 
through social production, humans continually alter their own surroundings, and, in turn, this 
alteration changes the humans themselves.41 Again, the social and the economic are interrelated 
elements of a unified totality, a singular material-world, not divided into separate realms. In the 
end, treating ‘the ideal’ as something mystical and non-material downplays the role of humans’ 
‘conscious activity’ – their creative praxis – relative to ‘objective forces’ and pushes ‘real living 
individuals’ into the backdrop of history. After all, humans make their own history, but only on 
the basis of the material circumstances set in place by the past.42  
The Road Less Traveled: Marx’s Value Theory  
There exists a great literary diversity between various Marxist and non-Marxist theoreticians, 
revolutionaries and scholars of all kinds concerning the “correct” way to interpret Marx. Yet, my 
concern here is simply understanding Marx on his own terms. While an assessment of the 
various interpretations of Marx’s value and crisis theory is beyond the scope of this chapter, a 
preliminary review of it is a necessary preparation for the forthcoming chapters.43 
                                                          
40 Engels 2001, p. 34. 
41 Fine and Saad-Filho 2004. 
42 Marx 1970b, p. 103. 
43 Interpretations of Marx’s value theory that I recommend are Mandel’s two-part treatise on Marxist economic 
theory (1968), Fine and Saad-Filho’s companion guide to Marx’s Capital (published in 2004 and again in 2010), and 
Smith’s forthcoming Invisible Leviathan, second edition (2018).  
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While it is somewhat apparent that the capitalist mode of production is a mode of 
generalized commodity production, it is far less apparent that it is also the first mode of 
production in which labour-power itself becomes, on a wide-scale, a commodity that is bought 
and sold on the market; a commodity, moreover, that can produce additional value beyond its 
own initial worth. This point is key to understanding Marx’s theory of surplus-value. 
To begin, a commodity can be defined as an object, thing or effect with some sort of 
usefulness and that is exchangeable in a market. This is captured in Adam Smith’s famous 
presentation of the dual character of the commodity-form of the product of labour: that it has 
both a ‘use-value’ and an ‘exchange value’. Marx saw that use-values are infinitely variable and 
cannot be quantified; however this was not true for exchange-values. Although some use-values 
are purely products of nature and are not presented at first as commodities, this makes little 
overall difference in the end because objects are exchanged as equivalents in the market. And 
they are exchanged as equivalents only because of an age-old, extended and generalized social 
exchange process that has unfolded throughout human history.44 Thus, the question for Marx was 
on the basis of what types of relationships and by what metrics are such equivalent, 
exchangeable values to be understood.45 
As stated earlier, the products of human labour are the foundation of human life. It takes 
little thought to realize that if everyone ceased working what would remain would be a ghost 
town – this is the ubiquitous ‘law of labour value’.46 Without first the performance of social 
labour, simple commodity production would never have emerged; and without simple 
commodity production, capitalist commodity production would never have emerged. Initially, 
                                                          
44 Delgado 2018, pp. 114-17 (unpublished).  
45 Fine and Saad-Filho 2004, pp. 15-20.  
46 Smith 2018, p. 81.  
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commodities are exchanged based on approximate perceptions of the expenditure of concrete 
labour-time. Then a universal equivalent emerges (a precious metal like gold) that represents 
quantities of value, produced and exchanged, based on the relative costs of production. Finally, 
as this social exchange process continues to evolve and as commodities grow into fetishized 
objects of value, ‘money-price’ reigns supreme as a ‘cash economy’ surfaces.47 
Once the productive forces of any society advance beyond the capabilities of a mere 
subsistence economy, this permits the development of a surplus and with this a dominant social 
class (“propertied” or ruling class) emerges that controls it. The emergence of a surplus – or, the 
surplus product, which is equal to what society as a whole produces minus the cost of producing 
it – was at first driven by environmental adversities and the need to create a reserve fund to 
ensure the security and well-being of the community as a whole. But with the rise of a surplus-
appropriating ruling class, and eventually a process of value expansion under capitalism, surplus 
production acquired an entirely new significance and logic.48  
In a society dominated by exchange, where exchange is ubiquitous (as in capitalist 
society) commodities are produced to be exchanged in the market for the purposes of private 
profit. No one enters the market to willingly get “ripped off” but rather to exchange to benefit 
both parties; or, in other words, to obtain something, something of equal value must be lost. This 
is the law of the exchange of equivalents. If y equals x then 5y exchanges for 5x; and if 1e is 
equal to 5x then 1e exchanges for 5x and 5y exchanges for 1e and so on and so forth. But what 
exactly acts as the metric that this exchange of equivalents revolves around? Perhaps, weight? 
But the weight of a commodity, for example, cannot indicate very much as the heaviest of 
                                                          
47 Marx 1976, p. 167, 185. Following the emergence of a “cash economy” is the acute financialization on the value-
expansion process.  
48 See José María Delgado’s hopefully soon to be published book Fundamentals of the Genesis and Development of 
the Social World. Here, I adhere to Monopoly Capital’s definition of surplus: see Baran and Sweezy (1963, p. 9). 
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objects would be the most valuable, and the lightest the cheapest. If it were weight, then the 
average motor vehicle’s cost would be roughly the same as 300 planks of lumber or 2000 cotton 
shirts.49 Obviously, if the weight of a motor vehicle changes, its value does not change. Its value 
does change however if the way in which it has been produced has become increasingly 
automated, requiring the expenditure of less living-labour-power and a greater contribution from 
accumulated ‘dead’ labour in the form of machinery in the production process. Its price becomes 
inflated as a result of the additional labour-power expended in its advertising as well as 
associated financial loaning schemes, driving up stocks, etc.; and the price of one motor vehicle 
compared to another fluctuates based on both production and market conditions. 
It is well known that Marx defined the two fundamental classes under the capitalist mode 
of production that form its essential social relations of value production and reproduction: the 
bourgeoisie (capitalists) as the ruling-class minority and the proletariat (wage labourers) as the 
working-class majority. He also made the critical distinction that workers, who have little to no 
other choice, enter the market to sell as a commodity, not the labour they perform, but their 
capacity to work: their labour-power.50 Due to the ontological uniqueness of the commodity 
labour-power, it is the only commodity with the potential to create additional value beyond its 
own exchange-value, and this ability to generate surplus-value is precisely its use-value to the 
capitalist.51 Due to this exploitative class relation, which is concealed by the ‘wage-form’, wage-
workers receive only a portion of the value they produce for their employers. Thus, surplus-value 
is equal to the labour performed during the ‘unpaid’ portion of the work day.  
                                                          
49 The cost of the average car in the US is roughly $25,000, while 300 2x4 lumber planks (300 x 3) is $900 and 2000 
emblemed T-shirts (2000 x 50) is $100,000. All of these have roughly the same weight at an average weight of 
4,000lbs.  
50 See Marx 1976, chapter 1.  
51 Fine and Saad-Filho 2004, p. 37.  
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In Capital Marx proved that social exchange-value emerges as a quantitative relation 
between classes and individuals in the market with ‘socially necessary abstract-labour time’ as 
the measure of value and money as its necessary form. The renowned Marxist economist, Anwar 
Shaikh, expresses Marx’s paramount discovery as follows: 
In Volume I Marx demonstrates that a surplus product can arise only if 
workers as a whole work more hours in a given day than it takes for 
them to produce the goods they themselves consume and goods needed 
to replace those used up the production process. It is the surplus labour 
time of workers over and above that necessary for them to maintain 
themselves and the productive system, which provides the surplus 
product [in the form of surplus-value] appropriated by the capitalist 
class.52 
 
The Circuit of Capital as Value in Motion 
Marx began his examination of capitalism with a consideration of its basic ‘cell’ form: the 
commodity-form. In the dialectical tradition followed by Marx, the method of investigation 
flows from its object. By analyzing value as a historically specific representation of social labour 
he was able to disclose that “netherworld” of the capitalist system. Accordingly, the opening 
passage to the first volume of Capital reads: 
The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production 
prevails appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities’; the 
individual commodity appears as its elementary form. Our investigation 
therefore begins with the analysis of the commodity.53 
 
The easiest way to portray the phenomenon of capitalist commodity production as a 
whole is to refer to the economic ‘circuits’ expounded by Marx in Capital I. Long before the 
emergence of capitalist exploitation, simple commodity production and exchange existed. The 
small-scale dynamic of ‘simple commodity production’ is represented by the economic circuit:  
                                                          
52 Shaikh 1978, p. 227. 
53 Marx 1976, p. 125. 
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C – M – C 
Here, C represents commodity, M money, and C a different commodity. A commodity is 
produced and sold for money by a small-scale producer, who then purchases a different 
commodity with the money earned. This is essentially an equivalent exchange process between 
small producers, where through their own individual or familial labours, the commodity 
producers earn an income adequate to meet their basic needs. Profit is not the goal of this circuit; 
rather it is consumption This process is about producing and selling commodities in order to buy 
and consume other commodities. As capitalist commodity production emerges, a new circuit 
becomes apparent and the goal of this circuit is radically different. Money profit, not 
consumption or the satisfaction of needs, becomes paramount. Hence: 
M – C – M^ 
The ‘circuit of capital’ is represented here by M (money-capital), C (commodity), and M^ 
(enlarged money-capital). In this sense, surplus-value is created through the enlargement of M 
into M^.54 In order to more precisely locate the origins of surplus-value, Marx expanded the M – 
C –M^ circuit as follows: 
M – C< LMP … P … C^ – M^ 
In this ‘expanded circuit of capital’ Marx adds into the formula the following elemenst: 
the commodity-input labour-power (LP), which is the worker’s capacity to labour during the 
work-day; the commodity input ‘means of production’ (MP), including machinery, tools, 
structures, raw materials, fuel, etc.; the production process (P), in which LP goes to work on MP; 
commodity-output or commodity-capital (C^), now endowed with the surplus-value generated in 
P, which therefore represents a greater sum of value than the original inputs; and finally, the 
                                                          
54 Marx 1992, p. 109.  
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enlarged money-capital (M^) that is realized in the market when and if the commodity output is 
sold at its value. The difference between the original M and M^ is surplus-value.55 As a result, 
the circuit can not be effectively completed in order to reproduce itself unless commodity-capital 
is realized in price form as money-capital.56 
Marx’s value-theoretic formulation of the sum of the total value produced is:  
O = c+v+s. 
Here, total economic output (O) is the sum of the three fundamental flows of value: constant 
capital (c), variable capital (v) and surplus-value (s). Referring back to the circuit of capital – the 
costs of LP to the capitalist, the productive wage-bill, is v; the value of the MP which is 
consumed during P is c; the surplus-labour performed that endows C with an increment, is s. 
Constant capital, at this level of theoretical abstraction, refers to the total value of the 
means of production consumed in a production cycle: raw materials, fixed capital depreciation, 
fuel, and so on, inputs that undergo no quantitative alteration in value during the production 
process.57 There is a great difference between stocks and flows of value, however. On the one 
hand, ‘fixed capital stock’ (fixed constant capital indicated by a capitalized C) represents the 
‘relatively enduring’ productive powers of the social capital. On the other, the constant capital 
flow refers to circulating elements that are consumed in the production process but whose value 
is preserved and transferred to the new output. More generally, the constant capital flow may be 
said to encompass all of the non-productive-labour costs of production and reproduction 
(indicated by a lower-case c). 
                                                          
55 Marx 1992, p. 159.  
56 Marx 1992, pp. 110-117. Moreover, the ‘– ‘represent transfers of value while the ‘…’ represent stages or pauses 
within the production process in which labour and capital come together in the production of commodities for 
surplus-value.  Furthermore, a more illustrative circuit of capital follows: M – C [(c+v)] (MP + L) … P … C^ [s] – 
M^ [realization].  
57 Marx 1976, p. 317. 
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Variable capital (v) is a flow of new value which is produced by human labour, or more 
specifically, productive living-labour (see the next chapter for the distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour). Variable capital is defined as the social cost needed to reproduce 
aggregate productive labour-power: it being equal to the wage-bill of productive workers. Marx 
considered the capital invested to employ productive workers as variable because it alone can 
create more value than it represents at the beginning of production 
In sum, productive living-labour (v) is the source of all new value under capitalism. 58 
The realization of commodity prices (rooted in the sphere of exchange) is not necessarily an 
automatic process, but it is a necessary step in order for expanded reproduction to take place. 
Before I progress further, however, let me briefly illustrate the phenomenon of capitalist 
production by looking at two hypothetical sectors of a capitalist economy. Both sector A and 
sector B begin with a total capital of 440 and produce an annual output of 40 each. 
Sector A: 40 
C= 300 V = 80 S = 60 
Sector B: 40 
C= 300 V = 80 S = 60 
 
The total capital across the economy in this example is 880 and total output is 80. This 
means that the unit-price is equal to 11 (i.e., 880/80 = 11). Each sector therefore realizes (40x11) 
commodities at a total of 440 and therefore possesses a profit rate of 15.7 percent (i.e., (440-
380)/380). Another way of looking at this is if r=s/(c+v) then: 60/[300+80] = 15.7.  
                                                          
58 Many empirical studies have verified the strength of the labour theory of value core postulate that living labour is 
the sole source of all new value, indeed proving that the great majority of costs can still be reduced to those of 
labour. For one strong example, see Shaikh 1994: The Empirical Strength of the Labour Theory of Value.  
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Normally, the costs associated with wages (v) are not included in the denominator of the 
Marxian rate of profit (r). Because we are working at the level of individual sectors of the 
economy, however, and not looking at the economy as a whole, it can be appropriate to include 
variable capital in the denominator for this example.  
Nevertheless, to further illustrate this process in a competitive market environment and 
how it impacts profitability, let us say to capture a greater portion of the market that sector A 
innovates (*) the following year and B does not. 
Sector A*: output now at 50. 
C= 340 V = 80 S = 60 
Sector B: output remains at 40. 
C= 300 V = 80 S = 60 
 
The total capital is now 920, and total output is 90 between these two sectors. The unit-price is 
now 10.2 (920/90 = 10.2). As A* realizes (50x10.2) 510 and B realizes (40x10.2) 408, B’s profit 
rate falls to 7.3 percent ((408-380)/380); meanwhile, the profit rate of A* has actually risen from 
15.7 to 21 percent ((510-420)/420) despite the fact that its technological composition also 
increased.59 Thus, through productive innovation which increases turnovers, output, travel-speed, 
etc., one capital – not unlike whole nations’ social capitals – is able to increase their profit rate at 
the expense of another. However, if the economy-wide technological composition of capital 
increases, then profitability across the board will fall according to Marx’s law.  
                                                          
59 Carchedi n.d. Other things being equal, if the technological composition of a capital increases, its rate of profit 
falls. The technological composition (C/v) for sector A was 3.75. Following innovation, however, sector A*’s rose 
to 4.25, and because the rate of exploitation (s/v) remained equal at .75, A*’s rate of profit should have fallen, as per 
Marx’s law. This is one simple illustration of the value-theoretic and the contradiction which exists between the 
micro and the macro level in regard to the actuality of Marx’s law and its impact on individual capitals compared to 
the economy as a whole.  
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Theories of Crisis and Marx’s “Famous Law” 
The most popular marginalist currents of the past half-century, the orthodox “supply side” and 
the heterodox “demand-side,” either uphold or reject Say’s Law.60 Say’s Law states that the 
production of a given quantity of commodities leads to the creation of enough income to 
purchase those same commodities (i.e., supply generates its own demand).61 At the level of the 
whole economy, the “supply-side” orthodoxy believes that economic growth under capitalism is 
driven by “the profit-maximizing utilization of the stock of capital and the full employment of 
the stock of labour.”62 In this framework, economic crises cannot be the result of 
“overproduction.” If supply fails to keep up with demand, crises must then be the result of a 
rising strength of labour that squeezes profits. This rather unscientific and ideological outlook 
understands that profits are the lifeblood of capitalism, but they paradoxically conceive profit – 
at least at the macro-level – as something virtually erased by unknown and inexorable economic 
forces.63 Indeed, profit is conceived not as an economic ‘surplus’ at all, but rather as a ‘return’ on 
capitalist risk-taking. 
At the same level of abstraction, the “demand-side” heterodoxy believes that economic 
growth under capitalism is driven by aggregate investment and consumption.64 In this sense, a 
crisis of “overproduction” occurs because there is deficient ‘effective demand’ (i.e., a lack of 
aggregate purchasing power backed by money in the hands of consumers). In other words, this is 
an underconsumptionist theory of crisis because it posits that demand fails to keep up with 
supply. 
                                                          
60 Foley 1985. 
61 Smith 2018, p. 256.  
62 Shaikh 2016, pp. 615-16 
63 See Obrinsky 1983.  
64 Shaikh 2016, p. 616.  
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Both the supply-side and the demand-side of this debate lack an adequate theory of 
macro-profits, instead conceiving prices as a natural consequence of exchange relations in a state 
of constant equilibrium. This is done by upholding i) the Smithian ‘price trinity’ (see the 
preface), ii) a version of Say’s Law that treats the income paid to workers (in the wage-form) as 
equal to the total value they produce.65 
While Marx recognized that capitalism was the first mode of production struck by 
recurrent crises of “overproduction,” he saw that such crises take on a contradictory form where 
too many use-values are produced relative – not to ‘effective demand’ – but to the production of 
exchange-values. In other words, because the production process becomes overwhelmingly 
dominated by ‘dead labour’ in the form of contants capital, commodities contain less and less 
surplus value.. While fully rejecting Say’s law, Marx held an understanding of capitalist crisis 
that is actually underproductionist – that is, crises are rooted in the underproduction of adequate 
volumes of surplus-value relative to capital invested. His analysis revealed that at its core 
capitalist crisis involves a ‘crisis of valorization’ rather than a ‘crisis of realization’, which exists 
primarily at the level of individual firms and refers to the realizability of set prices.66  
These considerations bring us to Marx’s famous law of the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall (LTRPF). It proceeds as follows: on the micro-level, competition between individual 
capitalist firms in the market compels each of them to reduce costs per unit of output by 
increasing the technological composition of their capitals through the introduction of 
sophisticated, productivity-enhancing technologies that displace living labour. While this 
benefits individual capitals, on the macro-level this translates into the wide-spread displacement 
                                                          
65 Obrinsky 1983, p. 3.  
66 For empirical verification that the problems of capitalism are rooted in a crisis of valorization and not in a lack of 
demand, or a ‘crisis of price realization’, refer to the figure in Appendix B.a. 
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of living-labour from the production process, thereby reducing the amount of new and surplus-
value added to the economy.67 So, in turn, the same dynamics that bring about an accelerated 
accumulation of capital and therefore an increase in the total mass of surplus-value also produce 
a tendential fall in the average rate of profit because there is a tendency for the ratio of ‘dead-‘ to 
‘living-labour’ to rise over time.  
The rate at which this valorization process is carried out – that is, the rate of return on 
capital invested – is indicated by the quantitative value-ratio formulated as total surplus-value 
over total investment in the stock of constant capital. This is the Marxian ‘average rate of profit’ 
(in value terms: r or ARP = s/C).68 And the contradiction between the forces and the relations of 
capitalist production – hence, the root of capitalist crisis – is expressed through fluctuations in 
the quantitative value-ratio: the ‘value composition of capital’ (in value terms: VCC = C/v) and 
the ‘organic composition of capital’ (in value terms: OCC = C/s+v). 
The ‘Countertendencies’  
According to Marxist theory, the average rate of profit will fluctuate greatly overtime due to 
various ‘countervailing forces’ or countertendencies. Marx suggested that it will recover 
primarily by means of the destruction/devaluation of capital as a result of economic crises, but 
over a long period, at least globally, it will still evince a secular downward trend.69 This implies 
that economic slumps will worsen insofar as capitalism itself suffers from a long-term malaise, 
and in response to such malaise new mitigating factors will need to be introduced (e.g., reduced 
wages and/or living standards, financialization and consumer debt) as periods of prosperity 
                                                          
67 If productivity growth in computers had been completely absent, productivity growth would have declined since 
1980. Industries that increase computer usage, do this by substituting away from employment and wages So as high-
wage workers use more computers, etc., this is done only at the expense of employing less low-skilled and low wage 
workers. See Lee and Shin 2018. 
68 Marx 1992, p. 355. 
69 Smith 2010, p. 52-54. 
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become less and less robust. It is precisely the existence of these countertendencies that there is a 
tendency for the average rate of profit to decline to begin with because without it would decline 
precipitously.70 And this is precisely the reason why the countertendencies must be considered 
when looking at the LTRPF.  
Marx’s law can be attenuated or even arrested by any of the following countertendencies 
which serve to undermine a rise in the ‘organic composition of capital’: 1) increasing the 
intensity of the exploitation of the workforce; 2) reducing wages below their value, which is only 
a short-lived phenomenon; 3) the cheapening of the elements of production; 4) relative 
overpopulation; and 5) foreign trade.71 Other things like imperial war for example can lead to a 
recovery in one nations’ profit rate at the expense of another nations’. 
Under capitalism, there is a tendency for the ‘value composition of capital’ (VCC = C/v) 
to rise, increasing productivity and output but reducing profitability because investment in the 
means of production (C) is rising faster than in productive labour-power (v), the latter being the 
source of surplus-value (s). A counter-tendential rise in the ‘rate of surplus-value’ (RSV = s/v) 
can lead to a recovery in profitability if it rises faster than the VCC. But there are finite limits to 
surplus-value extraction, such as the length of the work-day and the fact that exploitation leads to 
worker resistance. But in the end if the ‘organic composition of capital’ rises (OCC = C/s+v) – 
whose formula captures the production of surplus-value – the rate of profit will fall, other things 
being equal. Marx’s rather correct prognosis concerning capitalism’s historical trajectory is 
                                                          
70 Marx 1992, p. 349; Kliman 2011. Moreover, this should not be taken as fatalistic. Marx’s LTRPF is not meant to 
imply that the system will necessarily collapse. But rather that the system is fundamentally geared to continuously 
“shoot itself in the foot” – that the class struggle leads to proletarian revolution. 
71 Smith 2010, pp. 54-55.  
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fundamentally rooted in his understanding of a falling ARP accompanied by a rising OCC. By 
the end of the present study, this essential point will become much more evident.  
Marx asserted that falling profitability is an indirect cause of, and overcome by, 
capitalism’s crisis tendency.72 This is what Marx referred to as the ‘devaluation or destruction of 
capital’ and it is the chief consequence of economic crises. This devaluation happens through 
falling profits and rising debts, rising unemployment and widespread bankruptcies where strong 
businesses purchase cheap assets from other failed businesses.73 It also occurs through the 
destruction of physical capital, such as during war; but also during recessions and depressions as 
machines, tools and various inputs lay idle, deteriorate and becomes obsolete.74  
None of this means that a falling rate of profit is fully nullified by any of the 
countertendencies, nor does it mean that there has been a sufficient recovery in the ARP at some 
point in time contrary to a long-term secular decline.75 It just means that any rigours rate of profit 
study by any serious Marxist must look at the countertendencies as well as other exogenous 
factors, such as geopolitical struggle, the tax-rate, financial (de)regulation, and so on.  
Conclusion 
To further exemplify the failures of the mainstream economic current, failures which stem from 
their theories of value/price and capitalist crisis, take for instance the vulgarities of the 
neoclassical, Knut Wicksell. In the late 1800s, Wicksell envisioned a future capitalist world 
where landlords hire capitalists and workers, where capitalists hire workers and landlords, and 
                                                          
72 Kliman 2011. 
73 Moseley 2000.  
74 To get what they are worth per annum, and to ensure longevity, machines, tools and various material inputs 
require continuous use and maintenance or they cease working properly. For example, if you leave a parked vehicle 
for too long it will deteriorate and eventually cease functioning. It rusts, the computer system fails, the battery dies, 
the oil cakes, the exhaust system leaks and so on and so forth.   
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where workers somehow possess the ability to hire at a whim both capitalists and landlords.76 
Unsurprisingly, Wicksell’s rather naïve prognosis about the evolution of the capitalist profit 
system never came to fruition. Or, take the dubious economism of Keynes himself writing in 
1930 that with little assistance capitalism’s historical mission (its evolution due to technological 
advancement set in motion by market competition) would force down the average work-week to 
15-hours by the turn of the century.77 Like Wicksell, Keynes’ predictions have yet to pass – and 
just like Wicksell, “Lord Keynes” is never judged on his rather egregious and obviously failed 
predictions. On the contrary, however, Marx’s empirically verifiable forecasts appear to have 
stood the test of time. Yet, similar to the likes of Wicksell and Keynes, Marx is rarely judged on 
the grounds of his predictions.  
Nevertheless, some believe that Marx abandoned the LTRPF in the later part of his life 
due to some so-called inconsistency with the labour theory of value. But, there exists 
considerable evidence which confirms Marx’s fidelity to both empirical inquiry and the LTRPF 
itself. Most notably, recent evidence has emerged that it was actually in the attempt to improve 
Marx’s prose which inadvertently downplayed the significance of the presence of the ‘law itself’ 
compared to the countertendencies as Engels compiled and edited Capital II and III.78 For Marx, 
the law remained imperative to the overall critique of capitalism and is a historically specific 
expression of the central proposition of historical materialism: that every mode of production 
emerges to further develop the productive forces of society and only when it can no longer fulfill 
this task then a different and higher mode of production arises.79  
The law demonstrates the historical limitations of the capitalist market system: that this 
                                                          
76 Obrinsky 1983, p. 48.  
77 Keynes 1930, p. 5. 
78 Roberts 2018b, pp. 23-25. 
79 Mage 1963. 
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anarchistic and malicious system of commodity production for private profit is to be eventually 
transformed and replaced in full – through revolution spearheaded by the working-class – with 
an egalitarian and socialized global system tailored to meeting the basic needs of all. In turn, 
such internationalized socialist system with production reorganized on a global scale – and 
where the combined productive powers of society become the ‘real wealth of individuals’ as 
disposable free time replaces the private possession of abstract labour-time – forges the 
necessary objective social conditions for the eventual emergence of a classless borderless 
communist utopia.80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Smith 2010, p. 4.  
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Chapter 2: A Theoretical Survey of Various Issues in the Field of Marxist Political 
Economy 
 
In order to ‘test’ the empirical actuality of Marx’s value-theoretical analysis, it is crucial to 
engage with his concepts at a serious theoretical level. As theory informs practice, meaning that 
the way that Marx is interpreted directly informs how his concepts are used for purposes of 
empirical analysis. This chapter presents a theoretical survey of the relevant literature pertaining 
to various issues, perspectives and approaches to operationalizing Marx’s concepts as empirical 
variables today. For reasons regarding length, simplicity and clarity, I refrain from reviewing 
anything extensively algebraic or theoretical (like the so-called “transformation problem”).81 
Instead, I engage in a brief survey which focuses on some common (but important) 
misconceptions within the heterogeneous field of Marxian political economy. While the previous 
chapter was introductory, this chapter as well as the following chapter can be understood as 
conceptual “blueprints” indicative of the theoretical justification for how I specify Marx’s 
variables as found in the fourth chapter of this study.  
This chapter is divided into four principal sections. The tenacious effect of a declining 
average rate of profit on a capitalist economy cannot be overstated. For this reason, I begin by 
first discussing the role of the average rate of profit for the ‘social capital’ as the analytical 
bedrock to a Marxist-fundamentalist examination of any capitalist valorization process. The 
second section challenges the hegemony of ‘neoliberal financialization’ by introducing the 
                                                          
81 The so-called “transformation problem” – that is, the transformation of values into money-prices – has been 
debated exhaustingly by non-Marxists (primarily, by neo-Sraffian economists) and defenders of Marx’s value 
theory. This so-called “problem” is inherently anti-dialectical, shown to involve a methodological individualism that 
disregards micro-macro as well as production-circulation contradictions, and a non-temporalist, pure equilibrium 
model. For a rigorous defence of Marx’s value theory see: Moseley’s new 2016 book and, notably, Kliman 2007.  
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concept of fictitious capital and its adverse effect on the economy – that is to say, so-called 
“profits” associated with financial markets that falsely represent newly produced surplus-value. 
The third section reviews Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism and applies it to various 
“physicalist” and “individualist” elucidations of Marx’s analysis of the commodity-form. And 
finally, the fourth section discusses the widely debated concept of ‘unproductive labour’ (such as 
circulation, commercial, and state expenses) under contemporary capitalism and its place in 
Marx’s theory.  
The Average Rate of Profit and the Social Capital 
The average rate of profit is a broad profitability measurement that spans across the different 
industries and branches of a given nation’s capitalist economy, or, rather, a given ‘social 
capital’.82 An industry or branch that invests in innovative technologies that increases production 
power while reducing labour-costs has a high ‘organic composition of capital’. Such “high-
octane” and technologically sophisticated capitals are able to out-perform their less sophisticated 
competitors in the market by lowering the costs of production and increasing market share, 
permitting them to capture a portion of surplus-value that was produced elsewhere in the 
economy.83 This is because each firm does not receive in return all the surplus-value generated 
by the exploitation of the workers that it employs but receives instead only a particular 
proportion of the total mass of surplus-value (drawn even from the global pool of surplus-value) 
based on its ‘organic composition of capital’ (OCC). In turn, this leads to the formation of an 
average or general rate of profit across the economy as a whole. Otherwise know as the theory of 
the equalization of profit rates through market competition – that is, the redistribution of surplus-
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value among competing firms, both productive and unproductive firms, and the realization of 
surplus-value in price-form.84 
While the scope of Marx’s critical inquiry led him down various avenues of theoretical 
and empirical exploration, he was ultimately concerned with viewing capitalism as a totality, as a 
perpetual valorization process driven by the profit motive: from the banks and production to 
circulation, to consumption and back to production to start over again.85 A great deal of Marxian 
political economy today explores alternative ways to measure aggregate profitability in order to 
analyze capitalism and ‘test’ Marx’s forecasts. Yet, some have found it useful to abstract from 
certain spheres of the economy, either due to a lack of available data or to examine the economic 
phenomena of their choice, or, perhaps, they decide to abstract from certain spheres because that 
is where their interpretation of Marx directs them.  
For the heterodox political economists and value theorists who belong to the Marxist-
fundamentalist camp, they are most committed to an analysis of capitalism that is predicated on 
Marx’s fundamental value categories and value ratios. It should be noted that this understanding 
of “fundamentalism” is not the religious type and has nothing to do with parochiality. But, it is 
simply a dedication to Marx’s fundamental analysis of the value-form in order to strengthen the 
analysis of the value-magnitude.86 In this vein, the Marxist-fundamentalist camp upholds two 
core postulates. First, that a falling average rate of profit (ARP) must be accompanied by an 
economy-wide rising organic composition of capital (OCC); in this sense, the ARP functions as 
                                                          
84 Marx 1991. Furthermore, Marx often referred to the profit rate of all capitals as the ‘general rate of profit’ or 
capitalism’s ‘general law’.  
85 Hegel’s influence over Marx is overwhelmingly apparent, as the Hegelian tradition states: “The truth is the 
whole.”  
85 Smith 2018, p. 123.  
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an indirect cause of capitalist crisis and recovers primarily by way of recurrent crisis via the 
destruction of capital. Second, that Marx’s historical-materialist method and his critique of 
commodity fetishism are of central importance to any serious study of capitalist production 
conducted à la Marx.87  
Nonetheless, some ostensible Marxists claim to adhere to the fundamentalist camp but 
think it necessary to abstract from finance capital by conducting a ‘non-financial’ ARP 
measurement.88 In their eyes, this procedure is justified due to the proliferation of financial 
profits over the past 30 to 40 years as a result of the widespread expansion of debt. As these 
fictitious “profits” are problematically aggregated in the US National Income Accounts (NIA) 
along with corporate profits, falsely representing newly produced surplus-value. From the 
standpoint of the system as a whole, however, the credit system is a necessary component of a 
capitalist economy and therefore by abstracting from finance one abstracts from viewing 
capitalism as a totality.  
Some ostensible fundamentalists also believe that abstracting from commercial, 
circulation and government is also necessary in order to ‘test Marx’.89 By abstracting from these 
‘unproductive’ sectors of the economy this procedure measures the ARP on ‘productive capital’ 
alone. After all, the analysis of the struggle over production is the beginning point of all Marxian 
analysis; and after all, it is ‘productive capital’ where surplus-value is first extracted from 
workers. But again, it is impossible for surplus-value to be realized and then reinvested back into 
production to begin again unless the bearers of value (the commodities) are transported, stocked 
and shelved, and finally sold to consumers. And just because production is the starting point to a 
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88 See Shaikh 2010 and Smith and Butovsky 2018. 
89 Or, by treating all labour as productive of surplus-value. See Laibman 1991. 
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Marxian analysis does not mean it is adequate in itself. Because the circulation/realization 
process is a necessary component of the system, by abstracting from it once again one abstracts 
from viewing capitalism as a totality. In order to adequately ‘test Marx’ and adhere to the 
fundamental premise of a falling ARP accompanied by an economy-wide rising OCC, one must 
therefore look to an ARP measurement for the ‘social capital whole’.90  
The ARP can be best defined as the division of the total amount of surplus-value, 
produced by the collective exploitation of the work-force, by the total amount of social capital.91 
In this sense, the ‘social capital’ is the aggregate relationship between constant capital and 
variable capital (c:v), encompassing a valorization process on part of all the necessary spheres of 
capitalist production and reproduction across a given capitalist nation.92 The social capital takes 
on the appearance of a nation-state and is also protected by the nation-state system, all nations’ 
social capitals forming the global capital. Often one nation’s social capital will attempt to profit 
off another – such as prying, pillaging, or going to war with other nations – all in search for new 
avenues of profit at the expense of other nations’ ARP: this is imperialism. For the purpose of 
this study, it should be understood as a general “barometer” for the economic condition of a 
nation’s social capital and for the immediate proximity of that nation’s social capital.   
Take for example a vigorous capitalist economy with a high ARP. In such times of 
prosperity there rarely are any significant barriers to surplus-value production; even struggling 
firms with below average profitability are often kept alive by a high ARP. But when it falls, 
especially when it crashes to a low level, the mass of profits decreases and firms with low profits 
                                                          
90 Marx 1991, p. 274. To capture the combined productivity of labour as a whole, the productive and unproductive 
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productivity of labour for a social capital (Mandel 1991).  
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face serious barriers and often collapse under market pressures.93 In turn, the strongest firms can 
attempt to realize as much profits as they can, or, for instance, cut costs to purchase assets from 
other failed firms. As Marxist economist Andrew Kliman points out, a decline in the ARP 
creates the societal conditions necessary for an eruption of economic malfunctions and 
bankruptcies that breed crises, crises that lead to corporate buyouts and lower wages – and 
ultimately a recovery in the rate of profit.94 A crisis may occur after the ARP falls, or even as the 
ARP falls, and can also occur during a recovery after the ARP falls and begins to rise, as it often 
does immediately before crisis. But a decline in the ARP remains an indirect casual mechanism 
which induces crisis. And it is an indirect cause because when profitability is low, investment 
halts, expansion is inhibited, and social reproduction suffers. And so when profitability is high, 
so too are productive investments – in employment, capital goods, intermediate inputs, etc. – and 
the economy is robust. 
In the end what matters is that the ARP is actually capable of showing (both theoretically 
and empirically) the growing dysfunctionality of the system insofar as the system, at one and the 
same time, is becoming less and less capable of meeting human needs while the forces of 
production are becoming ever more sophisticated. Marxist economist Michael Roberts believes 
that the subtle differences in how much of the political economy in the Marxist tradition 
measures the law of profitability is of little importance. This is because he observes that almost 
all empirical measures of the Marxian LTRPF (formulated as s/C or s/C+v) for the US economy 
as well as many other “advanced” economies around the globe have shown a long-term secular 
downward trend over the last century. This downward trend, he continues, is accompanied by a 
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rising organic composition of capital and rate of surplus-value, as Marx projected as early as the 
mid-19th century.95 Interestingly, the fact that such a heterogeneous group of Marxists have 
produced numerous studies that verify falling profits as the result of technological change is 
exemplary of the accuracy and explanatory power of Marx’s forecasts – further demonstrating 
the empirical relevance and the overall importance of his value-form analysis of the value-
magnitude.   
The ‘Era of Fictitious Capital’ 
Simonde de Sismondi first recognized the phenomenon of fictitious capital and its adverse effect 
on the economy in 1815; and next was Marx in his discussion of the credit system, as compiled 
by Engels, in the third volume of Capital.96 Both of them regarded fictitious capital as 
‘illusionary wealth’ possessing no real intrinsic value.  
The financialization of the advanced capitalist economies is no accident. In an article 
which taps into the Marxist critique of neoliberal financialization, Sergio Izquierdo and Abelardo 
Flores describe the proliferation of finance capital as a renewed hegemony of the various 
financial forms of valorization as a historically specific product resulting from an ongoing crisis 
of profitability.97 Consequently, a large amount of investment has been and is being redirected 
away from the productive sphere toward the financial sectors of the economy, as they have the 
highest rate of return and thus yield the greatest profits to the elites who can afford such a luxury. 
As hedge-fund giant Ray Dalio said as the US housing-bubble soared in the mid-2000s: “The 
money that is made from manufacturing stuff is a pittance in comparison to the amount of money 
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made from shuffling money around.”98 For instance, some hedge-funds are even capable of 
achieving an average annual rate of return on speculative investment as great as 30 percent.99 
Since the late 1970s decay in profitability and the subsequent neoliberalization of the 
economy, capital has been increasingly hesitant to make productive investments (investment in 
productive labour and assets). From the point of view of the wealthy investor, for example, there 
is a much greater financial risk investing in research and development because it requires a larger 
upfront and long-term investment.100 Whereas the appeal of financial assets (like stocks and 
bonds), comes from their particular flexibility in allowing for either short- or long-term 
investments, without the need to interact with works or the environment, etc. 
Michael Roberts draws on research which shows that over the past 30 years the rate of 
‘US corporate fixed-capital formation’ has increased at a rate much slower than corporate 
profits.101 Thereby confirming that resources are increasingly being channeled into financial 
assets to beget money rather than into productive assets that would generate increasing volumes 
of ‘actual’ surplus-value (‘actual’ in the sense that it is reflective of aggregate surplus-labour-
time performed in the economy). Moreover, research also shows that if the ratio of profits 
invested in productive capital rather than financial markets returned to its 1979 level, the result 
would be an increase in investment that would approach 10% of GDP (in 2010) – enough to 
resolve the past 2008 crisis.102 In fact, in the ‘era of fictitious capital’ the majority of crises are 
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caused by economic malfunctions as a result of reckless money-folding and financial 
instability.103 
The US economy has both the highest level of debt and the highest level of financial 
speculation, often with low interest-rates for a protracted period of time. From the Marxist point 
of view, this financialization is conceived as something internal to the capitalist system based on 
the expansion of relations of credit and debt (i.e., claims on current and future income, or 
anticipated future values (AFV)).104 As these financial relations are essentially valueless 
relations from the standpoint of the social capital, as value under capitalism is measured by the 
yardstick of ‘socially necessary abstract labour-time’, fictitious capital is essentially money-
capital seeking to enlarge itself through speculative claims on future income, which enables an 
economy to appear much larger than the non-financial assets that underwrite it.105 
So, speculation in financial assets and other transfers of wealth create so-called “profits” 
less the expenditure of labour-power and therefore constitute falsely created wealth garnered on 
guesses and false promises.106 The main point here is that the growth of financial profits has 
become a barrier to capital accumulation, not amounting to an increase in the ‘actual’ magnitude 
of surplus-value.107As these fictitious “profits” are problematically aggregated in the National 
Income Accounts (NIA) as “real booked” corporate profits, in this sense, the proliferation of 
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fictitious capital has become a serious obstacle in measuring the ARP in ‘actual’ terms, which 
regulates ‘prices of production’ and therefore ‘actual’ economic growth.  
The hegemony of the marginalist conception of ‘value/price’ and the “bourgeois” 
accounting method used by the NIA serves to legitimate the acute financialization of the 
economy. So in order to calculate a more accurate ARP and to include finance capital but not its 
distorting “profits,” one must then reduce finance capital’s profit rate to be proportional to its 
fixed capital assets compared to its “paper assets.” In the following chapters, I attempt this 
procedure of ‘normalizing’ financial profits which yields interesting findings from the 1980s 
onwards.  
The Concept of Fetishism in Marx 
In his critique of the classical political economists’ frequent inversion or confusion of what is 
‘natural’ and what is ‘social’, Marx elucidated the hidden essence of the capitalist production 
process – that, above all else, value is a social relation and its substance is ‘socially necessary 
abstract labour time’. This is because Marx, with his dialectical-monistic approach, breaks from 
the traditional bourgeois outlook by viewing the social and the economic as interrelated elements 
of a unified material reality. Marx’s later development of his critique of the fetishism of 
commodities grew out of, and is reminiscent of, his earlier critique of alienation.108 The term 
fetishism can be found in Marx’s work in 1844, 1856 and 1859 before he further developed it in 
his analysis of the commodity in Capital I.  
Commodity fetishism can be defined as the illusory notion that the economic relations of 
production are not inherently social in character but are mere relations between money and 
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commodities which takes place in the ‘sphere of exchange’. Marx first referred to the term 
fetishism (i.e. a confusion between the social and the natural, or, the transformation of subjective 
values into objective ones) in 1842 in his attack on Karl Hermes. As Marx wrote then: “Fantasy 
arising from desire deceives the fetish-worshipper into believing that an ‘inanimate object’ will 
give up its natural character in order to comply with [their own] desires.”109  
Like the religious fetishism of the feudal age where the existence of God masked the 
origins of human-kind and the essential social relations which underpin social reproduction, 
capitalist exchange relations conceal the commodity-form’s social character.110 This compels 
people to look past social labour as the source of value and obscures the fact that social 
reproduction requires a wide-spread and organized division of labour where any individual 
person at any given time is highly reliant on an interdependent social network made up of 
diverse, yet connected, individual people.111  
Productive Labour as Something Beyond ‘Physicalism’ 
In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith refers to productive labour as the only labour type that can 
produce new value. Here, he only means the labour expended in the production of material and 
vendible objects, “which lasts […] after that labour is past.”112 Marx, however, the distinction 
between labour types is rooted in the social (class) position of the conscious actor – derived from 
the social relations of production.  
When Marx refers to productive labour he does not adopt the standpoint of the individual 
capitalist. A cashier to the individual capitalist may be considered productive as the elasticity of 
this employee’s wage is the source of their profit.  For Marx, however, he adopts the “macro 
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standpoint” of the social capital as a whole. In this sense, productive labour augments the surplus 
product, the total mass of surplus-value, it is labour that is productive for capital (i.e., physical 
and/or mental living-labour that is employed and exploited by capital for the purpose of 
producing use-values for exchange in the market).113 
It should now be clear that productive labour is not synonymous with production-based 
labour, or as Adam Smith incorrectly asserted: manufacturing labour. Manufacturing labour 
exists outside of, and it is not historically specific to, the capitalist mode of production. In turn, 
Marx stipulates that for labour to be considered productive it is not required to produce a 
corporeal object, as such a physicalist understanding of productive labour is a fetishistic error. 
Indeed, a commodity does not need to be physically vendible for it to be endowed with surplus-
value. Marx exemplifies this while addressing the distinction between productive and 
unproductive labour in Theories of Surplus-value: “An actor for example, or even a clown, 
according to this definition, is a productive labourer if he works in the service of a capitalist (an 
entrepreneur) to whom he returns more labour than he receives from him in the form of 
wages.”114  
Neither the services of the actor nor the clown produce a corporeal and vendible object, 
but they do produce an incorporeal effect that is exchanged for more money than the labourer is 
paid in wages in return (i.e., the creation of surplus-value through exploitation via the elasticity 
of the wage). Even though these entertainment or service workers produce an incorporeal effect, 
their labour is still considered productive from the standpoint of the social capital because it 
augments the total magnitude of surplus-value.  
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The Specter of the Okishio Theorem  
In response to the defense of the Okishio theorem by David Laibman and Duncan Foley, Andrew 
Kliman and Allan Freeman’s critique marks the demise of the famous theorem that was 
commonly used to refute Marx’s LTRPF. Kliman and Freeman write that “Marx’s law of the 
tendential fall in profit rate is rigorous as stated, free from the ‘logical errors’ that have been 
attributed to it for more than a century.”115 The two economists take this stance for two reasons: 
1) because Okishio made the error of assuming input prices must be equal to output prices; 2) 
and because the authors, quite successfully, argue that it is possible for both the money and 
labour-value rates of profit to fall under the conditions that Okishio specified in his 
hypothesis.116  
It was in 1961 when the Japanese economist, Nobuo Okishio, put forth his theorem that 
supposedly refuted Marx’s law of falling profits. In sum, the Okishio Theorem proposes that if 
real wages remain constant and if capitalists invest in new technologies that cut costs and 
increase output, the average rate of profit must then rise. In a more recent debate, the heterodox 
economists Laibman and Foley decide to support this postulate, but they do so with a caveat: it is 
only the material rate of profit that must be higher than the old one if the real wage rate is 
constant while new cost-cutting technologies are introduced.117 For them, this is apparently all 
that the theorem, and for that matter Okishio himself, has ever claimed. But this answer is 
nonsense to Kliman and Freeman; they dismiss this claim as dishonest because the theorem has 
been generally accepted by many as something that wholly disproves Marx’s ‘law’. 
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Although it was not a material rate of profit that concerned Marx, it is often falsely 
interpreted that way. Rather, Marx was concerned with a value rate of profit, as he eloquently 
described his idea over 150 years ago: “[the ARP stands for] the relative decline in the surplus 
labour appropriated in comparison with the mass of objectified labour that the living-labour sets 
in motion.”118 In a fetishistic error, the physicalist tradition assumes that the money rate of profit 
moves in tandem with the material rate of profit, and that in the end the latter (as a simultaneous 
valuation) is what governs productive investment and ‘actual’ economic growth.119  As Kliman 
and Freeman demonstrate, this is unverifiable because the claim that greater physical output 
equates to a rise in the rate of profit is clearly incorrect. And if such physicalism was correct, for 
example, then the unpaid labour of the actor or the clown in the previous example would not add 
to the total mass of surplus-value – their labour would have to be considered unproductive rather 
than productive.  
In his 1991 book, Marxist economist Fred Moseley draws on, ironically, the earlier work 
of Duncan Foley in order to provide a critique of the theorem. Contrary to Okishio, he states, the 
majority of capitalist economies have rising real wages and increasing exploitation at the same 
time; meaning that real wages are growing, but at a much slower pace than productivity.120 As 
such, when real wages and the rate of surplus-value both increase, as it does in most capitalist 
economies, then they fall into an “intermediate zone” in the theorem instead. Furthermore, 
                                                          
118 Marx, cited in Kliman and Freeman 2000, p. 290. 
119 See Kliman and Freeman (2000, p. 289) for an interesting perspective on the physicalist tradition. Here, the 
authors write: “The economy in which it would be fun to be a proletarian is instead the physicalist one. Viable 
technological advance would provide ever more goodies for workers and capitalists alike to share. With real wages 
rising in line with productivity, the economy would go on indefinitely in its merry, crisis-free way. Backward 
producers would not suffer from technological changes, nor make their workers suffer, because they are producing 
just as much corn as before, and of course the corn “price” of corn can never fall.”  
120 Moseley 1991, p. 22. I mean not to imply that capitalism is in a state of good health just because real wages and 
productivity are rising – because that would be entirely untrue.  
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Moseley’s own findings show that real wages as well as the rate of surplus-value had indeed 
increased in the US economy between the 1950s and 1980s (albeit, inconsistently). He adds, 
drawing again on Foley, that for economies set in this “intermediate zone” we cannot predict 
anything about the effect of technological change on the profit rate – a question answerable only 
by empirical investigation.121   
Like Okishio himself, David Laibman follows suit in measuring aggregate profitability 
by omitting the costs of fixed capital in the denominator of the profit rate. This greatly reduces 
the costs of production, forcing the ARP trend upwards.122 In turn, I agree in full with Moseley 
when he states that the two restrictive conditions of the theorem – that real wages must remain 
constant and that capital only consists of circulating capital (the flow rather than the fixed 
component) – are unrealistic assumptions.123  
What is more, in his 2018 book, Invisible Leviathan, Murray Smith critiques the Okishian 
‘choice of technique argument’ by citing the Marxist economist, Anwar Shaikh: 
In his response to this ‘choice of technique’ argument, Shaikh suggests 
that Okishio’s theorem merely underscores Marx’s own thesis that ‘the 
battle of competition is fought by the cheapening of commodities’ 
(Capital I) and that ‘the cheapest method of production will win out in 
the wars among capitals’. But there is a crucial difference between the 
‘cheapest method of production’ per unit of output and the ‘cheapest 
method’ from the standpoint of capital invested.124 
 
Marx’s profit rate is not a comparison between two flow variables but a ratio of a flow 
component to a stock component. Shaikh specifies that there is a clear distinction between the 
former, “profits in relation to capital used up in production” (Okishio), and the latter, “profits in 
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relation to capital advanced” (Marx).125 In reality, the costs of production from the point of view 
of the social capital are lowered per unit of output through a greater investment in the fixed 
means of production, and therefore they need to be included in the denominator of the ARP.126   
The omission of fixed constant capital (the fixed means of production) in the 
denominator of the rate of profit lends itself to ascribing fixed capital as something fixed to 
nature, something static and independent from human society, like a product of nature itself. 
Such a view perceives fixed capital as a relation between people and nature – as in, a relation of 
living labour to the “natural” conditions of production – instead of seeing fixed capital as a social 
product, or as a “mass of objectified labour put in motion by living labour” as Marx put it.127 
This is indicative of a static-model of economic analysis and methodological individualism 
which ignores micro-macro and production-circulation contradictions. So, in other words, 
abstracting from or taking the fixed means of production for granted in socio-economic analysis 
is a fetishistic error insofar as it confuses and subordinates a purely ‘natural’ production process 
to a purely ‘social’ exchange and circulation process.  
All the same, if real wages did remain constant and if capitalists continued to invest in 
socially progressive technologies then material output, not profitability, may very well rise like 
Okishio’s theorem states. But, as we know, real wages do not remain constant but instead greatly 
depend on the ongoing class struggle; and a rise in material output does not mean that 
profitability will rise, too. In the end, Okishio’s theorem, which combines elaborate algebraic 
equations with unrealistic assumptions about the real world stands little chance against the 
empirical and theoretical arsenal of Marx’s value theory.  
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From Commodity Fetishism to Capital Fetishism 
The idea that Marx’s value category of constant capital must be solely limited to the physical 
means of production is too a fetishistic error. Such a fetishism is found throughout much of the 
empirical work of many contemporary Marxists, whose utter refusal to accept the possibility that 
certain types of wage labour should be subsumed under an expanded “unfetishized” notion of 
constant capital, can be traced back to previous “physicalist” or “Smithian” presuppositions. By 
expanding the value category of constant capital beyond just the inclusion of fixed assets and 
circulating input goods (the means of production) it widens our theoretical scope and can permit 
additional empirical analysis that follows in the fundamentalist tradition.  
Clearly the physicalist conception of productive labour is inadequate, as Marx has shown 
that the labour performed by a clown, a singer, or an actor in creating incorporeal use-values can 
all be productive of new, surplus-value under the right conditions of exploitation. Indeed, the 
economic relations of production are fundamentally social in character insofar as they constitute 
relations between people within the society-wide division of labour. As such, Murray Smith 
explains that constant capital “is not merely a value expression of its ‘material’ [or, physical] 
forms in the immediate process of production.”128 Just as it was to Marx, the total social capital 
consists of the social relation between constant capital and variable capital – constant capital 
being social in itself as a product of social labour. Constant capital is an expression of previously 
existing values, or previously expended labour-power managed and set in motion by living wage-
labourers, and in which the capitalist class holds a monopoly over.  
In a recent article by Charles Post, he attempts to analyze the historical development of 
plantation slavery and its place in the origins of US capitalism. Post recognizes that the labour-
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power of plantation slaves are not what is purchased, but that the slave labourers themselves (as 
property) are, so instead of representing a form of labour-power they represent a form of fixed 
constant capital to the ruling planters.129 Hence, by conceptually widening Marx’s value 
category of constant capital by including in it living-slave-labour, Post’s critical inquiry in the 
Marxist tradition is one example of a somewhat unfetishized understanding of Marx’s value 
category of constant capital. 
In the next section I address the theoretical issues pertaining to the concept of constant 
capital and certain forms of unproductive labour that can be allocated as an element of constant 
capital. 130    
Unproductive Labour in Marx’s Theory  
Forms of unproductive labour (i.e. the maintenance, supervisory, and social “upkeep” labour-
forms) date back to long before the full emergence of the capitalist mode of production. In 
Capital II, Marx recognized that bookkeeping labour is not something specific to a commodity-
based society. In fact, in the Ancient Mediterranean, Crete bookkeepers used clay tablets 
engraved with hieroglyphic seals to record the various flows of goods.131 And across the ocean, 
the Incas of the early 15th century designated “economic accountants” called quipucamayocs to 
oversee logistics and resource use. Using quipus – a recording device made from knotted cords 
which were hung from a string – the Incans of South America could preform simple mathematic 
calculations and record information.132 What this means is that some forms of unproductive 
labour (the Ancient “accountants”) as well as some archaic forms of unproductive tools and 
                                                          
129 Post 2017, p. 183. See Post’s 2017 article Slavery and the New History of Capitalism in the new radical labour 
journal Catalyst, edited by Robert Brenner and Vivek Chibber. 
130 Smith 2018. Furthermore, the allocation of unproductive expenses, both theoretical and methodological, is taken 
up next, as well as in chapter 3 and empirically in 4.   
131 Kober 1948. 
132 Hirst 2016; Manka 2016, p. 2. 
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equipment (the clay tablets and “quipus”) are trans-historical social phenomena whose historical 
evolution appears to be a epiphenomenon of the complex and ever increasing division of labour. 
As a result, the question then becomes: what are the specific forms of appearance that 
unproductive activities such as bookkeeping take under capitalism?  
For Adam Smith, if the labour does not produce a corporeal and vendible object then that 
labour is essentially unproductive. For Thomas Malthus, nothing is more important than the 
distinction between productive and unproductive labour, and its importance flows ineluctably 
from the need to produce subsistence for a general population. According to Malthus, only 
productive labour augments the social surplus that provides for the populous as a whole. 
Meanwhile, in general agreement with Malthus, David Ricardo diverges from him at a lower 
level of abstraction in his appreciation of how some unproductive costs weigh on aggregate 
profitability.133  
As I have already indicated, Marx saw productive labour as the labour involved in the 
creation of “useful-effects” in commodity form, not as something restricted to agriculture or 
corporeal objects alone. As a result, his analysis revealed that a commodity’s value consists of 
the specific portion of social labour allocated by society to the sphere of production based upon 
capitalism’s ‘law of labour-value’. Again, a commodity’s value consists of the ‘socially 
necessary abstract labour-time’ required for its production; its price being a metamorphic form of 
its intrinsic value expressed as money.134 From the standpoint of the social capital, some forms 
of unproductive labour are “socially” or “systemically” necessary for the full completion of the 
circuit of capital (i.e. after the commodity is produced, shipped, and shelved, it must finally be 
sold). If the value of the commodity is not realized through a transference of ownership – say, if 
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it is not sold to a potential consumer – then the profits (the surplus-value expended in the 
production of the commodity) cannot return to the capitalist class for reinvestment. 
The “Allocation Problem” in Marx’s Theory: Debate and Distinction  
In the Fall, 1993, issue of Science & Society its editors refer to the question of the value 
specification of unproductive expenses within Marx’s theory as the “allocation problem.”135 This 
problem arose as a product of material changes in the structure of the global economy, as 
services, sales and state sectors in many advanced economies expanded enormously throughout 
the post war period – doubling in the US alone between 1950 and 1980.136 The increasing burden 
of unproductive expenses is partly to blame for the structural shifts in the advanced economies 
(neoliberalism and globalization) in the effort to revitalize profitability since the 1970s. In 
response to these structural changes, which led many political economists to rethink how the rate 
profit is examined in relation to the such ‘incidental overhead costs’ of the capitalist system, 
intense debate took place in the early 1990s between many scholars in relation to the allocation 
of unproductive expenses within Marx’s theory. 
Here, the confusion originates with Marx’s own undertheorized specification of 
unproductive expenses. Stemming from the fact that the spheres of circulation and the state were 
much smaller in Marx’s day. Given this theoretical interpretation and allocation of unproductive 
expenses in modern Marxist political economy are problematic and highly contested, especially 
since at one time or another Marx refers to such unproductive expenses as a component of all 
three of his value categories (i.e., constant capital, variable capital and surplus-value).137  
                                                          
135 Editors, S&S 1993. 
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137 At one-point Marx contradicts his definition of productive labour by treating commercial labour as variable 
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exploitation as their productive counterpart even though they are unproductive of surplus-value. 
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That said, interpreting Marx is dependant on the social standpoint from which one intends 
to proceed analytically. From the standpoint of the individual capitalist, unproductive labour can 
be “variable” in the sense that it involves the performance of unpaid labour; and yet from the 
standpoint of the social capital as a whole unproductive labour is then considered a faux frais 
(incidental cost) of capitalist production because it pertains directly to the social capital’s 
reproduction process.138 The Marxist scholar, Shane Mage – a pioneering proponent of the 
constant capital ‘overhead cost approach’ to the allocation of unproductive expenses – writes that 
there is no distinct specification in Marx’s theory of the ‘necessary but unproductive expenses’ 
as a part of the constant capital.139 Apart from a few ambiguous references, however, Marx never 
specifies them as components of variable capital or surplus-value either.  
Critical of the distinction between the two types of labour in Marx’s theory, David 
Laibman argues that the productive labour and unproductive labour distinction is altogether 
dubious. Because Marxists have not come up with a useful and congruent definition of these 
labour types, he writes, the distinction is ‘devoid of operational significance’ and cannot be 
defended.140 Much of Laibman’s skepticism arises from the difficulties in specifying what 
activities are productive and what activities are unproductive for capitalism. One can appreciate 
such scepticism, as differentiating between productive and unproductive activities can be 
incredibly complex. For example, a worker who pours and transports a cup of coffee (productive 
activity) and then completes the monetary transaction for that sale of that coffee (unproductive 
activity) is fulfilling both a productive and unproductive role.141    
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141 There are various methodological issues pertaining to how productive and unproductive labour is empirically 
defined, specified and allocated. 
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In his critique of the productive-unproductive (P/UP) distinction, Laibman provides what 
he believes to be the three dominant definitions of unproductive labour used by political 
economists: 1) the evaluative, 2) the socioeconomic, and what I am concerned with here 3) the 
analytical. The evaluative definition obscurely conceptualizes unproductive labour as a waste or 
“leakage” of surplus-value. The socio-economic definition understands unproductive labour as a 
non-value producing form of labour which normally occurs outside of capitalist relations (i.e., 
domestic labour, petty commodity producers, and perhaps other luxury expenses). The analytical 
definition recognizes this type of labour as a specific category of workers who are employed and 
exploited by capital but are unproductive of surplus-value, and whose wages are paid for out of 
the social surplus. In this vein, Laibman claims that those who abide by this allocation of 
unproductive expenses as a non-profit component of surplus-value provide no independent 
rationale for doing so even though much of this labour is obviously systemically necessary. 
In sum, Laibman does not believe the way that surplus-value is augmented by 
unproductive expenses is important, nor does he believe that an absolute increase or decrease in 
the total productive work-force is important.142 For Laibman, the P/UP distinction “leads at best 
to results that cannot be verified, because their meaning lies imprisoned within an arbitrary shell 
of unsubstantiated belief; and at worst to error.”143  
In a 1994 response to Laibman’s skepticism of the P/UP distinction, Fred Moseley writes 
that the distinction is required to fully grasp Marx’s LTRPF and is key to understanding 
capitalist crisis in relation to the rate of profit. He argues that Marx’s theory of unproductive 
labour can empirically explain why the rate of profit had not significantly increased since the 
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mid-1970s; and, in turn, he continues to say that without any recovery in the profit rate the US 
economy may again degenerate into a deep state of depression.144 Moreover, the Marxist Richard 
Wolff supports Moseley’s proposition arguing that the P/UP distinction is a useful analytical 
dichotomy for the detection of important trends in capital accumulation.145 And for Simon 
Mohun, the P/UP distinction is essential to the labour theory of value and thus for Marx’s theory 
as a whole, and that any serious Marxist must emphasize the ontological uniqueness and 
complexities of the commodity: living labour-power.146  
Many Marxists who uphold the P/UP distinction firmly believe that Marx laid out a 
coherent theoretical framework that also permits empirical study, and that the final judgement on 
the distinction ought to be left up to the empirical exploratory power of the perspective. Informed 
by his own study of the post-war US economy (see next section), Moseley says that Marx’s 
theory of unproductive labour can effectively explain many of the structural shifts that have 
taken place over the last 50 years in the advanced capitalist economies. He continues to say that 
Marx did make it clear that not all labour is productive of surplus-value, and that this distinction 
remains greatly underappreciated in much radical political economy today.  
Although he follows what Laibman refers to as the analytical approach to 
conceptualizing unproductive expenses, Moseley accurately specifies the two types of labour that 
can be considered unproductive but also systemically necessary: 1) circulation-labour (such as 
sales, insurance, legal council, accounting, debt/credit relations and securities exchange) and 2) 
supervisory-labour (the control and supervision of productive workers, payroll record keeping, 
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top bureaucratic management, etc.). 
The rationale for why circulation workers are considered unproductive for capitalism is 
rooted in Capital I where Marx assumes that the commodity exchange process is essentially an 
exchange of equivalent values.147 If the process of exchange is based upon equivalent values, 
then neither new value nor surplus-value arises from the exchange of commodities; and because 
this process is entirely necessary for the completion of the reproduction process, even though no 
new value is produced in this phase, circulation labour is required for the commodity’s exchange 
and therefore necessary from the standpoint of the social capital. The rationale for specifying 
supervisory positions as unproductive is found in the heart of Marx’s theory as well. Moseley 
says that Marx recognized that a small number of supervisors or managers are required for the 
smooth-operation and coordination of production under capitalism. However, the vast majority 
of supervisory labour is employed for the purpose of dealing with a class antagonistic workplace 
– like controlling and disciplining the working class, making sure employees are working 
vigorously, productively, etc.148 But what Moseley does not provide is a convincing rationale 
that adequately justifies his allocation of circulation and state workers as a deduction from 
surplus-value.  
The astute economist, Anwar Shaikh, affirms that commercial expenses and indirect 
taxes (that is, unproductive expenses) are general business expenses from the standpoint of the 
individual owner; but from the standpoint of the social capital, these expenditures serve a 
necessary function from the point of view of the social capital so commercial capital and the 
capitalist state are to be regarded as indispensable for the system. “But”, as he writes following 
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in the analytical vein and prepped with a dual-systems understanding of capitalist production, “it 
is necessary to produce the surplus product before it can be sold …”149 Many ostensible Marxist-
fundamentalists, like Shaikh and Moseley, uphold this dualism which undermines the systemic 
necessity of these expenses. This has been long considered the conventional treatment of 
unproductive expenses in Marx’s theory: one seldom questioned or criticized, and one that has 
become canonical in every sense of the word.  
Shaikh’s now canonical allocation of unproductive expenses as at once an ‘absolute 
deduction from’ and a ‘non-profit component of’ surplus-value is problematic. As Laibman 
argues, those who abide by what he calls the analytical approach provide no independent 
rationale even though much of this labour is systemically necessary from the point of view of the 
social capital. The implication of treating such expenses as a component of the already produced 
surplus-value is that these expenditures are non-value producing and unnecessary, arising only as 
“luxury expenses” or as “personal services” for capital.  
The analytical definition and allocation of the unproductive wage-bill is almost entirely 
based upon a single passage from Capital II – a passage that is anything but transparent. It reads:  
The replacement of [circulation] costs must come from the surplus 
product, and from the standpoint of the capitalist class as a whole it 
forms a deduction of surplus-value or surplus product […].150 
 
In opposition to the idea that unproductive wages constitute an ‘absolute deduction’ from the 
pool of currently created surplus-value, the ‘overhead cost’ approach suggests that the proportion 
of a commodity’s surplus-value shrinks due to an increase in the cost of the elements of the 
constant capital flow. In this regard, Mage conveys that any reference in Marx to an ‘absolute 
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deduction’ from surplus-value is purely from the standpoint of the capitalist class (i.e., “class-
centric”) and certainly not from the standpoint of the social capital whole.151 
The Alternative: A Constant Capital ‘Overhead Cost’ Approach to SNUL152 
Heavily influenced by Mage’s pioneering study on the US economy, Murray Smith is critical of 
how unproductive expenses are defined and allocated in Marx’s theory. While he upholds the 
P/UP distinction, Smith’s view accords with Laibman’s objection to the general subsumption of 
these expenses as a non-profit component of surplus-value. Such a treatment of unproductive 
labour as an element of the readily available surplus misleadingly implies that these incidental 
systemic costs remain a form of “luxury” expenditures deducted after the fact. For Smith, 
treating the unproductive costs of the reproduction process as ‘luxury’ expenditures 
underestimates their systemic necessity, while also encouraging ‘revisionist’ or ‘reformist’ 
political conclusions.153 
Smith stipulates that constant capital represents the factors of the production and 
reproduction process of capital which fill an indirect role in the production of surplus-value. It is 
undeniable that the means of production (such as a drill-press, iron or a conveyer-belt) are 
materially much different than living wage-workers, whether unproductive or productive. But it 
is a fetishistic error to conceptualize Marx’s value categories based simply on the physical 
properties of the various elements of the total capital.154 In defining the elements of the three 
basic value categories, what matters is the particular social relation expressed by each of them, 
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and their specific connection to valorization (i.e., to how new value is created and then 
manifested in the commodity output). 
From Smith’s perspective, only the unproductive expenses that are systemically 
necessary from the standpoint of the social capital should be subsumed under the value category 
of constant capital flow. Thus, many service, sales and ‘social maintenance’ workers, along with 
the great majority of state and para-state sector employees, represent ‘systemically necessary 
unproductive labour’(SNUL) and their wages and associated expenses should therefore be 
allocated to an expanded notion of constant capital (i.e. as a component of the constant capital 
flow).155  At the same time, many non-productive workers who perform labour outside of the 
capital-wage labour relation can be conceived as elements of the luxury consumption of the 
capitalist class – the cost of their labour resolved into the revenue component of surplus-value 
(consistent with Laibman’s socio-economic definition of unproductive labour expenses).  
There is a continuous battle between the productive sphere and the unproductive 
sphere(s) of the economy, new value originates in the productive sphere, but it is only when the 
commodity is sold does that value become realized.156 The productive capitalist will always want 
the commercial capitalist to pay more and the commercial capitalist will always want to pay less. 
As competition between firms in the market intensifies within each sphere of the social capital, 
and as each of these capitalists attempt to grow their profits in the face of such competition, 
competition then intensifies between each of the spheres of the social capital. 
On the surface of things, unproductive workers are not much different than their 
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156 Note: once the commodity is created but yet to be sold, the abstract labour expended in its production becomes 
the commodity’s material substance, endowing it with ‘social value’. Therefore, during the production process in 
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productive counterpart. By their respective employers (unproductive capital), unproductive 
workers are purchased as variable capital as the elasticity of their wages remains their 
employers’ source of profits. But how can this labour remain unproductive of surplus-value even 
though it can take the form of surplus labour? – well, because it is drawn from the surplus labour 
of productive workers. The rationale behind this lies in Marx’s discussion of transfers of value 
between industrial capital and commercial capital.  
 “Just as [productive] capital makes profit by selling labour embodied and realized in 
commodities, for which it has not paid any equivalent,” Marx writes in Capital III, “so 
[unproductive] capital derives profit from not paying in full to productive capital for all the 
unpaid labour contained in the commodities.”157 Although SNUL yields no surplus-value, the 
unpaid portion of its wage allows for its capital to secure a share of the social capital’s total mass 
of surplus-value carried out through sphere to sphere transfers of value and the equalization of 
profit rates. In this sense, the exploitation of all workers is a fundamental characteristic of 
capitalism. And the exploitation of SNUL is a definite condition for the preservation and transfer 
of the surplus-value which is purchased for less than its actual cost from the productive sphere. 
Insofar as it is evident that SNUL’s relationship to the commodity is of previously existing value 
(PEV), and as the notion of its ‘systemic overhead cost’ is evident in Marx’s discussions of 
unproductive labour and commercial activity, the Mage-Smith perspective provides adequate 
independent rationale for how we should conceptualize these expenses.  
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Figure 1. Productive Labour & Systemically Necessary Unproductive Labour in Relation to the 
Marxian Value Categories. 
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To be clear, instead of allocating unproductive labour as an arbitrary deduction from 
surplus-value, the Mage-Smith approach proposes that from the standpoint of the social capital 
as a whole the costs associated with SNUL constitute a relative reduction in the proportion of the 
commodity’s value that is surplus-value – a diminution of realizable surplus-value, rather than an 
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absolute deduction from it.158 
To be sure, it is difficult to distinguish between the types of labour which represent the 
factors of the production and reproduction process of capitalism which play an indirect role in 
the production of surplus-value as the constant capital approach proclaims. For example, due to 
the particular nature of workers employed by ‘non-profit enterprises’, they cannot be reasonably 
allocated as a component of constant capital but, in turn, are indeed a deduction from the pool of 
surplus-value. So too would be personal and home services, like an at-home butler. 
Paradoxically, as Smith attempts to diverge from the analytical approach to SNUL, he remains 
faithful to Shaikh’s canonical procedure in distinguishing between what labour is productive and 
what labour is unproductive from the standpoint of the social capital.159 Pushing past Smith, 
perhaps a further re-specification of how Marxists distinguish the particulars between productive 
and unproductive labour is also necessary? 
The Capitalist State, Taxation and the Spheres of the Social Capital 
One aspect of SNUL are those employed as workers in the capitalist state. In fetishistic error 
again, many political economists are dedicated to a perspective that is fundamentally opposed to 
“earlier”, so-called ‘reductionist’ theories of the capitalist state. Theories like Lenin’s 
‘instrumentalist perspective’ which views the “state-machine” as a class weapon hell-bent on 
driving the working class into submission is generally rejected by contemporary scholars as their 
theories are often hell-bent on reforming the existing state, viewing it as a “neutral arbiter of 
class struggle.”160  
Treating the costs of general taxation as a deduction from surplus-value is indicative of a 
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160 Lenin 1970.  
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reformist approach. This is because workers obviously do not subsist on the their before-tax 
income but on their after-tax income, meaning that if variable capital is based on the average cost 
of a worker’s consumption requirements then variable capital must be calculated after-tax. 
Because taxes are financed by wages, and wages are paid to workers by capital, taxation is 
therefore first a tax on the social capital. For those who own the means of production, they then 
own the means of new and surplus-value production and must bear the general costs of the 
system’s maintenance, of the capitalist state, taxation, circulation, and all those things necessary 
for reproduction – this is the core of the Mage-Smith ‘overhead cost’ approach.  
However, a few caveats are in order. None of this is supposed to imply that a portion of 
the new value produced in the productive sphere which goes to the state is never surplus-value. 
When in fact it is often channeled to the state (i.e. due to a “generous” donation on behalf of 
capital) for various reasons. In periods of prosperity, the state is permitted to expand and can 
receive a portion of redistributed surplus-value from the productive sphere. But at the same time, 
the state can also contract in periods of despair which would release a portion of surplus-value 
back into the economy.161 What is more, SNUL can also temporarily enhance the rate of 
‘surplus-value realization’ through a ‘general speed up’ of circulation/realization, albeit this is a 
rare feat for capital.162 
Nevertheless, there are three key benefits to a constant capital ‘overhead cost’ approach 
to the capitalist state, and for that matter, SNUL in general. First, compared to the alternatives, it 
provides an actual way to conceptualize the capitalist state in value terms through a radical 
framework. This demystifies the democratic façade of the ‘repressive state apparatus’ by treating 
                                                          
161 Smith 1984.  
162 Smith and Butovsky 2018. 
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its costs as assumed by the social capital.163 Second, it provides an adequate independent 
rationale for its allocation within Marxist theory. And third, it provides a means to empirically 
measure the impact that the SNUL wage-bill has on the ARP.164 The larger picture here is that 
this perspective actually establishes that the objective contradictions inherent to the system have 
not only intensified but have spread to the unproductive spheres as well. As each of these spheres 
of the social capital grow and become more independent – the productive sphere, the 
circulation/sales sphere, the financial sphere and the state sphere – all engage in constant 
competition with one another over a shrinking mass of surplus-value (relative to capital invested) 
in the effort to stand against the malicious pressures of a so-called “free” market. As a result, the 
more autonomy that each of these spheres achieve the greater the impact they inflict on 
valorization, hindering profitability and reproduction.165  
 
                                                          
163 The old adage goes, “who ever pays the piper calls the tune.” 
164 This approach is based on Smith 1984, 1993, and 2010:  referred to as the ‘value composition of output’ (VCO): 
the comparison of each of the aggregate flows of value as a percentage of nominal GDP (or, rather, MGO).  
165 Smith and Butovsky 2018.  
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Source: Author.  
 
The dialectical relation between the production and realization of surplus-value, a 
competitive market, state activity and social reproduction are indeed mutually reliant spheres of 
the social capital but also appear as deeply contradictory elements of social value production. In 
regard to the SNUL sphere, circulation (B) is centered atop because of its primacy in the general 
requirements of reproduction, while the adjacent financial (C) and state spheres (D) are located 
below. Underneath is the struggling productive sphere (A), the “true economic base,” depicted 
by a shirking tear drop as it not only struggles to keep the rest of the economy afloat, but also 
Figure 2. The Spheres of the Social Capital. 
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struggles to retain an acceptable rate of return of its own. As Smith puts it, such a contradictory 
social capital truly gives “Marx’s proposition that ‘the true barrier to capitalist production is 
capital itself’ a somewhat new twist.”166   
In conclusion, it is important to note that none of the other perspectives mentioned here 
effectively capture the arguments purported by the Mage-Smith approach and thereby provides 
no independent rationale for their treatment of unproductive expenses in Marx’s theory. In 
chapter four I attempt to operationalize the Mage-Smith constant capital approach to SNUL in 
the examination of the US economy.167   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
166 Smith 2018, p. 280. 
167 For the Canadian economy, see Smith 1984 – cited in Smith 1991 and 1993. 
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Chapter 3: A Methodological and Empirical Survey 
 
The problem that Marx set himself in Capital was to “lay bare the economic law of motion 
of modern society.” But why this task? Because he knew only too well that in order to 
change the world it is necessary to first understand it.  
– Anwar Shaikh (1978)168 
 
The ‘taint of empiricism’ interferes with any research conducted with the empirical method. 
Economic analysis using input-output tables (IOT), the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIA) and so on and so forth are no exception.169 To be sure, the NIA figures are not exact 
representations of real world processes, but exact representations are impossible to ascertain. 
With a few modifications, however, the NIA figures can be used by political economists of all 
perspectives to assess economic activity and social processes in the US and other economies.170  
There are serious limitations to empirical research but empirical research in the Marxian 
tradition is struck by additional limitations because such raw data holds opposing preconceptions 
which therefore distort results.171 The point for Marxists is then to ‘capture’ as accurately as 
possible the flows and stocks of value in price form by transforming the NIA’s “bourgeois” 
                                                          
168 Anwar Shaikh 1978, p. 116 [emphasis in original].  
169 See Schumpeter 1962.   
170 All macroeconomics are broad estimations. The great majority of tradition empirical work in economics, 
however, has been replaced by modern-day experimental computer programs. Economists compute a matrix of an 
economy and calibrate it to resemble the real economy. They add and remove variables and change parameters in 
order to make the research question fit the model. For the supposedly critical and heterodox post-Keynesians, they 
apparently reject the conceptual “straitjacket” inherent to any and all equilibrium models of analysis and replace it 
with their so-called “dynamic” models. Despite what they claim, it remains static and presumptuous. For example, 
the benchmark New Keynesian Model of computation is based on the same age-old assumptions that Marx would 
have considered ‘vulgar economics’ because it is derived from micro-economic foundations for macro purposes, its 
calculations for aggregate demand assume that ‘consumers’ are infinitely lived and foresighted, and it assumes that 
interest rates are always knowable. For more, see Blanchard 2018, p. 45.  
171 Freeman 1991. There also exists problems revolving around companies lying about their finances, as well as tax-
evasion, governmental lobbying to influence regulations, hiding assets, etc. But to a degree the “books” must be 
balanced at the end of the year. Moreover, the nature of the 1920-1945 period, due to the Great Depression and war, 
greatly complicates economic analysis as it set the stage for a qualitatively different stage of capitalism in the late 
1940s. The pre-1950 data sets are seen to be less reliable and should be treated with caution because, as Freeman 
writes, a) prior to the second world war, data on state expenditure is limited; b) and it was not until the 1950s when 
capital stock and depreciation figures were systematically evaluated on a regular basis. 
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national accounting system into a Marxian national accounting system to improve its aggregation 
and therefore its explanatory power. Elections have been won and lost on NIA figures; and 
corporate enterprises, investors, and researchers of all kinds draw on them for their own 
purposes, so as long as this is the case these figures will continue to remain relevant.172  
There is also considerable evidence that Marx himself valued empirical inquiry.173 
Marx’s social-scientific method of beginning with an abstract model and moving to the concrete 
to develop essential laws and (testable) forecasts encourages empirical analyses.174 For many, 
however, the concept of ‘value’ is simply too abstract and therefore is by nature unquantifiable. 
For others, ‘value’ is measurable but the NIA are unusable because they are formulated in 
‘prices’ which constantly deviate from ‘values’, price being a product of market forces rather 
than social relations of production. But, since prices are a direct result of values, it becomes 
possible to work in reverse from prices to values – conceptualizing price as merely one form of 
value, the result of one commodity measured in terms of all other commodities at the level of 
exchange.175  
Hence, although there exists a quantitative deviation between prices and values, such 
does not fully obscure the fundamental relationship between the two.176 It would be preposterous 
to circumvent empirical inquiry simply because the NIA are formulated in prices rather than in 
values or because of whatever limitation concerning empirical research. It is crucial to move 
                                                          
172 Ibid.  
173 Marx never said not to interpret the world. If theory cannot be measured or tested in anyway then it remains 
ideology. Refer to Appendix B.c for an example of Marx’s personal empirical work.  
174 Hudelson 1982, p. 252. 
175 Shaikh 1978.  
176 Shaikh 1981, p. 292. The systematic deviation of prices from values is a dialectical phenomenon, whereas the 
“price” of money as a commodity also deviates from its intrinsic value. Meaning that such deviation is explainable 
by, and certainly not alien to, Marxian economics. 
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beyond ‘theory’, and to draw and compare informed conclusions in order to better interpret the 
world.  
The present chapter surveys the work of several contemporary Marxists whose empirical 
inquiry falls under the broad canopy of Marxian “rate of profit studies.” Particular attention is 
given to the specific methodological procedures used by these Marxists; while the value-
theoretical status of unproductive labour, the measurement of ‘actual’ surplus-value production 
as opposed to fictious “profits,” the debate between historical costs versus current costs of 
production, and the causes behind capitalist crisis, are all key themes throughout the present 
chapter. Similar to the previous chapter, the open inquiry found in this chapter informs my own 
methodological approach to operationalizing Marx’s concepts as empirical variables.  
Anwar Shaikh versus Murray Smith  
The heterodox economist from the New School, Anwar Shaikh, describes capitalism as a system 
of accumulation where the general requirements of social reproduction are carried out through 
the anarchy of private production for the purposes of profit. When the economy is in a healthy 
state (when profitability is high), it is able to recover from setbacks, but when unhealthy (when 
profitability is low) it becomes prone to crisis. Shaikh’s main concern are the economic setbacks 
and crises which are products of capitalism’s inner laws of motion. In the earlier years of his 
scholarship, he was concerned with a falling average rate of profit (ARP) accompanied by a 
rising organic composition of capital (OCC).177  
Comparable to the scholarship of the young Shaikh, the Marxist-fundamentalist Murray 
Smith argues that the root cause of the current global economic malaise is found in an 
intensifying crisis of valorization: a systemic crisis located in the creation of satisfactory 
                                                          
177 Shaikh 1978, p. 46. 
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volumes of ‘actual’ surplus-value relative to capital invested.178 Unlike Shaikh, Smith has spent 
the majority of his life as a political and social activist within the socialist-movement and pays 
close attention to what is referred to as the ‘dialectic of the unity between program and theory’: 
that one’s conception of what needs to be achieved to address the problems of our time 
inescapably informs the questions one asks and the conclusions that one will ultimately reach 
through critical inquiry.179 This is something merely glanced at by other political economists, but 
it is something that overwhelmingly informs Smith’s inquiry.    
Again, both Smith and Shaikh uphold the productive-unproductive labour (P/UP) 
distinction, but nevertheless they diverge in how exactly unproductive expenses are specified for 
purposes of empirical research. On the one hand, Shaikh rejects the Mage-Smith ‘constant 
capital overhead cost’ approach to ‘systemically necessary unproductive expenses’ (SNUL); and, 
naturally, Smith is adamant in his own rejection of Shaikh’s now canonical treatment of SNUL 
as an ‘absolute deduction’ and a ‘non-profit component’ of surplus-value. As Robert Eisner 
succinctly informs us, circulation and reproductive expenses are a “precondition for the net 
product rather than the net product itself”, something that “maintains the social fabric” of the 
capitalist social relation.180 As covered in the previous chapter, SNUL resembles ‘intermediate 
inputs’ which are systemically necessary from the point of view of the production of surplus-
value, of the social capital. 
Despite their differences, Shaikh and Smith engage in the identical procedure of 
segmenting the national wage-share based on the P/UP distinction. Productive labour is drawn 
from the NIA categories of mining, construction, agriculture, transportation, public utilities, 
                                                          
178 Smith 1991. 
179 Smith 2018, p. 195. 
180 Eisner, found in Shaikh and Tonak 1994, pp. 10-11. Shaikh and Tonak note that Mage 1963 conceptualizes such 
systemically necessary expenditures in a similar vein.  
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manufacturing and ‘productive services’ (that is, all services minus legal, business and private 
household services). SNUL is drawn from the categories that were omitted in the calculation of 
the productive labour force (that is, circulation, sales and government employees).181 Shaikh’s 
canonical position in regard to SNUL’s allocation persuades him to use before-tax estimates, 
while Smith uses after-tax estimates. Thus, Shaikh subtracts the SNUL wage-bill from his 
estimates for surplus-value while Smith does not; but unlike Shaikh, Smith goes one step further 
by including the accruals to the top one percent by income (the top 1%) in his estimate for 
surplus-value. Consequently, this greatly inflates Smith’s estimates, especially over the course of 
the neoliberal period as income polarization increased since the 1980s, widening the gap between 
rich and poor. 
There are various ways to operationalize Marx’s variables. In their 1994 book, Shaikh 
and Tonak attempt to measure US profitability using a different method than Smith. Shaikh and 
Tonak calculate the Marxian variables in units of labour-time rather than money-units: surplus-
value is equal to the new value added by workers less workers’ consumption requirements.182 
Hence, the work-day is divided into two parts a) necessary-labour-time and b) surplus-labour-
time, profits being a product of the latter. Necessary-labour-time over surplus-labour-time is the 
rate of exploitation (RE); or for productive workers, the rate of surplus-value (RSV).  
                                                          
181 Shaikh and Tonak 1994, p. 295. Smith and Butovsky 2018, p. 359. 
182 Shaikh and Tonak 1994.   
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Source: Shaikh and Tonak 1994, p. 187.  
 
In Figure 3, all maintain the canonical position that SNUL should be treated as both an 
‘absolute deduction’ and a ‘non-profit’ component of surplus-value (s). As previously stated, 
Shaikh and Tonak engage in the simplistic procedure of subtracting the SNUL wage-bill from 
the pool of already produced surplus-value which, in turn, obscures the actual magnitude of 
surplus-value produced in a given year.183 Shaikh and Tonak’s procedure places them between 
Tonak’s earlier independent study and Shaikh’s earlier independent study, and far above that of 
Moseley’s earlier study. Tonak uses a broad measurement for s similar to Roberts’ (see later in 
this chapter) as he subtracts the national wage-bill from total new value added. As a result, 
according to Shaikh and Tonak, Tonak’s earlier method overestimates s while Moseley’s 
                                                          
183 This actually leads to a modified, before tax RSV’: if SNUL’s wage-bill = u then RSV’= s-u/v. Such issues with 
the allocation of unproductive expenses were taken up in the previous chapter.   
 
Figure 3. Rate of Surplus-value, US Economy 1948-1989. (Shaikh and Tonak 1994; 
Shaikh 1981; Moseley 1985; Tonak 1984). 
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underestimates it.184  
 
Source: Smith and Butovsky 2016, p. 352.  
 
 
Smith’s and Butovsky calculates the RSV as a ratio of s (after-tax domestic corporate 
profits plus the elites’ wage-bill) over v (after-tax wage-bill of productive labour). Moreover, 
Smith and Butovsky urge their readership to understand that the jumps in their RSV in the late 
1980s as well as the peak in the early to mid-2000s are essentially ‘anomalous’ due to a 
proliferation of financial “profits” which distorts their findings.  
And as financial “profits” obscure the actual amount of surplus-value produced per 
aunnum, Shaikh calculates a ‘non-financial corporate ARP’ in a 2010 publication which evinces 
                                                          
184 See Shaikh and Tonak 1994, pp. 185-88. It is stated that Moseley’s imputations concerning ‘value added’ are 
roughly 20 percent lower than Shaikh and Tonak’s. 
Figure 4. Rate of Surplus-value, US Economy 1950-2013. 
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– albeit, with many fluctuations – a clear secular decline between 1947-2010. By abstracting 
from the financial sector altogether (that is, the finance, insurance and real estate sectors), his 
calculations remove aspects of currently produced surplus-value that have become associated 
with fictitious capital. Shaikh believes the ‘non-financial ARP’ is the strongest indicator of 
capital accumulation.185 
 
Source: Shaikh 2010, p. 48.  
 
In Figure 5, Shaikh calculates the US ‘non-FIRE corporate ARP’: the ratio of before-tax 
non-FIRE corporate profits over the current cost of ‘fixed corporate assets’. 186 As a result, it 
declines almost 50 percent from 15 percent in 1947 to eight and a half percent in 1982, then 
increasing to 13 percent in 1997 before dropping again in the early 2000s.  
                                                          
185 Shaikh 2010, p. 46.  
186 See (the appendix to) Shaikh 2010, p. 58.  
Figure 5. 'Non-FIRE' Average Rate of Profit, US Economy 1947-2009. 
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Source: Smith and Butovsky 2016, pp. 349-50.  
 
Here are Smith and Butovsky’s ARP and non-FIRE ARP estimates. These are formulated 
as the ratio of after-tax corporate profits plus the income of the top 1% over the current cost of 
corporate fixed assets. Smith and Butovsky’s estimates show a slight upward trend in the ARP, 
and a major decline in the non-FIRE ARP over the period of study. Their non-FIRE ARP 
declines over 50 percent from just north of 14 percent in 1950 to three and a half percent in 1982, 
rebounding to seven percent in 1997 (investment boom) and not surpassing that peak again.  
The upward trend in Smith and Butovsky’s ARP is most-likely a result of their procedure 
of adding elites’ income to the numerator of the ARP in the attempt to more accurately gauge the 
production of ‘actual’ surplus-value. In turn, this method served to inflate the revenue portion of 
their surplus-value estimate, which is especially clear since the 1980s. Yet, their ‘non-FIRE 
ARP’ declines significantly more than Shaikh’s; and this is most likely due to Shaikh adding 
Figure 6. Average Rate of Profit & Non-FIRE Average Rate of Profit, US Economy 
1950-2013. 
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corporate interest back while Smith and Butovsky abstain.  
 
Figure 7. Organic Composition of Capital (Bottom Line) in 1982 ‘Constant Dollars’, US 
Economy 1948-1989. 
. 
Source: Shaikh and Tonak 1994, p. 128 
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 Source: Smith and Butovsky 2016, p. 353 
 
Here, the OCC is defined as the ratio of dead-labour to new value produced, or dead- to 
living-labour (C/s+v).187 Both Smith and Butovsky’s as well as Shaikh and Tonak’s 
compositions rise over the courses of study and depict an inverse relationship with their 
corresponding ARP measures. While Shaikh and Tonak’s study is conducted in units of labour-
time and Smith and Butovsky’s in money-units, the general trend in their results are similar, 
however. Furthermore, although the former conceptualizes unproductive expenses in a different 
vein than the latter (including using either before-tax or after-tax measures), it appears to make 
little empirical difference. However, this directly affects the OCC and the VCC. So while it 
makes little difference in the results of the ARP, it is much more impactful concerning any 
formula which includes v. 
                                                          
187 Shaikh and Tonak refer to ‘fixed constant capital stock’ as Cf while Smith and Butovsky use C, and cf for 
‘constant capital flow’.  
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Figure 8. Value Composition of Capital & Organic Composition of Capital, US 
Economy 1950-2013. 
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From Fred Moseley to Andrew Kliman 
The preface to Fred Moseley’s 1991 book, The Falling Rate of Profit in the Post War United 
States Economy, begins by outlining the main objective of his study: subjecting the most 
important conclusions of Marx to rigorous empirical test: mainly that the rate of profit of a 
capitalist economy will fall due to changes in the composition of capital (primarily, the OCC).188 
Moseley goes beyond Smith and Shaikh by attempting to empirically test Marx’s theory of 
‘unproductive labour’ in great detail. According to Marx, Moseley writes, both the VCC and the 
RSV will increase overtime as a result of technological advancements set in motion by market 
competition. Consequently, the VCC will increase faster than the RSV putting downward 
pressure on the ARP. But as technological change causes the total capital invested to increase 
faster in the means of production (increasing output, growth, etc.) than in the means of 
circulation (increasing the rate of realization) there will also be a relative increase in the 
unproductive labour force to match the volumes of output, which puts downward pressure on the 
ARP.189 Moseley stipulates that constant capital and variable capital are restricted to the capital 
invested in production activities.190 By “production” Mosley means an expanded definition of 
‘production labour’ which includes transportation and storage facilities but excludes circulation 
and supervisory labour. In sum, all this indicates Moseley’s ostensible fidelity to the Marxist-
fundamentalist position.  
Moseley reduces constant capital to include only the physical means of production, 
whose value he says is transferred to the commodity via the production process. According to 
Moseley, Marx insisted that the costs of unproductive capital are to be recovered out of the pool 
                                                          
188 Moseley 1991, p. xxi.  
189 Moseley 1991. 
190 Ibid., p. 34.  
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of already produced surplus-value. Moreover, Moseley argues that the distinction between 
constant capital and variable capital has little to do with unproductive expenses, whose value is 
neither new nor transferred to the finalized commodity-product.191 Because Moseley defines 
variable capital as the money expended as capital to be exchanged for labour-power, he says that 
this exact amount of money must first be recovered through the sale of commodities before being 
transformed into surplus-value.192 It is in this dualistic and false notion which misleads Moseley 
to favour a ‘before-tax productive capital ARP’, which also includes a portion of governmental 
taxation as a component of variable capital.   
As Moseley deducts what he approximates to be the SNUL wage-bill from the numerator 
(s), he goes one step further by subtracting unproductive fixed and circulating assets from the 
denominator (C) of his profit rate as well.193 In turn, this method obscures the ‘actual’ amount of 
surplus-value generated relative to capital invested in a given year and excludes the costs of 
unproductive capital – thus, it is not a measure of the social capital as Marx intended.  
                                                          
191 Moseley’s approach is class centric in the sense that he adopts the standpoint of the capitalist class themselves.  
192 Moseley 1991, pp. 37-41. 
193 See Moseley 2000. 
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Source Moseley 1991, p. 78.  
 
Here, Moseley estimates surplus-value (s) by taking new value added in the productive 
sphere and subtracting employee compensation (a method similar to Michael Roberts), employee 
compensation being equal to variable capital (v). He uses the current cost of private fixed assets 
of productive capital and its circulating constant capital as the denominator. He defines the latter 
as something similar to the former, but instead subtracts the unproductive wage-bill from the 
numerator and excludes unproductive capital in the denominator of the profit rate. (If u stands for 
‘unproductive’ and a assets, then Mosley’s “new” rate of profit calculation follows as s-u/C-ua.) 
After peaking in 1965, Mosley’s “RP” and “RS” decline until the end of his study.  
To Moseley, Marx suggested that the laws of motion of capitalism will lead to expansive 
long-wave periods of prosperity which last until the ARP falls, culminating in depression or at 
Figure 9. Rate of Surplus-value, Average Rate of Profit and Value Composition 
of Capital, US Economy 1945-1977. 
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least ‘secular’ stagnation. Like many Marxists, Moseley writes that the ARP primarily recovers 
from economic crisis by the ‘devaluation of capital’ – the prerequisite to capitalist prosperity 
being prior depression.194 Due to a falling rate of profit, Moseley argues that the US economy 
entered a qualitatively new stage of development in the mid-1970s. This change occurred 
because capitalism entered a new long-wave cycle, from a long-wave period of expansion to a 
long-wave period of stagnation. Moseley argues that the economy was in a similar state in 1947 
as it was in 1977, for this reason he chooses to examine the US economy between these years. 
However, in a study conducted a decade later, Moseley extends his ARP estimate throughout the 
1990s. 
 
Source Moseley 2001, p.3. 
 
Figure 10. is Moseley’s updated ARP measure. This measure includes the neoliberal 
period and therefore the recovery in profitability that began in the 1980s. This temporary wave of 
                                                          
194 Moseley 2001, p. 12.  
Figure 10. Average Rate of Profit, US Economy 1947-2001. 
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prosperity continued through the 1990s and led to the 1997 jump in profits (investment boom), 
paving the way for the 2000s Dot-com bubble and crash. 
 
Source Moseley 1991, p. 86. 
 
Above, Moseley compares his OCC with the “wage-push/profit-squeeze” theorist, 
Thomas Weisskopf. Moseley defines the OCC as the ratio of the constant capital stock to the 
annual flow of new value, that is, the ratio of dead- to living-labour. Over the period of study, as 
Moseley’s ARP fell the OCC increased by 24 percent. His study also showed that the cost of 
fixed constant capital actually increased 36 percent while circulating constant capital – which he 
includes as a component of the rate of profit denominator – declined 19 percent over the same 
period.195 In turn, Moseley suggests that the counteracting force of the cheapening of the means 
                                                          
195 Moseley 1991, p. 65.  
Figure 11. Organic Composition of Capital, US Economy 1947-1977. 
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of production have devalued circulating constant capital more than its fixed counterpart. Moseley 
further suggests that the deflation of constant capital is a result of the extreme devaluation of 
stock which took place during the Great Depression, as well as earlier depressions and 
recessions. In turn, perhaps Marx’s predictions of an increasing OCC met with a corresponding 
decline in the ARP would be clearer over the post-war period if capitalist crises were not so 
effective at devaluating the costs of capital.   
What is more, Moseley also calculates the necessary-labour-time it takes for the average 
productive worker to produce the value equal to their wage and the surplus-labour-time which is 
appropriated by capitalists. Since 1947, surplus-labour-time has increased and necessary-labour-
time has decreased substantially. Given an average eight-hour workday in the US, by 1977 the 
former reached almost five hours while the latter dropped to roughly three hours.196 
Furthermore, Moseley’s findings indicate that the ratio of unproductive labour to 
productive labour has doubled over the post-war period. He writes that one explanation is that 
the majority of the productive work migrated overseas, generally to low-wage peripheral 
countries. However, he also argues that such changes in the economy only account for a small 
portion of the relative increase in unproductive labour, the causal mechanism behind such being 
increases in productivity.197 Moseley also finds that since the second world war commercial 
labour has increased 134 percent while productive labour only 44 percent.198  
Supervisory labour has also increased over the post-war era. Moseley argues that the 
majority of the growth in supervisory labour can be attenuated to management’s continuous 
attempt to maintain and improve their control over workers. Moseley proposes that the growth in 
                                                          
196 Ibid., p. 52 
197 Ibid., p. 124.  
198 Ibid., p. 143.  
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supervisory labour has not effectively contributed to falling profits because supervisors actually 
fill a functional role by assisting in increasing the productivity and discipline of workers. And, 
according to Moseley, although supervisory labour has increased, it only composes of roughly a 
quarter of the total unproductive workforce.199 
Moseley draws the conclusion that the growth of unproductive labour appears to be an 
inherent tendency of the capitalist system as a result of two derivative laws of motion: 1) slower 
productivity growth in the sphere of exchange compared to the productive sphere, 2) the size of 
commercial capital must expand because of rapid increases in productivity (this is because an 
increasing magnitude of exchange-values must be continuously realized in price form). Thus, it 
appears as the productive powers of a capitalist economy advance, so does its upkeep 
requirements. Growth in the former leads to growth in the latter, which therefore serves to 
amplify falling profits over the long run. 
In the end, Moseley’s initial estimations for how great an impact that the growth of 
unproductive capital has on capitalist production was overzealous. Perhaps, the hypertrophy of 
such unproductive expenses was more noticeable during the immediate post-war period. Moseley 
concludes his study by stating that we can still assume that the negative contribution from 
unproductive labour on the ARP is marginally greater than the negative contribution from an 
increasing composition of capital. An intriguingly bold statement that I attempt to empirically 
substantialize in the following chapter.  
Kliman 
In his 2011 book, The Failures of Capitalist Production, Kliman sets out to show that 
“overproduction” is not the cause of capitalist crisis, but instead a symptom of the inner 
                                                          
199 Ibid., pp. 142-145. 
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contradictions of capital accumulation and thus the result of a secular decline in the ARP. 
“Overproduction” may appear to be the cause of crisis, but this phenomenon is simply the 
surface manifestation of deep structural antagonisms inherent to capitalist production. Kliman is 
also one of the founding proponents of the temporal single system interpretation (TSSI) of 
Marx’s value theory. The TSSI approach is temporal rather than simultaneous because Marx’s 
theory – and social reality itself – is dynamic.  
The TSSI approach has wide-ranging implications. For example, Okishio’s theorem that 
the profit rate will tend to increase rather than to fall was based on a simultaneous system of 
equations. The algebra led him to unrealistically assume that increases in productivity would 
simultaneously reduce the costs of production. But this is not how it works in reality. Thus, 
inputs entering the production process do not need to match the prices of the ensuing outputs. 
What matters, as Kliman reassures us again and again, is not the current cost but the original cost 
of reproducing those assets, or a ‘historical cost’ valuation of constant capital.200  This method is 
followed by many Marxist economists, including Michael Roberts and Peter Jones. 
Kliman’s ‘historical cost approach’ is predicated on calculating the ARP denominator as 
the historical costs of private fixed assets corresponding to the previous year – meaning, for 
example, that the year-end 1949 NIA figure is imputed in his data set for the 1950 year. 
However, Anwar Shaikh, who uses the ‘current cost’ approach, also calculates the ARP in the 
Marxian tradition by using figures for the previous year because, and as he and Tonak assert in 
their 1994 book, the NIA database inputs the capital advanced for the year at the end of that 
same year.201 So this method of using the previous year is not unique to TSSI, only using the 
                                                          
200 Kliman 2007, p. 35. 
201 Shaikh 2010, p. 58. Indeed, as capital ‘advanced’, it is appropriate to use year end for the beginning of the next 
year.  
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NIA figures for ‘historical costs’ is. Yet, it appears that any difference in results is empirically 
inconsequential in the end, so the choice is really a matter of personal theoretical preference. 
Now, thus far I have surveyed two different methods pertaining to the treatment of 
unproductive expenses within the Marxian framework: the canonical ‘absolute deduction’ 
approach (Shaikh and Moseley) and the Mage-Smith ‘constant capital/overhead cost’ approach. 
Kliman is the first of the lot to effectively reject the P/UP distinction by treating all wages as 
productive of surplus-value, and therefore as variable capital.202 It is important to note that while 
Kliman rejects the P/UP distinction, his Marxian measurements refer to the social capital as a 
whole rather than just to productive capital. 
Kliman’s rejection of the P/UP distinction is a serious weakness in his work. But another 
weakness is the way that he measures workers’ wages. Sangjun Jeong asserts that Kliman 
overstates his estimates by counting the income of the top wage and salary earners as workers’ 
wages and also by double-counting.203 Jeong argues that the case made by the heterodox 
economists, Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, shows that a measure that includes the top 
five percent by income – like Kliman’s – is not really an estimate of working-class wages 
because it includes the various beneficiaries of capital and some capitalists as well.204 
 
                                                          
202 Kliman 2011, p. 101.  
203 Kliman’s double-counting is a result of him adding back social and government benefits to the wage-share.  
204 Jeong 2012, p. 5. In the next chapter, while undergoing a process that separates productive and unproductive 
labour, I only exclude the wages of the top 0.1%.  
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Figure 12. Average Rate of Profit & 'Property-Income' Rate of Profit, US Economy 1929-
2009. 
 
Source: Kliman 2011, p. 76.  
 
Here, Kliman operationalizes two ARP measures using historical-costs for the capital 
stock: a ‘property-income ARP’ and a ‘before-tax ARP’. What he refers to as “property income” 
is simply a calculation of net value added less employee compensation similar to Moseley and 
Roberts’ broad measurement for surplus-value; while the ‘before-tax ARP’ is his before-tax 
calculation for corporate net operating surplus.205 
Kliman writes that both of his profit rates appear to follow the same trajectory; sharply 
rebounding after the Great Depression of the 1930s due to massive amounts of monetary 
                                                          
205 Kliman 2011, pp. 99-101. Net operating surplus is a corporate rate of profit measurement and can be attenuated 
to before-tax corporate profits over the corresponding corporate fixed assets, historical valuation.  
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stimulus and capital destruction. From the end of the second world war to 2009, his ARP 
declines with only minor recoveries throughout. Mirroring my own research, Kliman states that a 
great deal of empirical research in the Marxist tradition grossly overstates the sharp increase in 
the ARP throughout the 1990s and right before the Great Recession of 2008.206  
Kliman is convinced that the aggregate wage-share has not fallen over the neoliberal 
period in the US. He asserts that the wage-share today is higher than it was a few decades ago, 
meaning that the problems of capitalism cannot be reduced to the problems of ‘effective demand’ 
or a lack of purchasing power (for example, “overproduction” cannot be the cause of the 2008 
crisis). In turn, he believes that a great deal of empirical research in the Marxist tradition has 
mistaken falling wages for the acute financialization of the economy.207 
 
Source: Kliman 2011, p. 132. 
                                                          
206 Kliman 2011, p. 77-8.  
207 Ibid., pp. 165-7, 89-91.  
Figure 13. Organic Composition of Capital, US Economy 1947-2007. 
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Figure 13 contains Kliman’s compositions of capital, which have risen over the period of 
study, the average growth of all three is 1.7 percent annually.208 Kliman’s empirical findings 
correspond with Marx’s own forecasts and again confirms the core thesis of the Marxist-
fundamentalist position of a falling ARP accompanied by a rising OCC. Kliman is insistent that 
the recovery in the ARP is not a result of falling wages but financialization; he also stresses that 
the lack of the destruction of capital which began around the early-1970s played a major roll as 
well. 
As Kliman is most concerned with economic crises, much of his 2011 book is dedicated  
to the ‘07-08’ global financial crisis that originated in the US economy’s real estate sector. But 
being so concerned crisis, it is odd that Kliman prefers a ‘property-income ARP’ which includes 
an element of taxation (specifically, he includes a tax component in the numerator of his ARP 
measure). This is odd because taxation fluctuates much differently than profits either before, 
during or even following a crisis. As covered previously, taxation is an ‘unproductive 
expenditure’ and not a component of surplus-value, and as the NIA imputes figures for taxation 
that do not reflect newly produced surplus-value, it is not to be included in the numerator.  
Guglielmo Carchedi and Michael Roberts: The Roots of Capitalist Crisis 
In The Long Roots of the Global Crisis, Carchedi and Roberts set out to prove that movements in 
the rate of profit on productive capital best reveals the roots behind capitalism’s tendency to fall 
into crisis. Similar to Moseley, they argue that because surplus-value originates in the productive 
sphere, special attention must be given to this profit rate.209 
                                                          
208 Ibid., pp. 132-3.  
209 Carchedi and Roberts 2018.  
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As Marxist economists, Carchedi and Roberts are most concerned with the empirical 
validity of Marx’s LTRPF as a theory of crisis, both explaining past capitalist crises and 
anticipating future ones. Like everyone surveyed in this chapter so far, they both uphold the 
fundamental postulate that the cause of capitalism’s dynamism – technological change – is the 
main cause of its failures: that is, the value expression of a rising OCC is met with a 
corresponding fall in the ARP. Like Kliman, Carchedi and Roberts argue that what is known as a 
crisis of “overproduction” is actually rooted in technological change, a result of the increasing 
mass of use-values which contain less and less exchange value. 
For Carchedi and Roberts, Marx’s ‘law as such’ (as in, the ‘social weight’ of the LTRPF 
is always ‘felt’) prevails irrespective of the various countertendencies because it is cemented in 
the fundamental social relations of capitalist production and reproduction – and regulated by the 
‘law of labour-value’. Overtime, as the ARP declines it eventually leads to the mass of profits 
contracting, which induces crisis.210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
210 Carchedi and Roberts 2018, p. 22; Carchedi 2017, p. 67-8.  
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Source: Roberts 2017, p. 4. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Carchedi and Roberts 2018, p. 21. (10yr rolling average) 
Figure 14. The Profit Cycle. 
Figure 15. US Average Rate of Profit, 1955-2012. 
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In Figure 15., like Moseley and Kliman, Roberts subtracts employee compensation from 
net national income for s, inflating his profits estimate. Like Kliman, both Carchedi and Roberts 
reject the productive-unproductive labour distinction, but they take it one step further by adding 
employee compensation (as v) to the denominator of the ARP.211  
From the standpoint of the individual capitalist, variable capital – in the form of wages – 
is simply a cost of doing business and may be included in its profit rate; but from the standpoint 
of the social capital, v is returned to it when workers use their wage to purchase commodities. 
Variable capital is therefore not included in the social capital’s ARP as its cost is “consumed” 
during reproduction. But nevertheless, Carchedi and Roberts decide its appropriate when looking 
at productive capital, and perhaps when analyzing specific junctures as it can tangentially 
enhance explanatory power.212 
 
                                                          
211 See chapter 2 of this study on the concept of fetishism.  
212 Including wages in the ARP can be a useful analytical tool, but it can also boost its downward tendency.  
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Source: Carchedi 2018, p.55. 
 
Here, Carchedi calculates the ARP using a narrow measure of surplus-value while 
remaining attached to the historical cost approach for private fixed assets and adding variable 
capital into the denominator (i.e., s/(C+v). This measurement appears as a much more accurate 
representation of US profitability than Figure 15.  
In order to better detect the causes behind capitalist crises, Carchedi goes further in 
calculating a modified ARP measure that uses a constant rate of exploitation: a ‘constant-
exploitation ARP’ (CE-ARP). This method effectively reduces the rate of surplus-value (RSV) to 
be constant with that of the 1950s, which in turn negates the countertendency of ‘increasing 
exploitation’ that came with neoliberalism in the 1980s. This modified ARP calculation evinces a 
stronger (albeit, a somewhat unrealistic and anomalistic) downward tendency. 
Figure 16. Average Rate of Profit & Organic Composition of Capital, US 
Economy 1947-2007. 
93 
 
 
Source: Carchedi 2017b, p 3. 
 
Carchedi believes that we must look to the factors which undermine any increase in 
aggregate profitability, and because a rising technological composition reduces surplus labour, 
we must look at what exactly exerts influence over the OCC – such as slow employment growth 
accompanied by a rise in growth in fixed productive assets. So, Carchedi thinks that 
investment/divestment in productive fixed and “non-fixed” assets are strong indicators of a crisis 
to come – which is agreeable. Moreover, this can be extrapolated to mean that fluctuations in the 
mass of constant capital and in the mass of variable capital (v), and potentially an increase in 
unproductive expenses, are all strong indicators of a potential crisis. 
Carchedi’s proof here is that five out of the seven financial crises over the last 60 years 
coincided with crises that originated in the productive sphere of the economy; and as the profit 
rate on productive capital fell, investment in assets grew faster than employment in the majority 
Figure 17. 'Constant Exploitation' (Normalized) Average Rate of Profit, US Economy 
1948-2014. 
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of cases.213 Over the post-war period the share of workers’ wages increased before 11 out of 12 
crises, confirming Marx’s statement that even though wages fall in the long-term, they rise right 
before crisis.214 Moreover, Carchedi identifies three specific points of intersection present in all 
12 crises since the second World War. He states that crises emerge when the rate of change in (a) 
the “CE-ARP” on productive capital, (b) employment and (c) new value are all negative.215 
However, both points (b) and (c) are rather superfluous in this sense because they are essentially 
captured by Carchedi’s “CE-ARP” measure anyway. 
 
Source: Carchedi 2017, p. 9. 
 
Although Carchedi’s use of the “CE-ARP” has demonstrated its analytical usefulness in 
learning about the causes behind crises, however, its purpose is ultimately rooted in the 
                                                          
213 Carchedi 2017, p. 21. 
214 Carchedi 2017, p. 23.  
215 Ibid., p. 8; Carchedi 2018, p. 75.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Percentage Fall from Pre-Crisis to Last Crisis Years: 'normalized' 
ARP, Employment, New Value Added, US Economy 1949-2009. 
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examination of the validity of Marx’s law of profitability itself, rather than real world processes 
despite what he argues.216 Insofar as the ongoing exploitation of the working-class is a 
fundamental characteristic of capitalism (after all, it is the very source of profit), a “CE-ARP” is 
not a measure of the social capital’s valorization process as a whole and not what Marx intended. 
Hence, by abstracting from fluctuations in the RSV one abstracts from viewing capitalism as a 
totality. 
It should be noted that many of the difficulties with Marxian empirical work arise from 
the need to rely on official but inadequate national accounting systems. Even so,  it remains well 
worth the effort, because Marx’s conceptual framework remains far superior to the alternatives. 
In response to the “demand-side” (post-) Keynesians and the “critical” Austrian economists’ on 
the issues of capitalism, Carchedi and Roberts argue that both these ‘mainstream currents’ 
proceed from the concept that production is for consumption rather than for profit, leading them 
to believe that consumption (exchange) fuels investment. The main variables for these currents 
are consumption and investment, not profits.217 Indeed, the mainstream economic paradigms of 
the last 200 years completely lack an adequate understanding of profits at the macro-level.218  
Drawing on other research, Carchedi and Roberts determine it is quite clear that 
investment is fueled by profits, with profits originating through the collective exploitation of the 
working-class in production. After all, exchange cannot occur before the production of 
exchangeable-commodities, so the former cannot act as the mechanism behind crisis. Now in 
regard to the problems of capitalism, Carchedi and Roberts argue that the Austrians think that 
increasing debt will prolong economic malaise; meanwhile the Keynesians reject this and believe 
                                                          
216 Then again, I am beginning to believe such ‘CE-ARP’ which includes v in its denominator, and that also includes 
unproductive assets while omitting a portion of the FIRE sector, would be the best indicator of crisis.  
217 Carchedi and Roberts 2018, p. 26. 
218 Obrinsky 1983, p.3.  
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that regulation and government stimulus will fix the underlying problems. For the Marxists, they 
add, the failures of capitalist production are rooted in falling profits relative to capital invested; 
capital needs to “self-destroy” in order to revitalize.219 
Carchedi and Roberts reckon that there are several conjunctural factors that will become 
catalysts in the next profitability crisis: such as commercial and trade wars (i.e., economic 
nationalism); the persistent growth of international debt and speculation in financial assets; 
military wars, especially in the Middle East and Africa; and the growth of nationalist, far right, 
fascist movements – with devistating austerity programs mixed in, of course.220 And as it seems, 
at least over the last few years, that much of their forecast is becoming reality. 
Conclusions 
While the combined work of Carchedi and Roberts is an impressive exposé of the current state of 
“advanced” capitalism in the US, I have various issues with their analysis. Carchedi and Roberts 
attempt to make visible the source of capitalism’s dysfunction: that the system’s social relations 
of production continuously generate unemployment, the destruction of value, poverty and war. In 
his 2016 book, The Long Depression, Roberts writes that over five years since the 07-08 crisis 
economic growth has yet to return to pre-crisis levels – meaning that we currently remain in the 
Long Depression today.221 His diagnosis can be summarized as follows.  
US profitability peaked in 1997, and again in 2005. This peak was a product of a 
multitude of factors but mainly due to the cheapening of the costs of production that happened 
over the 1990s due to the “high-tech/digital” revolution in the methods of commodity 
production, as well as globalization processes that pushed down wages in the ‘developed’ world. 
                                                          
219 See Carchedi and Roberts 2018 collection: The World in Crisis. 
220 Carchedi 2017, p. 22. 
221 See Roberts 2016.   
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After the 2005 peak in profitability, which was in fact lower than the peak in 1997, as suggested 
by Roberts, the countertendencies were exhausted. By the early- to mid-2000s, Marx’s ‘law as 
such’ became dominant once again; and by 2006 the mass of profits began to fall.222 Thus, the 
tenacious yet indirect effect of a declining ARP was present since 2000, and it fell for three 
years preceding the crisis. But the actual crisis wasn’t triggered until late 2007.223 Ever since, 
profitability and economic growth have failed to reach their levels of before the crash.  
The Great Recession of 2008 had deep roots. Consumers were offered increasing levels 
of debt peonage in order to accelerate consumer spending; by the 1980s, the ratio of household 
income to debt grew substantially and continued to grow throughout the 1990s and 2000s. By 
mid-2000, household debt hit its historic high before plummeting in early 2008.224 Low interest 
rates led to high consumer spending, which assisted profitability by maintaining ‘effective 
demand’ despite the decline in real wages.225  Yet, in the end, the surge in consumer spending 
increased the severity of the crisis, and the Great Recession of 2008 was the worst economic 
disaster since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Roberts and Carchedi’s assessment of the trends in the US economy is supported by the 
literature examined in this chapter and the findings found in the next chapter. Shaikh, Smith, 
Moseley and Kliman all observe a declining rate of profit prior to the 2008 crisis, indicating that 
the financial panic was rooted in the poor performance of productive capital (which began in the 
late-1960s and 1970s, well before neoliberalization).  
Indeed, Shaikh’s findings show that the US rate of profit drifts downward until the early 
1980s, when it stabilizes. Similar to Moseley, he designates the period of 1966 to 1982 as the 
                                                          
222 Roberts 2011; Carchedi and Roberts 2018.  
223 Roberts 2016.  
224 Carchedi and Roberts 2018, p. 22. 
225 Smith 2010, pp. 22-4; Shaikh 2010, p.54.  
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‘stagflation crisis’ (a crisis of stagnate economic growth combined with rising inflation), and 
1982-2007 as a long-wave period of growth. For the latter period, writes Shaikh, labour 
repression throughout Ronald Reagan’s presidency served the purpose of propelling 
profitability.226 While Smith, Shaikh and Moseley stress the negative impact of unproductive 
expenses on profitability, the others completely ignore it.  
Additionally, in his 1991 book Moseley suggested that it is unlikely that the US profit rate 
will recover over the 1990s, and without a significant recovery stagnation will continue, 
eventually culminating in severe depression.227 While Mosley was incorrect about the 1990s, he 
was correct to forecast another severe crash like the 2008 collapse and the Long Depression. 
Nevertheless, in a 2001 paper Moseley withdrew his earlier comments about the 1990s 
performing worse, maintaining (unlike Kliman) what has become near consensus among 
Marxist-fundamentalists concerning the recovery in the 1990s. While Kliman is alone in his view 
that wages have not decreased over the neoliberal period, much of his analysis follows the 
others. For these Marxian political economists, the secret behind the credit boom of the 2000s – 
the boom which sent the ARP climbing to new heights – was a sharp decline in interest rates and 
a proliferation of financial forms of valorization.228 
Nevertheless, there are also many theoretical and methodological problems that exist 
across the board. For instance, only Smith, Shaikh and Kliman attempt to operationalize an 
economy-wide ARP with a corresponding economy-wide OCC; that is to say, only these three 
adopt the proper analytical standpoint by conceptualizing capitalism as a totality, as Marx 
                                                          
226 Shaikh 2010, p. 22, 31. 
227 Moseley 1991, p. 158. 
228 Also, it should be noted that the overall reduction in ‘unproductive labour’ due to the shrinking of the public 
sphere via the neoliberalization of the 1980s and 1990s would have served to assist profitability. 
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intended. Moreover, as it is not possible to disaggregate the NIA figures into the Marxian 
categories of productive and unproductive capital with analytical precision, Carchedi and 
Roberts use goods-producing industries as a proxy for productive capital.229 Essentially, this 
yields a ‘physicalist’ profit rate, one that has definite uses but ultimately remains fetishized – and 
reminiscent of Adam Smith’s work. 
Using a broad measure of surplus-value – by following the procedure of dividing 
aggregate value added into two parts: 1) profit and 2) employee compensation – also suggests 
Smithain affinities insofar as this procedure seems informed by Adam Smith’s “trinity formula” 
rather than by Marx’s value-theoretic. Marx made it clear that he rejected Smith’s method 
because it was incapable of adequately explaining origin and nature of the surplus product under 
capitalist relations of production.230 Both Roberts and Moseley use this wholly bourgeois 
procedure to estimate quantities of surplus-value and to calculate the profit rate on productive 
capital; but Roberts also proceeds to add wages to the denominator while Moseley does not. This 
latter move by Roberts poses another problem by conflating stock and flow variables in the 
calculation of the Marxian value magnitudes. As Murray Smith argues, the total wage-bill is a 
flow that actually represents an ensemble of flows of value – some representing new value and 
some previously existing value.231 And as Marx’s law is formulated as the ratio of two value 
magnitudes consisting of s, a flow variable, and C a stock variable,, the denominator must 
represent the value of the stock for which capital has been advanced. 
 
                                                          
229 Ibid., p. 44, 47, 97.  
230 Adam Smith’s ‘trinity’ being rent, labour and profit – so in actuality a dualism, labour and profit; while Marx’s 
value-theoretic is triadic, P= c+v+s. See Marx 1991, p. 602. 
231 Smith 2010, pp. 56-59.  
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Despite the wide-ranging theoretical and methodological differences highlighted in this chapter, 
the general consensus is that profitability fell as the composition of capital rose after World War 
2, and that falling profits induce crisis. Marx recognized that ‘capital itself’ is the obstacle to 
capital accumulation, and this is precisely what the combined analyses of these Marxists show.232 
Their scholarship has empirically substantiated the historical limitations of the capitalist system 
that Marx identified over 150 years ago. They provide empirical proof that the historical trend of 
the capitalist system is to greatly benefit the owners of capital at the expense of those who 
struggle to produce it. What follows from this is the need to abolish capitalist social relation of 
commodity production and exchange in full, and replace capitalism through the reorganization, 
internationalization and socialization of the world economic system based on the scientific-
socialist paradigm that Marx and Engels spent their lives framing. 
Addendum: Financialization and Fictitious Capital 
Peter Jones shares many concerns of mine pertaining to the measurement of profitability and its 
determinants à la Marx. Jones, for example, argues that many ostensible Marxist economists 
subscribe to wholly inadequate Marxo-Keynesian or Neo-Ricardian interpretations of Marx’s 
theory of surplus-value.233 As an admirer of Andrew Kliman, Jones upholds the ‘temporal single 
system interpretation’ as well as the fundamental postulate of a falling ARP accompanied by a 
rising OCC. Jones also follows the conventional and canonical treatment of necessary 
unproductive expenses as a ‘non-profit’ and ‘absolute deduction’ from surplus-value. Instead of 
focusing on the measurement of the denominator of the ROP as Kliman does, Jones looks closely 
at its numerator; specifically, how we conceptualize and calculate an accurate measure of 
‘actual’ surplus-value.   
                                                          
232 See Marx 1973, p. 476.  
233 This includes Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital and the majority of David Harvey’s work, for example.  
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This means that the proper measurement of ‘corporate surplus-value’ (what he calls the 
corporate profit derivative component of surplus-value) is his chief concern.234 Furthermore, 
Jones claims that he can calculate the magnitude of essentially non-fictitious ‘corporate surplus-
value’ via the unique procedure of measuring on the expenditure-side rather than the income-side 
of the national economy. Along the lines of what has been argued in this study, Jones sees 
fictitious capital as something that destroys the equality between the ‘income and expenditure of 
value’, generating a misleading picture by illegitimately inflating the NIA category of domestic 
corporate profits.235 Because of this, Jones decides to calculate s by using his own “net revised 
output datasets” that he believes will yield a non-fictitious ARP measurement. The result is an 
ARP that displays a paradoxical downturn over the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
Source: Jones 2013, p. 17.  
                                                          
234 Jones 2018. This is a newer, revised and far superior version of Jones’ 2013 work. For the purposes of this 
section, I focus on his 2013 work.  
235 Jones 2013, p. 10. Here Jones is referring to the NIA category of ‘domestic corporate profits’.  
Figure 19. Jones’ ‘Non-Fictitious’ Average Rate of Profit, US Economy 
1949-2012. 
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Here, Jones’ ARP (ROP in the Figure above) declines at an unrealistic rate starting in the 
1980s. His method of calculating ‘corporate surplus-value’ has led him to remove an excess of 
profits, negating the neoliberal recovery. Jones rightly considers ‘capital gains’ fictitious, but so 
does the NIA. Therefore, accounting for ‘capital gains’ is Jones’ first mistake of double-
counting. His second mistake comes with the treatment of value added in the financial sphere as 
an ‘intermediate input’ rather than a part of the final output.236 As Takuya Sato notes, the NIA 
adopted a new policy in 1993 which counts value added in the financial sphere as final output, 
meaning that Jones’ method cannot resolve the problems associated with fictitious capital 
aggregated alongside financial profits in the national accounts.237 Contrary to Jones, Sato argues 
that the best strategy for dealing with fictitious profits in the NIA accounts is to distinguish 
between actual and fictitious profits – a disaggregation to suppress fictitiousness.238 Jones 
attempts no such disaggregation. 
Based on Sato’s recommendation – and proceeding from the law of the tendential 
equalization of profit rates  – I ‘normalize’ the profit rate of the FIRE sector by bringing it into 
line with the average non-FIRE profit rate. This is done by applying the ‘non-FIRE ARP’ to 
financial assets, removing much of the so-called “profits” generated by financial speculation and 
redistributions of income.239 Consequently, the difference between total financial profits (FP) 
recorded in the NIA and ‘normalized’ financial profits (nFP) in a given year is total fictitious 
capital (FC): 
                                                          
236 Jones 2013, p. 13.  
237 Sato 2015, pp. 66-7.  
238 Sato, found in Smith and Butovsky 2018, p. 343.  
239 Take for a given year a non-financial ARP of 15 percent and a financial rate of profit of 35 percent. This 
procedure simply ‘normalizes’ finance’s 35 percent profit rate by bringing it down to 15 percent, equal to the rest of 
the economy. Here, credit for this procedure must be given to my supervisor, as this idea came to him over lunch 
last summer.   
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FC = FP - nFP 
To calculate what I call ‘actual’, or, rather, ‘Marxian Gross Output’ (MGO), one simply subtracts 
FC from total national output (GDP): 
MGO = GDP - FC 
And to arrive at a ‘normalized’ ARP calculation, one needs to calculate nFP. This is done by 
taking the ‘non-FIRE ARP’ and multiplying it by the corresponding year’s financial assets (FA): 
nFP = non-FIREARP * FA 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (NIA).  
 
The difference between FIRE sector profits and normalized FIRE sector profits is 
fictitious capital (FC), indicated by the ‘up/down bars’ in Figure 20. Based upon these results, 
the normalization method appears to suppress some elements of fictitiousness, especially since 
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2001. Another way to illustrate this is with the mass of profits. Below, I take the mass of profits 
(i.e., the total mass of surplus-value produced in a year) and highlight the proportion which 
constitutes FC. 
 
Figure 21. Mass of Profits (FC). 
Source: Author’s calculations (NIA).  
 
Figure 21 shows that before the 2008 crash, the mass of profits fell in the year preceding 
it, with large volumes of FC growing in the decade before it. Following the Great Stagflation of 
the 1970s, the lowest point in Figure 21 was when the “third world” debt crisis finally struck the 
US in 1986.  
As for my own procedure in calculating surplus-value (s), I include the accruals to the top 
one-tenth of a percent (the top 0.1%) by national income. By doing so, this procedure still treats 
as surplus-value elements of FC embedded in elite salaries, elements that have unquestionably 
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grown considerably since the 1980s. It should also be noted that, at the moment, it is impossible 
to differentiate between FC in the FIRE sector and FC circulating in the broader economy. 
Nonetheless, as long as the FIRE sector generates massive volumes of FC relative to its size, 
then this procedure holds merit. For now, this normalization procedure serves to suppress to a 
reasonable extent some fictitious elements of profit in the FIRE sector, thereby lessening (if not 
eliminating) the spurious impact of fictitious profits included in the NIPA accounts on our 
measurement of surplus value. 
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Chapter 4: Marx’s Empirical Variables and the Analysis of US Capitalism, 1950-2016 
 
Between the years 1825 and 1985, the laws of development of global capitalism surrendered the 
world market to 21 industrial crises, averaging one every seven and a half years.240 The US 
economy, the most advanced capitalist economy in the world, has contracted in recession or 
depression over 33 times since the American Revolution of the late 18th century, averaging one 
every six to seven years.241 The last US economic crisis, which was also a global crisis, ended in 
mid-2009, over nine years ago. This marks the last nine years as the longest period of seemingly 
continuous capitalist reproduction without crisis in the history of the US.242 The obvious 
question: what comes next?  
This chapter presents empirical findings pertaining to the fundamental Marxian value-
ratios for the (post-war) US economy between the years of 1950 and 2016: the average rate of 
profit (ARP), the rate of surplus-value (RSV), the organic composition of capital (OCC) and the 
value composition of capital (VCC). Furthermore, this chapter also presents estimations of the 
rate of growth of total US output (MGO) and capital accumulation (CA), as well as an 
assessment of the negative impact of ‘systemically necessary unproductive labour’ (SNUL) and 
fictitious capital (FC). The study uses data from the US National Income Accounts (NIA), US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics, Saez-Piketty (2015), Anwar Shaikh (2016), and Michael Roberts 
(2017), and contributes to the burgeoning body of literature on Marxian economics by 
demonstrating the indispensability of a class-based, value-theoretical analysis of “advanced” 
                                                          
240 Mandel 1986, no page.  
241 See Roberts 2016. In 2017, the sum of global GDP (the valuation of 189 different economies combined) was 
slightly greater than $85tr while US GDP was slightly greater than $19tr – which means that in 2017 the US 
economy alone contributed to just north of 22% of global economic output. 
242 Next to the prosperous stretch of continuous economic growth in the 1990s, now (spring 2018) is the longest 
stretch without crisis in the history of US capitalism. This “prosperous stretch” may be crisis-less but is seriously 
lacking any actual growth as it is mostly driven by finance.  
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capitalism.  
The objective of chapter four is twofold. First, I ‘test Marx’. By operationalizing Marx’s 
concepts as empirical variables based upon the definitions found in the previous chapters as well 
as the appendix to this chapter, my goal is to ‘test’ his most crucial forecasts against the 
evolution of US capitalism between 1950 and 2016. Second, I ‘test capital’. By drawing on my 
own empirical work, I analyze broad trends in capitalist production since the Great Stagflation of 
the 1970s and the advent of ‘neoliberalization’.  
Part I: Marx’s Forecasts, The Rate of Profit and US National Income and Accounting Data 
The US Economic Order Today 
The US has experienced many years of lively growth, especially following the Second World 
War; but the US economy has also been stricken by various forms of economic crises and 
decades of sluggish economic growth. Since the 1970s, the US economy has performed more 
and more poorly as employment, economic growth and productive investment have all 
undergone a historic decline. The underlying source of this decline is to be found in the secular 
downward trend in the economy-wide average rate of profit – particularly, its long descent 
beginning at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s. However, due to the neoliberal restructuring 
of the late-1970s and early-1980s, this decline has been masked by the heightened exploitation of 
the workforce, by globalization and state-driven imperialism, as well as by various mechanisms 
of financial engineering that have led to a proliferation of fictitious forms of capital circulating 
throughout the “advanced” economies. 
The historical evolution of the US economy confirms several of Marx’s projections about 
the development of the capitalist mode of production, above all his ‘law of capital accumulation’. 
As per the latter, capital accumulation has skyrocketed since the Second World War as 
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investment in fixed and financial assets in the US has increased at a much faster pace than  
employment.243 According to the 2018 World Inequality Report, wealth inequality in advanced 
capitalist countries is mainly a product of the unequal ownership of private and public fixed and 
non-fixed capital, and while public capital has contracted due to neoliberalism, private capital 
owned by just a tiny minority of the population has doubled since 1970.244 Capital accumulation 
globally has led to such an extreme concentration of capital in the hands of a tiny minority that in 
2013 just five companies – Carlsberg, Heineken, SABMiller, InBev, and Anheuser Busch – 
accounted for over half the world’s consumption of beer.245 
At the top of the US Economic Order is that tiny minority of the population that Marx 
called the bourgeoisie. One way of constructing quantitative measures of inequality in the US 
social order is by examining national income shares of different population strata as percentages 
of GDP. However, this measures a pre-determined share of aggregate income and therefore it is 
not a measure of class as Marx understood it. In Figure 22 below, I use the NIA as well as the 
data-sets provided by the economists Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty to construct after-tax 
measures of the income of what can be understood as the ruling class (or ruling elite) by 
examining trends for the top five percent and the top one percent of income as a percentage of 
Marxian Gross Output (MGO).246 Since the mid-1980s, the ruling elite’s income has been 
accelerating, peaking in 2006 and again in 2012.   
 
                                                          
243 Roberts 2018, pp. 33-36. For a detailed exposé see Shaikh 2016.  
244 World Inequality Report 2018, p. 10. 
245 Norfield 2016, p. 113.   
246 See Saez-Piketty’s excel datasets (2015): table A.1. Retrieved from https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/. 
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 Source: Author’s calculations (NIA). 
 
Figure 22 also includes two Marxian categories as a percentage of MGO: variable capital, 
calculated as the after-tax wage-bill of the productive labour force, and systemically necessary 
unproductive labour, calculated as the after-tax wage-bill of the SNUL labour force. I also 
include the total working-class wage-bill, which combines both. My findings show that workers’ 
wages declined as a percentage of the value of output over the post-war period and began to 
decline at an even faster rate starting in 1988 with a near vertical drop of six percent. The chief 
factor behind this drop was massive neoliberal funding cuts to the public sector, leading to a drop 
in the SNUL wage-bill in the late 1980s. It was not until the investment boom of the late 1990s 
and the following 2000-01 dot-com crash that workers’ wages partially recovered.247 
                                                          
247 In Figure 21., each flow is calculated as a percentage of MGO (a Marxian approximation for GDP less the 
fictitious capital located in the FIRE sector): two particular reasons for a somewhat anomalous drop in workers 
wages between 1987-2000 for example are 1) major shifts in the global economy which led to changes in gross 
output over the neoliberal period: see Kliman 2011, and 2) the black Monday stock market crash of 1987 which 
began in China and emerged later in the US economy.  
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Looking at current trends, it appears to be only a matter of time before the top five 
percent (by income share) overtake the income share of the collective productive workforce 
(depicted as v in the above figure). What’s more, the clear secular decline in variable capital 
further confirms Marx’s prognosis concerning the diminishing rate of return on capital stock due 
to the law of falling profitability, as an absolute reduction in variable capital is most likely 
associated with a contraction in the size of the productive workforce and reduced surplus-value 
production. Interestingly, the findings in Figure 22 show that the SNUL wage-bill peaked in 
1971 and remained flat until 1988. Thereafter it dropped and continued to do so up to 2016. 
These findings challenge the core thesis of Moseley’s 1991 book, which was reviewed in the 
previous chapter. To recap, Moseley argues that, at least in the advanced economies, there is a 
tendency for SNUL to increase as output increases; and that the negative impact of this increase 
on the rate of profit is greater than that of a rising technical composition of capital.248 Contrary to 
Moseley’s thesis, my findings suggest that there is no clear secular rise in the SNUL wage-bill – 
at least in the period after 1970. This is most likely due to the fact that sophisticated labour-
displacing technologies have shifted towards commercial and finance capital (such as advanced 
computer networking systems). As a result of technological innovation, productivity is increased, 
and workers are displaced.  
Moreover, beginning in the 1980s, much of the SNUL workforce shifted to precarious, 
menial, and low-wage work, a trend that would also explain why the SNUL wage-bill has been 
relatively stagnant.249 Indeed, over the last two decades there has been a general rise in 
precarious-type employment in the advanced economies. Using a narrow measure for precarity, a 
                                                          
248 Moseley 1991, pp. 150-51.  
249 In recent years automation has penetrated unproductive capital. Take for example the cashier-less stores that 
Amazon has now introduced which have fully replaced workers in various types of convenience and retail stores 
with a quick transaction tap-and-go style checkout.  
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May 2017 report released by the US Bureau of Labour Statistics stated that nearly four percent 
(5.9 million) of the working population were employed in ‘contingent’ positions. In addition, 
i2.6 million workers were employed in ‘on-call’ positions and 933,000 were employed by 
precarious contract firms.250 It is safe to assume that SNUL’s negative impact on the ARP would 
have been more apparent over the immediate post-war period, and that its steady growth over the 
1940s, 1950s and 1960s would have contributed to the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s. 
Simon Mohun attempts to locate the “modern capitalist” – whom he calls a “financial 
oligarch” – by using tax-unit data in his analysis of the class composition of the US economic 
order. Mohun specifies a class that is not in direct need of employment and that can, afford a 
luxurious lifestyle by dint of access to non-labour income (such as rent, share dividends, etc.) as 
the quasi capitalist class.251 In 1918, this class made up roughly four percent of the US 
population, but by 2011 it comprised roughly two percent of the population.252  
Moreover, a minuscule fraction of quasi capitalists can be considered the ultra-affluent 
billionaire capitalists – the industrial/tech giants or finance moguls like Warren Buffet or Jeff 
Bezos – the wealthiest of capitalists whose fortunes often dwarf the combined national wealth of 
whole countries. Such fortunes also grants them tremendous global socio-political influence.253  
                                                          
250 See the US Bureau of Labour Statistics, May 2017, Economic News Release: Alternative Employment 
Arrangements Summary. The BLS uses a narrow measure for precarity which they have termed ‘contingency’, for a 
more accurate measure see a 2015 article on the Canadian region by Lewchuk et al.  
251 See Mohun 2014, p. 22. While Mohun avoids mainstream conceptions of “income-brackets” he looks specifically 
at the social position and therefore class (that is, the relation to the means of production). When attempting to 
disaggregate national income, the issues that one is confronted with when looking at separating people into ‘income 
brackets’ are immense. Nevertheless, some who attempt to do so report that CEO-to-worker compensation in the US 
has increased over 900% since the 1970s. See: Mishel and Davis 2014. 
252 Mohun 2014, p.25.  
253 By July 2018, Bezos’ personal fortune towered over the competition as it swelled over $50bn since the beginning 
of the year, reaching an unprecedented $150bn, sitting just below the combined fortune of the Walton family. See 
Bloomberg, July 16, 2018.   
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Now below this ensemble of modern-day capitalists, are bureaucrats and managers. This 
supervisory layer attends to ‘social upkeep’ and functions as defenders of capital – something 
like Marx once called ‘functioning capitalists’.  Mohun refers to them as ‘labour-power 
dependent managers’ rather than capitalists because of their particular social position in relation 
to commodity production. These ‘well off’ managers (including state bureaucrats and politicians) 
take home hefty incomes primarily derived from the performance of salaried labour rather than 
ownership of assets (although, like some affluent workers, they normally enjoy ownership of 
significant pension funds at the very least). Based on Mohun’s estimates, this ‘managerial class’ 
had almost doubled from eight percent in 1918 to roughly 14 percent by 2011.254  
Finally, Mohun finds that roughly 84 percent of wage and salary earners  can be 
considered working-class, down from 88 percent in 1918.255 At one pole one finds a small 
minority of affluent workers who can be viewed as part of the upper echelons of the wider 
society (perceived, perhaps, as the “upper-middle-class” 256) while at the opposite pole, one finds 
an ‘under-class’ (a ‘reserve army of labour’, as Marx called them), which constitutes a 
marginalized and “specially oppressed” layer of the working-class.257  Consider the following: a 
2004 US study found that the bottom quintile of the white working population owned over 400 
times the wealth of the bottom quintile of the black working population.258 This suggests that 
racialized workers in the United State experience a special oppression that distinguishes them 
from their white counterparts. To put this into perspective, in the US in 1918 the average 
                                                          
254 Mohun 2014, p. 25.  
255 Ibid. 
256 These are high-skilled technology-based workers for example, or those who have benefited in some way or 
another from major shifts in the economy, from inheritance, or perhaps they are low-level department-based 
supervisors or ‘key-holders’.  These are the beneficiaries of capital, the “well-paid” workers, entirely 
unrepresentative of the masses.  
257 There are more classes in society than this, such as the petty-bourgeoisie (small-scale producer or employer). 
258 Williams 2004, pp. 683-85. See Mills 2014, p.28.  
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individual quasi capitalist (whose class made up four percent of the population) was “worth” 3.7 
times the average ‘LP dependent manager’ and 11 times the average worker.259 In 2011, the 
average “quasi-capitalist” (whose class now makes up two percent of the population) saw his 
wealth rise to 5.8 times that of an ‘LP dependant manager’, 21.8 times that of the average 
worker, and thus thousands of times that of the average black worker.260 
The Value Composition of US Output  
The Mage-Smith perspective demonstrates that the massive expansion of unproductive expenses 
in the advanced economies – specifically, over the immediate post-war period – has become a 
major systemic ‘overhead cost’ which has long impaired capital accumulation. The growth in the 
unproductive wage-bill has an inverse relationship to profitability. In other words, over the post 
war era it appears that the greater the magnitude of surplus-value relative to output the larger the 
SNUL wage-bill. The increase in the magnitude of SNUL is a result but never the cause of an 
increasing mass of surplus-value. Although SNUL operates in conjunction with the social 
capital, its magnitude depends on the quantity of output – the total mass of saleable commodities 
must be constantly realized as exchange-values in price form, and the realization process depends 
upon the performance of SNUL labour.261 
In order to study trends in the value composition of capital for the US economy, I draw 
on the method found in Murray Smith’s 1984 MA thesis. The ‘value composition of output’ 
(VCO) is a ratio involving all three Marxian flows of value: surplus-value (s), variable capital (v) 
and the flow of constant capital (cf). The purpose of the VCO is to construct an empirical 
                                                          
259 Mohun 2014, p. 25. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Smith 2010; Moseley 1991. However, this requires a caveat. Unproductive capital has long introduced labour-
saving technologies such as ‘self-checkouts’. But this is become more and more advanced and pronounced 
throughout the digital age as online-shopping and delivery, etc.  
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measurement alongside the ARP that tracks the composition of value (re)production (the flows of 
value produced annually). Other things being equal, an increase in the constant capital flow 
results in a relative reduction in the new value added to the economy. As against the proto-
reformist procedure of treating SNUL (S) as a deduction from surplus-value (s) after the fact (s – 
S), as with Moseley, Jones, Shaikh and Tonak, I subscribe to the Mage-Smith approach to SNUL 
which treats S as a component of constant capital (cf). Since cf incorporates a myriad of different 
value streams (such as capital depreciation, raw material consumption, taxes, fuel, etc.) I also 
include in the figure below Inventories and Tax Flow to ensure that fluctuations in the VCO are 
not simply mistaken for increases in taxes or the cost of goods.  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (NIA).  
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Because cf represents the annual consumption of the ‘factors of production and 
reproduction’ that play an indirect role in valorization, SNUL is subsumed under this value 
category.262 While the value of Inventories evinces a serious decline, the Tax-Flow remains 
steady, hovering around 10 percent of MGO over the 66-year period of study. Similar to the 
SNUL wage-bill found in Figure 21, cf slows its longitudinal ascent in the early 1970s, and from 
1970 to 2016 its trend is essentially flat. The sharp drop in the SNUL wage-bill in 1988 (seen in 
Figure 22) is reflected in the VCO by a minor downturn in cf in 1988. In 2016, the components 
of annual output consisted of 77 percent cf, 14 percent v, and 9 percent s.  
Mostly because its trend has been relatively flat since the 1970s it appears that the 
negative impact of SNUL on the ARP was marginal over the entire period studied. But it should 
be noted that the period in which the ARP fell most dramatically was also the period in which 
SNUL expanded most rapidly. In regard to Moseley’s 1991 study, his empirical analysis was 
conducted between 1947 and 1977 so it is possible that the hypertrophy of the SNUL-sphere 
over the immediate post-war period would have been more noticeable then. That being said, it 
appears that SNUL’s negative effect on profitability is significantly less than that of the rising 
composition of capital.  
The Average Rate of Profit for the US Social Capital  
Since capitalism is a mode of generalized commodity production dominated by the private 
appropriation of profit, the ARP is a reflection of the ongoing class struggle between capital and 
labour and an expression of the contradiction between the development of the forces of 
production and the historically specific capitalist relations of production.  
                                                          
262 This does not include ‘fixed constant capital’ (C) – which is the denominator for the ARP.  
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Because the NIA data series are not conducive to empirical analysis in the Marxian 
tradition, many modifications must be made. As suggested by Smith and Butovsky, in order to 
calculate variable capital the national wage-share must be segmented into the categories of 
productive and unproductive labour, and then a crude ‘effective tax rate’ must be applied to 
obtain after-tax wages. I have calculated variable capital (v) as the after-tax income of productive 
workers based on the NIA figure employee compensation, less the after-tax income of the top 
‘one-tenth of the top one percent by income’ (what I see as income of the capitalist ruling 
class/elite), and less the income of the SNUL wage-bill. The following NIA sectors are defined 
as unproductive: finance, insurance, real estate, legal services, wholesale, general government, 
business services and other miscellanies services (see the Appendix to this chapter for my 
methodology). Due to various limitations in the data, all other workers are considered productive 
labourers.263  
Since I adhere to the ‘temporal single system interpretation’ of Marx’s value theory, I 
concur with Kliman and Carchedi that the historical valuation of fixed assets is what truly 
matters. Accordingly, C is calculated as the historical-dollar value of private fixed assets across 
the whole economy (i.e., both productive and unproductive assets) that corresponds to the 
previous year – meaning that, for example, the 1949 NIA figure is imputed for the 1950 year. 
And finally, I calculate surplus-value (s) as after-tax domestic corporate profits (in which the 
FIRE sector’s profits are normalized, see Figure 20) plus the after-tax income of the ‘top one-
tenth of the top one percent’ (the top 0.1%) of the recipients of the national income share.264 I 
                                                          
263 To note, this is a serious compromise because not all workers employed by productive capital are indeed 
productive of surplus-value and, moreover, sometimes a single worker can fill both a productive and unproductive 
role within the same work-hour.  
264 Data on the top 0.1% by income was retrieved from Saez-Piketty’s excel datasets (2015): table A.1. Retrieved 
from https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/. For the 2016 year, I use the data from 2015 but add inflation.  
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believe this procedure generates a relatively accurate picture of the surplus-value produced. 
Unlike Carchedi and Roberts, I do not include v in the denominator of my ARP calculation 
because, from the point of view of the social capital, there is no meaningful investment in 
variable capital prior to production and the ‘advanced capital’ in Marx’s rate of profit in Capital 
Volume III (either productive or SNUL workers).265 As  previously mentioned, I adopt the Mage-
Smith approach insofar as I have allocated SNUL as a component of cf.  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (NIA).  
 
According to Marxist theory, if the VCC – expressed in value terms as C/v – rises at a 
faster rate than the RSV – expressed in value terms as s/v – the ARP will also fall, other things 
                                                          
265 Mage 1963, p. 36. 
Figure 24. Rate of Surplus-value & Value Composition of Capital, US Economy 
1950-2016. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
3
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
7
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
6
R
SV
V
C
C
VCC RSV
118 
 
being equal. Figure 24 shows that the RSV and the VCC have a near identical slope, which, in 
turn, implies that the trend in the corresponding ARP will be roughly flat – and indeed it is (see 
my preferred ARP measure below). The neoliberal restructuring involved austerity measures that 
were forced upon the working-class and operated as a boost to profitability. Figure 24 shows that 
the RSV maintains an altitude north of 50 percent for the greater part of the last three decades. 
The rising VCC trend also reflects the relatively minor destruction of capital since the late 1970s, 
at least up to the Dot-com crisis of 2000-01. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (NIA). 
 
Figure 25 reveals my ARP and OCC trends over the same period – my after-tax 
historical cost and ‘normalized’ ARP and OCC measures for the US social capital. As the US 
emerged victorious from the Second World War, the rapid post-war advancement in the methods 
Figure 25. Average Rate of Profit & Organic Composition of Capital, US Economy 
1950-2016. 
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of production forced a steep decline in the ARP as the OCC rose up to 1970. The prosperous 
stretch that followed the initial stages of the Vietnam War was only temporary as the inner laws 
of capital forced escalating interest-rates, triggering a crisis in 1969-1970 and compelling US 
President Richard Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971. Toward the 
end of the 1970s inflation was running rampant. At the same time, however, there was little 
economic growth and by 1980 the ARP was falling.266 
The Great Stagflation of the 1970s induced a near uninterrupted decline in US 
profitability of near 50 percent from 1979 to 1983. As a result of the various economic 
malfunctions from Great Stagflation, the “solution” to the unassailable contradictions of 
capitalism was draconian neoliberal social architecture. This new architecture, as Carchedi and 
Roberts argue, with its dismantling of various less-profitable industries, globalization, the 
massive expansion of private debt and wide-spread austerity programs, has led to a new 
economic environment with less crises overall but also much less growth. 
Following the banking crises in the 1980s, the hyper-financialization of the US economy 
culminated in a mostly fictitious, financial boom over the course of the 2000s which ended in a 
financial crash that shook the world. And while a slight post-crisis recovery took place in 2012, 
and again in 2015, profitability has yet to return to its earlier 2006 level. Hence, it is entirely 
plausible to speak of what Roberts calls ‘the Long Depression’. 
                                                          
266 Not only did the relative price in the means of production decrease in the 1970s which would boost the rate of 
profit, there were low levels of fixed constant capital in the US around this time – primarily due to the severity of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. See Moseley 1991, pp. 67, 99. However, capital accumulation (CA) increased at an 
unparalleled rate in the late 1970s (see Fig. 31. in part II of this chapter).  
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Source: Author’s calculations (NIA). 
 
Stemming from the ubiquitous ‘law of labour value’ is what Marx, Engels and many 
others considered the most important law of political economy: the ‘law of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall’. In Figure 26, I have taken it upon myself to operationalize eight variegated 
ARP and OCC formulations based on the work found in Chapters Two and Three of this study. I 
have also presented a calculation of the mean of all eight ARP and OCC formulations along with 
their respective trendlines as well. What this suggests is that when one ‘tests Marx’, even in 
somewhat different ways, the actuality of his law of profitability proves to be quite striking. All 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
6
O
C
C
A
R
P
non-FIRE ARP Preferred ARP (After-Tax Hist.)
Productive Capital ARP (s/C+v Before-Tax Current.) Productive ARP (s/C+v+SNUL After-Tax Current.)
Productive Capital ARP (After-Tax Current.) ARP (Before-Tax Hist.)
ARP (Before-Tax Current.) 'Working' Corporate Surplus ARP (After-Tax Current.)
AVG of all Eight ARPs non-FIRE OCC
Preferred OCC (After-Tax Hist.) Productive Capital OCC (Before-Tax Current.)
Productive Capital OCC (C+SNUL/s+v After-Tax Current.) Productive Capital OCC (After-Tax Current.)
OCC (Before-Tax Hist.) OCC (Before-Tax Current.)
'Working' Corporate Surplus OCC (After-Tax Current.) AVG of all Eight OCCs
Linear (AVG of all Eight ARPs) Linear (AVG of all Eight OCCs)
Figure 26. Eight Variegated ARP & OCC Measures & Averages, US Economy 1950-
2016. 
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of the ARPs depicted here display a clear secular downward trend, while the corresponding 
OCCs show a clear secular upward trend – just as Marx so aptly anticipated in the 19th century. 
It is difficult to deny that the weight of evidence empirically confirms that over the long run 
profitability suffers as the composition of capital rises. under capitalism.267 Displaying such a 
counter-intuitive and irrational socio-economic dynamic, this suggests that capitalism can never 
be a system tailored to meeting the fundamental needs of all of humanity or conducive to 
meeting the great challenges that we face in the 21st Century.  
The ARP with the lowest rate of return and therefore the highest ratio of dead-labour is 
the ‘non-FIRE ARP’ formulation. It begins at 9 percent in 1950 and ends at six percent in 2016, 
while the corresponding ‘non-FIRE OCC’ begins at 3 points in 1950 and ends at 4.1 points in 
2016 – a 1.1 increase in the OCC is met with a three percent decrease in the ARP. The ARP with 
the highest rate of return is the ‘before-tax historical cost ARP’ which begins at 24 percent and 
ends at 12 percent. The corresponding ‘before-tax historical cost OCC’ begins at 2.7 and ends at 
4.4 in 2016 – an increase of 1.7 is met with a 12 percent decline in the ARP. 
 The general trend across all sixteen quantitative value-ratios is that the OCC climbed as 
the ARP fell over the post war period, peaking only in 2006, a peak that should be understood as 
partly anomalous due to a proliferation of fictitious “profits.” This rather ominous peak should 
be understood as the culprit behind the major stock-market meltdown triggering the financial 
collapse in late 2008. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a clear tendency for the ARP to fall as 
the OCC rises confirms not only the significance and importance of the work of Marx and Engels 
but also validates the fact that their critical and scientific inquiry, rooted in a historical-class 
                                                          
267 It is worth noting that my preferred ARP and OCC calculations (see Figure 24.) track these averages quite well.  
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based analysis, possesses actual explanatory power, something that cannot be said about most 
other economic research today.  
Part II: Long Waves and Depression in Capital Accumulation 
Academic circles largely ignore contentious theories of long wave upturns and downturns in 
capital accumulation.268 However, this has not always been the case. In the 1930s, the famous 
economist Joseph Schumpeter popularized the hypothesis that technological booms launch 
periods of macroeconomic price-cycles which last 40 to 60 years.269 Here, Schumpeter’s 
postulates were primarily based on the work of the Soviet economist Nikolai Kondratieff who 
was the first to demonstrate the existence of long wave-cycles at the level of the world economy. 
Kondratieff rightly argued that economic crises were inherent patterns built into the capitalist 
system which reoccurred every several years, but he also argued that this turbulence resulted in 
‘long waves’ of upswings characterized by high prices – representative of high wages and robust 
output – and downswings characterized by low prices – representative of low wages and 
depressions.270 This means that the ‘Kondratieff wave’ is both non-linear and tempestuous in 
nature (like capitalism itself!).271 Both the cause behind the wave-cycle and the lifespan of each 
wave, however, remains inconclusive. 
Shaikh’s personal attempt to redeem the ‘Kondratieff wave’ is rooted in his application of 
it using price levels expressed in gold rather than in national currency. By using the gold price 
series data, Shaikh’s research shows that such wave-cycle is present in the post-war US 
economy. Moreover, Shaikh also demonstrates that the major economic crises that shook the 
                                                          
268 In moving from his essential notebook (the Grundrisse) to Capital, Marx started to write about ‘industrial 
cycles’, before he only wrote about commercial or money-based crises. See chapter 15 of Capital I.  
269 Schumpeter [1964]2006, pp. 1123-24. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Shaikh 2016, pp. 726-27.  
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world over the past 200 years, all of which originated in the advanced capitalist economies, have 
commenced sometime during the downturn of one of these wave-cycles.272 But since the 1960s, 
the duration of Shaikh’s wave-cycle has become shorter than that of Kondratieff or Schumpeter’s 
initial hypotheses, falling closer to that of Ernest Mandel’s with a lifespan of roughly 20 years.273 
It appears that in the post-war US economy such wave-cycles have become shorter in length.  
A few others adhere to some sort of long wave theory as well. Moseley’s Marxist 
approach observes the post-war rise in the organic composition of capital alongside an increase 
in the unproductive work-force as core culprits behind the Great Stagflation of the 1970s. 
Moseley argues that the US economy transitioned from a ‘long-wave period of expansion’ in the 
late 1970s to a ‘long-wave period of contraction’ thereon.274 In a similar vein, Kliman argues that 
advanced capitalism’s dynamism was unable to pull the US economy out of the slump it entered 
in the early 1970s – that is, well before neoliberalization – and that any so-called recoveries 
following this slump are mere “paper recoveries” from finance. Kliman believes that referring to 
the post-1970s breakdown as just a ‘long downturn’ or a ‘crisis of neoliberalism’ paints a 
misleading picture because the structural crisis, rooted in the essential relations of capitalist 
production, has intensified since the 1970s, so he prefers the term ‘relative stagnation’.275 
                                                          
272 Shaikh 2016, p. 727.  
273 Mandel 1976, pp. 120-22.  
274 Moseley 1991, p. 2.  
275 Kliman 2011, p.9. The opening passage to Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy’s recent book summarizes the 
so-called ‘crisis of neoliberal strategy’ quite well: “Neoliberalism is a new stage of capitalism that emerged in the 
wake of the structural crisis of the 1970s. It expresses the strategy of the capitalist classes in alliance with upper 
management, specifically financial managers, intending to strengthen their hegemony and to expand it globally […] 
The contemporary crisis is an outcome of the contradictions inherent in that strategy. The crisis revealed the 
strategy's unsustainable character, leading to what can be denoted as the ‘crisis of neoliberalism’” (2011, p. 1). As 
this study has attempted to demonstrate – and for a matter of fact, many of the studies that I have reviewed – that the 
‘historical structural crisis of capitalism’ is not over; ultimately expressed in the form of a falling rate of profit 
accompanied by a rising technological composition of capital. 
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However, Kliman’s argument is rooted in the false notion that the wage-bill has not decreased 
over the neoliberal period. 
For Smith and Butovsky, it is not waves per say but an accrual of contradictions which 
led to the emergence of a ‘multidimensional crisis of valorization’ in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Furthermore, alongside two other grave factors (1, the ecological crisis, 2, the decay of the 
nation-state system and war), Smith believes that humanity has entered a ‘twilight phase’ of 
capitalism, in which the working-class either brings about a new socialist world or capitalism 
brings about the destruction of it.276 
In his 2006 book, The Economics of Global Turbulence – rooted in a Smithian 
conception of value – the economic historian Robert Brenner refers to the post-1973 US 
economy as ‘the long downturn’ where economic performance was weak compared to not only 
the immediate post-war period but also compared to the “boom period” that preceded the First 
World War. Thus, Brenner sees the post-1973 economy as a deep structural crisis “far too 
extended to be passed off as simply another phase of the Kondratieff cycle.”277  
Despite the fact I disagree with a large part of Brenner’s diagnosis, I agree entirely that 
the qualitative alteration in “advanced” capitalism at this time is no mere result of another 
Kondratieff wave and therefore cannot be conceived as an outcome of some cycle which occurs 
every 20-50 years. And although this wave-cycle (formulated in the price of gold) is not the 
causal mechanism behind this transition to what Brenner refers to as ‘the long downturn’ – 
because after all why was this particular wave’s downswing so protracted compared to the 
previous? – this does not mean that such transition cannot materialize during a downswing. In 
actuality, it did precisely this during the downswing in the midst of the Great Stagflation crisis. 
                                                          
276 Smith 2018, p. 19. 
277 Brenner 2006, p. xxvi. 
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Following the 1982-3 dip the Kondratieff wave-cycle, Figure 27 depicts a qualitative 
alteration in economic dynamism in which the upswing of each wave-cycle has become 
significantly weaker than that of the last as the level of prices fails to reach that of previous 
waves. While the Kondratieff-like wave-cycles of what Schumpeter, Shaikh and Mandel talk of 
still persist, they have become quite anemic in range compared to before the Great Stagflation 
where the new peak (i.e., in 2006) fails to reach the previous dip (i.e., in 1938)! In Figure 27, I 
use Shaikh’s gold price data series to chart the Kondratieff wave-cycle; and following Shaikh’s 
procedure, I take the average of the last two waves to approximate the duration of the next wave 
to further illuminate the depressing trend in performance since the 1970s and 1980s. My 
Figure 27. The Kondratieff Long Wave-Cycle (price of gold), US Economy 1800-
2012, (forecast 2012-2040). 
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approximation indicates that if this wave-cycle indeed ends in 2018-19, then the next will 
supposedly begin its decent in the early-2030s and run until 2040. 
While Roberts argues that the US fell into a long depression, similar to the long 
depression of the late 19th century, following the Great Recession of 2008, he dismisses the 
notion that there has been any form of depression (or at least any form of protracted structural 
crisis) prior to the 2008 crash. Indeed, for Roberts the world economic crisis that was first 
unleashed in the US in 2007-08 is the first Great Depression of the 21st century as its aftermath 
left capitalism in a depression that is approximated to end sometime nearing the end of 2018 or 
early-2019.278 In his earlier 2011 book, The Great Recession, Roberts writes: 
Some Marxists have latched onto the secular decline in the rate of profit 
over the last 60 years as a sign that capitalism is entering a period of 
permanent economic depression. They cite the different rate of economic 
growth seen before 1975 and then afterwards. From 1948-74, the average 
rate of real economic growth (after inflation) in the US economy was 
3.85%. After 1975 to 2005, that rate was only 3.1%, about 20% 
slower.279 
 
He continues: 
However, this estimate is misleading. If we look at economic growth in 
each of the four economic periods of upwave and downwave of 
profitability from our value rate of profit graphic, we find that real 
economic growth averaged 4% a year between 1948-65, then it fell back 
to 2.9% a year up to 1982 […] Between 1982-00, real growth averaged 
3.6%, nearly matching the 1948-74 period that many economists 
concentrate on as the Golden Age. In the current wave from 2001, 
growth has slowed to just 2.6% a year and it will get slower still.280 
 
But what does this really tell us about the state of the post-1970s US economy? That the 
neoliberal ‘response’ (1982-00) to the Great Stagflation crisis resulted in a recovery in 
profitability, and because profits drives growth, such recovery in profitability that occurred in the 
                                                          
278 See Shaikh 2016, p. 724.  
279 Roberts 2011, pp. 45-6 [emphasis mine]. 
280 Ibid., p. 46.  
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1990s (and then again in the 2000s) is a sign that capitalism is no longer in depression? Well, 
there certainly was a recovery in the 1990s due to an increase in the rate of exploitation and a 
few other conjunctural factors. And there certainly was a recovery in profitability in the 2000s as 
well, but the question that must be plumbed is what exactly is the nature of these recoveries? 
Unlike the 1990s, the “recovery” in profitability over the 2000s never translated into an increase 
in ‘actual’ economic growth because it was almost entirely ersatz, based in financial markets and 
relations of credit and debt, specifically in the real estate and banking sector.  
To first assess whether or not the term ‘depression’ can be applied here, it should first be 
defined. The mainstream economic paradigms, rooted in their marginalist conceptions of value, 
loosely define both recessions and depressions. Regarding the latter, a capitalist economy falls 
victim to a depression when a pronounced economic downturn continuous for longer than three 
years.281 Roberts, a specialist in recessions and depressions, believes that depression ought to be 
redefined to when an economy is so weak following a crisis that it takes multiple years for the 
trend in growth to return to pre-crises levels.282  
Like Roberts, I observe a minor recovery in growth between 1980 and 2000, but a severe 
decline in growth following the Dot-com crash at the turn of the century. Compared to the 
economic dynamism that existed prior to the Great Stagflation, however, the recovery in the 
1990s was rather weak, and over the 2000s, non-existent. Now, if Roberts extended his 
conclusions about the US being in a depression back to the 1980s, then I believe a great deal of 
our argumentation would overlap.  
“Recovery” #1: Neoliberal Restructuring  
                                                          
281 Roberts 2016, p. 11.  
282 Ibid. 
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It took two World Wars and the Great Depression of the 1930s to set the historical stage for what 
some refer to as the “Golden Age” of capitalism. By the 1980s, however, the rather draconian 
neoliberal state-regimes of Ronald Reagan (and Margert Thatcher in the UK) looked to reverse 
the gains made by the working-class during the so-called “Golden Age” by cutting pensions and 
various social services, along with mass privatization and the deregulation of financial 
markets.283 Ultimately, the neoliberal ‘response’ was a strategic counter-offensive by capital 
during the cold war which served the purpose of propelling profitability through austerity and 
destroying organized labour. 
 
Source: Keen 2012, p.2.  
 
                                                          
283 Roberts 2016, p. 61.  
 
Figure 28. Level of US Debt (Public and Private), 1920-2012(2020). 
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Figure 28 shows the debt-ratio (that is, debt as a percentage of GDP) for both the public 
and private sectors of the US economy.284 Here I use the chart by the post-Keynesian, Steve 
Keen, which shows that in 1945 total US public debt was at 125 percent of GDP and private debt 
was at 49 percent of GDP. In the 1970s, US public debt shrunk while private debt began its 
ascent, the latter peaking in 2009 at a whopping 303 percent of GDP.285  
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates a few years earlier 
along with with a sharp rise in the price of oil in 1974 led many “third world” countries to rely 
on borrowing from US banks in the late 1970s.286 But as total output in many of these countries 
declined (an outcome of neoliberalism of global proportions) they encountered serious problems 
servicing the debt loads, which then generated a plethora of sovereign debt crises across the 
globe. As a result, the US was struck by its own banking crisis between 1985-1986. Not 
surprisingly the lowest point for my preferred ARP calculation is reached in 1986 (see Figure 
25).  
Thus, neoliberalism was not only a response to a severe structural crisis, with its move 
away from a “mixed-economy” to an hyper-competitive, atomized socio-economic and political 
climate that signified a relentless return to unfettered markets and strong individual property 
rights, it was also a key factor in the financialization of many capitalist economies.287 Take for 
example the 16-year period between 1983 and 1999, the number of countries around the globe 
                                                          
284 Kliman 2011, p. 60. 
285 See Keen 2012, p. 2-5. Kliman (2011) notes that it is worth mentioning that one of the reasons that the debt-ratio 
rose so much is because of the slowdown in GDP. 
286 Ibid; Harvey 2006, p. 22. Following the initial turning point in 1971, the final turning point in neoliberalization 
was in 1979 when the US President at the time, Jimmy Carter, appointed Paul Volcker as chair of the Federal 
Reserve. Volcker’s tactical response to ‘stagflation’ was to allow interest rates to rise as high as necessary in order 
to stabilize the US-backed global dollar system. While the “Volcker shock” sent the US back into crisis from 1979-
1981, this crisis was different; at least not in the sense of its severity, but for the seismic shifts in the global economy 
that followed. 
287 Harvey 2006, p. 2.  
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that experienced banking crises quadrupled compared to the pre-1980 period. Moreover, US 
private debt started to grow exponentially in the mid-1980s, only slowing briefly in the 1990s. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (NIA). 
 
In regard to the recovery in the 1990s: increases in productivity (from the “digital” 
revolution), globalization, and austerity measures along with union busting all led the RSV to 
dwarf its earlier 1978 peak in 1996-7. Such an increase was one of the core reasons behind this 
recovery, the other was the fact that capital formation was stagnant, depicted here by either a flat 
or declining VCC and OCC. As the RSV surpassed the VCC mid-way through 1994, it led to a 
rather small jump in the ARP and thus an increase in growth. But if we compare this recovery 
and dynamism to the pre-Great Stagflation and pre-neoliberal periods, it is far less robust. Take 
for example that employment in manufacturing peaked in 1979, just as the ARP began to fall; 
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and as industrial capacity declined throughout most of the post-war period it peaked again only 
in 1968. Industrial capacity did begin to rise again in the mid-1990s, however, the peak in the 
1990s was only half that of the previous in 1968.288  And as Kliman notes in his 2011 book, the 
Gini-coefficient for the US was higher in the 1950s and early-1960s as social inequality 
increased thereafter.289. In 1997 the ARP (again, see Figure 25) never overcame its earlier 1978 
peak – and thus, this is not much of a recovery but a recovery nonetheless. 
“Recovery” #2: Out of the Frying Pan and into the “FIRE” 
Ultimately, the Great Recession of 2007/08 was triggered by financial meltdown, originating in 
the banks with mortgage-backed securities and lax financial regulations. Here, the sub-prime 
housing market was the trigger. Borrowing was reinforced with the expectation that housing 
prices would continue to rise, or at least not plummet. For as long as low interest rates fed the 
housing bubble it drove consumption, allowing for much of the populous to spend more than 
they could normally afford through means of additional borrowing and mortgage equity.290 
While this kept the economy afloat temporarily, consumer demand eventually slowed. Once the 
financial bubble burst, household wealth evaporated and the free fall endured, many powerful 
Banks and corporations began to implode forcing Bush to spend over $700 billion to bail out the 
elite Wall Street executives and bankers responsible for the crash.291 Nevertheless, global credit 
markets collapsed as the world stock market plunged over 50 percent from its peak in early 
2007.292 It was the deepest crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and its aftermath was 
no better.  
                                                          
288 Kliman 2011, p.55.  
289 Ibid. 
290 Stiglitz 2010, p, 4, 35. 
291 Ibid, pp. 35-8. 
292 Roberts 2016, pp. 66-7. 
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In the 18 months following the initial crash in October 2007, the US economy contracted 
at an annual rate of roughly 2.9 percent. From mid-2009 to 2014, its recovery was well below 
average at an anemic two percent per year.293 Yet despite this, the top one-tenth of a percent (the 
top 0.1 %) exceeded a national income share greater than 10 percent twice in the last century. 
Once preceding the Great Recession in 2007 at a 10.5 percent share, and again following it in 
2012 at a 10.1 percent share. And for the top one percent by income, it was again in the years 
preceding the Great Depression and Great Recession when they took home their greatest shares: 
once in 1928 and again in 2007.294 For the upper echelons of society, it appears that crisis 
provides an opportunity for even greater prosperity from not just the standpoint of the social 
capital where it revitalizes profitability, but for their own personal fortunes, fortunes in which 
financial markets are used to amplify.  
The ARP did not surpass its earlier 1978 peak until 2006. However, the majority of the 
latter’s peak is fictitious. I suppose if my ‘normalization procedure’ was effective in suppressing 
fictitious capital (FC) in other sectors of the economy besides just the FIRE sector, the ARP 
calculation would not have surpassed its earlier 1978 peak in 2006, and probably would not have 
surpassed its 1996 peak either. While various counteracting forces were in play from before, like 
the cheapening of constant capital through the 1990s, as well as the destruction of capital from 
the earlier Dot-com crash, by the mid-2000s such countertendencies were all weakening and 
there ARP began to fall by late-2006 and so did the mass of profits by 2007.295 
                                                          
293 Ibid, p. 131.  
294 Saez-Piketty’s excel datasets (2015): table A.1. Retrieved from https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/. In addition, the 
top 1 percent by income exceeded a total income share greater than 21 percent three times in the last century. First in 
1928, then in 2007 and again in 2012, that is, prior or following some of the most severe crises which were rooted in 
finance.  
295 Roberts 2016. 
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Source: Author’s calculations (NIA).  
 
By 2005, FIRE sector profits doubled what they were in 2000 totaling a near $270Bn; 
surmounting the $300Bn mark a decade later in 2016. Although the ARP peaked in 2006, this 
peak was mainly due to an excessive amount of fictitious “profits” treated as real corporate 
booked profits. Despite all this, the 2006 peak in the ARP was only two percent above the 1978 
peak – again, this is no recovery. Indeed, Kliman may have been onto something when he stated 
that in the post-Great Stagflation US economy the majority of recoveries are mere products of 
financialization and therefore mostly ersatz. 
The Assessment 
In the case of the US economy the trends in ‘actual’ valorization since the protracted Great 
Stagflation crisis of the 1970s are rather depressing: 
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1. Since 1950, there has been a growing diminishing rate of return on capital invested 
because the ratio of dead- to living-labour (the OCC) has risen, putting downward 
pressure on the ARP. 
According to Marx’s law of profitability, the persistent diminishing rate of return on productive 
capital has led to a structural ‘crisis of valorization’. 
2. Until the early- to mid-1970s, there was an increase in SNUL relative to productive 
labour as unproductive capital underwent a rapid expansion. Often this is 
misconstrued as a transition away from a ‘manufacturing economy’ or 'industrial 
capitalism’ towards a ‘service and sales’ economy or ‘cognitive capitalism’. 
3. Since 1970s, the “advanced” economies have become increasingly financialized and 
therefore increasingly debt-burdened.  
The above two points, combined with point one, form the principle characteristics of the 
‘multidimensional crisis of valorization’. So, again, the intensifying contradictions of the global 
capitalist system led to the Great Stagflation of the 1970s and, subsequently, prompted the 
inherently contradictory neoliberal response. Most notably, this response paved the way for the 
acute expansion of financial forms of valorization. 
4. Since the late 1970s, economic crises are less frequent (meaning less capital destroyed 
than beforehand), resulting in less “boom phases” capable of revitalizing profitability.  
5. Beginning in the 1980s, speculation in financial markets – a parasitic, volatile, and 
ultimately unproductive form of capital accumulation – became the core driver of 
accumulation, impregnating the economy with massive volumes of fictitious 
capital/”profits” which constrains ‘actual’ valorization.296 In addition, at this time the 
US’s debt-ratio began to grow exponentially (most notably: US private debt beginning 
in 1986). 
                                                          
296 Since 2012, the level of debt and FC in the US economy has astonishingly risen to new heights.  
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Instead of investing in productive capital and employment, companies of all kinds have 
been buying back their own shares in order to boost their shareholders incomes by increasing the 
valuation of their stocks – this is an increasing, not decreasing, phenomenon. As profits were 
increasingly channelled into financial markets, this permitted the capitalist class to appropriate a 
larger magnitude of profits – albeit, fictitious “profits” – than they would generate from 
production alone. Thus, according to Marxist theory, the same factors that bring about an 
accelerated accumulation of capital and therefore a growth in the total amount of surplus labour 
performed in the economy also produce a tendential fall in the average rate of profit.297 However, 
in the ‘era of fictitious capital’ this is no longer the case as investment in financial markets brings 
neither an advancement in technological innovation nor an increase in the amount of surplus 
labour performed in the economy.  
6. Since the 1980s, there has been a serious slowdown in productive investment as it has 
been, and increasingly is, being replaced with unproductive investment and personal 
hoarding. Other things being equal, this has seriously amplified the diminishing rate 
of return on capital invested from the standpoint of the social capital 
While points 1-3 form the essential structure of the ‘multidimensional crisis of 
valorization’, points 4-6 (i.e., the ‘era of fictitious capital’) exacerbate it. It is in my judgement 
the 1978-1986 crisis ridden juncture dismantled what remained of the socially or systemically 
necessary conditions of ‘actual’ valorization compared to what existed in the 1950s and early-
1960s, or even during the pre-World War “boom” period. According to either of the 
aforementioned definitions of depression, the US economy descended into a form of depression 
at the tail end of a long wave-cycle, following the Great Stagflation. This is not some new 
economic downturn or slump, this is also not some mere ‘crisis of neoliberalism’, and this is also 
not ‘relative stagnation’ as Kliman claims because valorization has become hyper-financialized 
compared to before. While the relative performance of the economy has clearly declined, 
                                                          
297 Marx 1991, p. 331. 
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‘stagnation’ has also become a normal feature of everyday life. Similar to the Kondratieff wave 
measure found in Figure 27, the figure below acts as another illustration of the transition to this 
meta-crisis which I conceive as a depressionary socio-economic environment.298 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations (NIA).  
 
According to Figure 31, since 1950 the trend in the annual growth in Marxian Gross 
Output (MGO) and the Accumulation of Capital Stock (CA) in constant 2009 USD has declined. 
Since the early-1980s, the US has been struck by even slower levels of growth and accumulation. 
Over the entire period of study, average annual MGO growth is 3.1 percent and average CA 
growth is 3.6 percent.  From 1950 to 1980, average annual MGO growth is 3.8 percent and 
average annual CA is 4.4 percent. But from 1980 to 2016, the average growth in MGO and CA 
                                                          
298 Moreover, under this depressionary environment – which I speak of as no typical, singular and protracted 
economic crisis, but rather a major historical-structural meta-crisis which has resulted in a qualitative alteration in 
socio-economic dynamism from the standpoint of the actual valorization process – macroeconomic cycles like the 
Kondratieff wave (rather, Shaikh’s iteration) still occur. But compared to earlier cycles, such post-stagflation cycles 
are much more lethargic (again, see Figure 27.), which is a prime characteristic of depression.   
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stood at a sluggish 2.6 percent and 2.9 percent. The peak in CA first in the early to mid-1970s 
and again in the late-1970s is due to rising inflation as well as a much-welcomed rebound from 
the devaluation that took place during the Great Depression of the 1930s.299 MGO peaked in 
1983 only because it followed a major contraction in output a few years earlier. Moreover, as CA 
is inclusive of the FIRE sector, the 2005-06 peak is mostly a result of the credit-boom of the 
mid-2000s and should be understood as almost completely fictitious.  
 
         1980-89: 3.09%           1990-99: 2.64%           2000-09: 1.75% 
 
Source: Smith and Butovsky 2014, p. 30 (IMF and World Economic Outlook Database). 
  
Although, when incorporating other wide-ranging variables in the question of humanity’s 
future, it is quite bleak. Together, the following interrelated problematics: a) “ecological debt” 
(i.e., unsustainable value (re)production), b) the continuously growing financial “house of cards” 
(with the explosion of stock-buy-backs and other, new ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’), 
c) the decay of the nation-state system and the colossal wars it sparks, alongside d) the 
emergence of this depressionary environment as well as major reoccurring meltdowns like the 
Great Recession, proposes that the global capitalist system has descended into a state of entropy 
as it drains humanity of its last resources, energy and time.300  
                                                          
299 CA was slow since the 1920s and 1930s up until the 1970s, mainly due to the amount of capital destroyed in 
during the Great Depression and the World Wars. See Kliman (2011) for insights into this.  
300 Entropy, according to the laws of a thermodynamic system, is the unavailability of energy or the inability of 
converting energy into productive work. A better for definition here is: the decline or deterioration into disorder but 
not collapse – i.e., “the old is dying but the new cannot be born.” See E. T Jaynes’ short 1991 piece on entropy in 
economics. Moreover, I find the world rate of profit as per Marx is somewhat representative of the concept of 
entropy.  
Figure 32. The Post Great Stagflation Era: Average Annual Growth (%) of the Combined 
GDPs of the Top 35 “Advanced” Economies by Decade. 
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Source: Roberts 2017, no page.301 
 
Now it may seem like a sufficient recovery is impossible, which may as well be true from 
an internal point of view, but factors external to the system play a major role as well. Serious 
political turmoil or economic nationalism like fascism for example could heavily influence the 
production of ‘actual’ surplus-value by redefining trade relations. Large scale war or catastrophic 
ecological crisis could reduce the level of fixed constant capital relative to the performance of 
available surplus labour, raising profitability. Or even the reorganization of the human populous 
in ways which lead to new, cheap forms of labour-power could lead to some sort of recovery as 
well. 
However, it becomes increasingly difficult to address these issues when the debt-ratio of 
many so-called “advanced” economies has climbed to such heights, and this has been an 
                                                          
301 As there are serious limitations with data at the national level, it is obvious that an accurate ‘world rate of profit’ 
is impossible to formulate: so, this is a mere approximation by Michael Roberts. Nevertheless, note that the decline 
and subsequent “recovery” between 1965 and 1983 is yet another illustration of this asymptotic meta-crisis of 
historic proportions, this depressionary environment.   
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increasing concern since the 2008 crisis. But it is also very difficult to reduce the level of debt 
when profitability has been subject to such malaise (rooted in the shrinking of the productive 
sphere). Take Figure 27 as an example, if prices are unable to return to the level of previous 
wave-cycles, then it becomes increasingly difficult to service debts that were entered during 
those earlier cycles when the following cycle is a fraction of its size.302  
 Ideally, reducing the role of finance capital in valorization (that is, reducing the levels of 
debt and fictitiousness and increasing the performance of surplus labour) would be a necessary 
first step in addressing this structural crisis since the growth of debt and fictitious capital play a 
major role in the very fruition of this depression to begin with. But, again, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to do this because the economy has grown to be so reliant on financial 
markets and debt. The only real solution is a massive destruction of capital which would, albeit 
temporarily, refresh profitability by lowering the organic composition of capital. However, this 
grows increasingly difficult because, since neoliberalism, there have been less crises overall, 
meaning less devaluation/destruction overall.  
Nonetheless, since the ruling elite do not take the standpoint of the social capital it is 
therefore highly unlikely that they would spearhead the necessary changes to increase ‘actual’ 
valorization.303 So the destruction of capital of seismic proportions, which is ultimately 
disastrous for society as a whole, is the only real solution to this capitalistic quandary – that is, to 
not only restore the productive sphere itself, but also to restore its rate of return. So it more or 
less boils down to the likes of another Great Depression and war, nuclear winter, or even social 
                                                          
302 At least at the level of the macro-economy, and other things being equal.   
303 Another example is the work of some critical criminologists who refer a market economy as a criminogenic 
entity. Take for example market induced social harms like when Goldman Sachs deemed successful ‘one-shot cures’ 
bad for business because, due to market forces, curing hepatitis C is bad for business. See Consumer Affairs, March 
13, 2018: https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/goldman-sachs-warns-biotech-clients-that-curing-patients-may-
not-be-sustainable-041318.html.  
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revolution. And as investors always gravitate to the place with the highest rate of return – 
namely, financial markets – the level of investment necessary to restore productive capital will 
never be reached. So to convince capitalists to spearhead the necessary changes to the productive 
sphere would mean a task of convincing them to be a ‘revolutionary force’ themselves by acting 
against the very nature of the system by willingly impairing their own incomes.304 
Take for example the priorities of the ruling elite. The minor recovery in the US economy 
that occurred at the end of 2017 and into early 2018 has led to the “too-big-to-fail-banks” (the 22 
largest US banks) to return a greater amount of capital to their shareholders than they receive in 
revenue, a return estimated at roughly 25 percent more than the previous year.305 This is 
anticipated to yield an unprecedented return of $170Bn in dividends and stock buybacks over the 
2018 year to investors while inflation runs rampant. For a few years now, the Federal Reserve 
has been preparing to eliminate even more financial regulations like the ‘Volcker rule’ – a 
regulation implemented by the “father of neoliberalism” himself. This is what policy makers are 
concerned with. This is where growth is being channelled: to the private sphere, to the financial 
oligarchs themselves.306 
As a result, this implies that capital will continue to attempt to solve any and all crises by 
using financial tools that actually ends up worsening them. Furthermore, this also means that the 
financialization of the advanced capitalist economies will probably heighten in years to come.307 
                                                          
304 CNBC, February 2, 2018: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/02/corporate-buybacks-are-the-only-thing-keeping-the-
stock-market-afloat.html. 
305 Financial Times, June 17, 2018: https://www.ft.com/content/bcf77ea2-6ff3-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914. 
306 Huffington Post, May 22, 2018: https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/bank-bill-deregulation-
congress_us_5b043b70e4b0c0b8b23ea6cd. 
307 At the end of 2017, Trump pushed heavy tax cuts for the wealthy in hopes for a ‘trickle down’ effect that would 
raise workers’ wages and benefits. However, lowering the tax rate and deregulating financial markets did not result 
in what was hoped for. The generosity of the ruling elites is nil as long as the law of accumulation and falling profits 
are in play (and market competition is fierce) as the elites will continue their relentless gluttony and hoard profits. In 
the end, it was reported that less than 45 of the S&P 500 companies paid any bonuses to their workers.  
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As a result, and drawing on Smith’s inquisitive rebranding of Marx’s phrase, such a 
contradictory social capital combined with such ruling elites’ disregard puts an even newer twist 
on: ‘the true barrier to capitalist production’ … has become the capitalists themselves.  
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Conclusion 
 
The tendency for capitalism to periodically fall into crisis has been a recurring theme throughout 
this study. According to Michael Roberts, there has been no significant recovery in US corporate 
profitability over the course of the Long Depression. The little devaluation/destruction of capital 
and no effective reduction in the levels of private debt has made it increasingly difficult to bring 
profits up since the 2008 crisis.308 While we currently reside in the longest ‘crisis-less’ stretch, 
there has been no rebound in growth – or at least until 2018. 
The recovery that began after the stock-market “adjustment” in early 2018 can be 
attenuated to the mid- to late-2017 recovery in profitability which set the US economy on tack to 
reach four percent growth sometime in 2018. The ‘pro-corporate’ and ‘anti-working class’ 
campaign of the current US President, Donald Trump, ended in a reduction in corporate taxation 
that helped to propel this recovery. Thus, it appears possible that the US will emerge from this 
Long Depression sometime in the next year or two, and if so, it will probably follow the next 
recession.  
 But such ephemeral wave of prosperity is hollow to the core; in fact, if inflation is 
considered in the measurement of economic growth then this “recovery” is absolutely non-
existent. It is much more likely that the triumphalism on part of the Trump administration and its 
allies in championing this nonsense is a mere ploy to reinforce the otherwise declining state of 
American exceptionalism. The US economy and its ruling social order has been in an 
increasingly vulnerable state – especially since the 2008. Like the rate of profit, the overall trend 
                                                          
308 Roberts 2016; Roberts 2018.  
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in the US empire is a depressing one – a trend that fluctuates, but one which evinces an overall 
long-term secular decline.309  
Today, the US has higher levels of fictitious capital and private debt than during the 2000s 
credit boom (again, see Figure 30). Many non-financial corporations have become even more 
financialized in order to ameliorate capitalism’s deep economic malaise. Some economists 
speculate that it is only a matter of time until a chain-reaction of debt crises break out across the 
globe (perhaps, first in Turkey), or that some monstrous and unknown debt bubble will burst 
without warning. Some others believe that the decay of the nation-state system and the 
subsequent geopolitical turmoil it sparks will be the trigger for some global economic 
catastrophe.  
For instance, over the last year the phrase ‘trade war’ began looming as a result of the 
various tariffs imposed by Trump in the effort to offload the US’s own problems. Instead of 
working with them, Trump’s attempt to redefine exchange relations at his partners’ detriment is 
another example of how the ruling elites of a nation will attempt to solve falling profits at the 
expense of other nations. This shift away from trade liberalization and globalization towards 
national chauvinism and trade war is not new but a perverse reaction to the failures of capitalism 
and an unfortunate and rather frightening step in the direction of fascist authoritarianism. Indeed: 
“fascism is nothing else but capitalist reaction,” as the great Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky 
stated in 1932.310 
With such a volatile, parasitic and ultimately uncoordinated economic system certainty in 
the short term is not probable. The structural instability that comes with such extreme levels of 
                                                          
309 On the one hand, the Federal Reserve’s February Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey stated a rough 19 
percent probability of a recession in 2018. On the other hand, Michael Roberts’ blog indicated that Roberts sees a 
potential recession surfacing in late 2019 to 2020. Sometime in 2019 or 2020 seems more likely. 
310Trotsky 1993, no page.  
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debt, inflation, with finance driven imperialism, alongside negligent political leaders, and 
combined with the fact that Financial Times reports a shift in the emerging market index away 
from ‘bull market’ to ‘bear market’ conditions as of August 2018, all surely implies that a crisis 
could hit any day.311  
Nevertheless, if my calculations for the Kondratieff wave-cycle (see Figure 27) indicate 
anything – albeit, even crudely – there should be a transition from a long wave of decline to a 
long wave of expansion around 2018-21, probably following the next recession. Following suit, 
the upswing should continue to 2030-31 before it shifts again to another downswing sometime 
between 2031-38. While regular crises occur during both the upswing and downswing of the 
wave-cycle, this implies that a deep, more severe crisis – and therefore anopportunity to further 
heighten the class struggle – will strike sometime in the mid- to late-2030s, perhaps landing the 
US back in another long depression.312 
From the wide-ranging theoretical and empirical results of this project, and the subsequent 
implications of such, some general conclusions can be drawn about both the evolution of Marxist 
scholarship since the birth of Marx as well as the evolution of US capitalism since the second 
World War. Many of these conclusions are summarized in the conclusion to chapter three as well 
as chapter four – specifically, Part II of the latter. To reiterate, Marx’s fundamental prognosis 
about capitalism’s historical trajectory – depicted by a falling average rate of profit accompanied 
by a rising organic composition of capital – appears empirically valid when ‘tested’ against the 
concrete evolution of US capitalism over a 66-year period.313 
                                                          
311 Reuters, August 15 2018: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emerging-markets-stocks-bear/emerging-market-
stocks-in-bear-territory-after-20-percent-drop-since-january-idUSKBN1L01UZ. 
312 There are several limitations to a crude approach such as this, so any indicators of crises should be understood as 
a rough approximation of how a capitalist economy may unfold. 
313 Scores of evidence exists proving Marx’s forecast of a falling ARP met with a rising OCC valid for many 
capitalist counties around the globe. This also goes for his other forecasts, such as the ‘law of accumulation’. See 
Carchedi and Roberts upcoming edition of World in Crisis (2018) and Roberts new 2018 book: Marx.200.  
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In sum, this study engaged in a value-theoretical reconceptualization of a national 
accounting system which categorizes aggregate prices in the NIA in terms of ‘values’ à la Marx. 
Through an original re-specification of Marx’s concepts for purposes of empirical research, this 
study demonstrated not only the contemporary relevance of the Marxist paradigm, but also 
established that the US economy – at least, from the standpoint of the socially necessary 
conditions of ‘actual’ valorization – decended into a depressionary environment following the 
Great Stagflation of the 1970s. A novel feature of this study is the way in which it framed Marx 
as an underproductionist in his account of the origins of capitalist crisis: an “underproductionist” 
in the sense that Marx regards capitalist crises as stemming fundamentally from inadequate 
levels of surplus-value production relative to capital investment. This study suggested some 
innovative methods of measuring ‘systemically necessary unproductive labour’, the ‘composition 
of output’ and economic growth alongside Marx’s fundamental value-ratios – namely, the rate of 
surplus value, the organic composition of capital and the average rate of profit. It also proposed a 
unique procedure for distinguishing between components of financial profit resting on surplus-
value production from ‘fictitious’ components deriving from relations of credit/debt. Proceeding 
from Marx’s tendential law of the equalization of profit rates, the fictitious profits booked by the 
financial sector and registered in the US National Income Accounts are eliminated via 
‘normalization’ – that is to say, leveling – the financial sector’s profit rate with the average rate 
prevailing in the rest of the economy.  
The main limitations to this study are with the raw data. There are various problems with 
national income and accounting data and the measurement of GDP. Additional problems and 
various theoretical quandaries arise when utilizing an entirely bourgeois data set in the attempt to 
operationalize Marx’s variables. One major statistical problem that presented itself during data 
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collection was that in order to calculate Marx’s fundamental value categories some proxies must 
be made. For example, when estimating the unproductive wage-bill I include the employment 
costs of finance, insurance, real estate, legal services, wholesale, general government, business 
services and other miscellanies services as components of ‘systemically necessary unproductive 
labour’ (SNUL). Due to the NIA methodology, not all of these workers are actually reflective of 
the costs associated with SNUL. This formulation unavoidably captures elements of the 
productive workforce (and perhaps other labour types such as supervisory labour) as well, just 
like my calculation for productive labour (variable capital) unavoidably captures elements of the 
SNUL workforce. Thus, the exploration of new, innovative methods in the segregation of the 
national wage-bill into its respective Marxian categories or finding a more expansive and 
accurate data set is in need.  
What is more, the Marxist theoretical approach is also under-theorized in regard to the un-
paid labour of domestic workers and some other forms of surplus labour such as “luxury” 
expenses.314 When talking about various political and economic structures and social 
reproduction, Marxist theory is concerned with the mode of production, and hence capitalism 
(i.e., the reproduction of capital). This study therefore gives primacy to the reproduction of 
capital as the dominant form of social reproduction while acknowledging that other, more 
general forms exist.  
Moving forward, a number of crucial questions and research possibilities posed by this 
study require attention. The procedure of ‘capturing’ as accurately as possible the performance of 
aggregate surplus labour (or, ‘actual’ surplus-value) has become increasingly arduous owing to 
the proliferation of volumes of fictitious capital incorporated in bourgeois national income and 
                                                          
314 See, for example, the work of some feminist scholars in regard ‘domestic slave labour’ such as Luxton 1986 or 
Mies 1999. 
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accounting data. Thus, in the ‘era of fictitious capital’ a growing portion of booked income and 
booked corporate profits diverge from the ‘actual’ magnitude of currently produced new and 
surplus-value. To better ‘capture’ the actual magnitudes of surplus-value produced in a given 
year, I include the elite wage-bill of the top 0.1% by income as a component of my surplus-value 
estimation. This procedure also requires that I subtract the top 0.1% by income from either two 
of the Marxian value categories (that is, to maintain Marx’s value-theoretic of total value output 
= c + v + s). However, as Dumenil and Levy argue, the incomes above the top 5% serve to inflate 
what is supposed to be restricted to workers’ wages.315 In contrast, however, Smith and Butovsky 
include the top 1% by income as a component of surplus-value and therefore subtract it from 
variable capital; but as a result, adding this greatly inflates their surplus-value estimation, 
pushing the trend in their profit rate upwards. While the omission of the top 5% of wage earners 
may be necessary to better estimate the wage-bill associated with the actual proletarian work 
force, I am afraid that adding the top 5% to surplus-value would would result in an estimate 
irreflective of the performance of ‘actual’ surplus labour.  
Additionally, this study also contains a critique of the canonical specification of 
unproductive expenses as a deduction from surplus-value. In turn, the Mage-Smith ‘constant 
capital overhead cost’ approach was presented as an alternative that further complicated the 
productive-unproductive labour distinction, raising the question of what labour is exactly 
‘systemically necessary’ and what labour is just ‘unproductive’ (that is, from the standpoint of 
the social capital). Contrary to Moseley’s thesis, I established that the negative impact on 
profitability from a rising composition of capital is greater than from the relative growth in 
SNUL, at least in the case of the US economy. 
                                                          
315 See Appendix B.b for data on the wage-share less the top 5%.   
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Another question arises concerning the protracted dip in the Kondratieff wave’s 1970s 
downturn. As Figure 27 is measured in the price of gold rather than in national currency, perhaps 
the move away from the gold standard is the reason behind the depth of the dip? Or, can this dip 
be caulked up to just slowing economic dynamism or is it due to inflation and the subsequent 
‘Volcker Shock’ at the time? The countertendencies to Marx’s law are of the upmost importance, 
but this discussion is limited because its focus is rooted in the validity of Marx’slaw itself and 
what it can explain rather than a theoretical and empirical discussion of the countertendential 
forces. It is important to note that scale must be properly conceptualized because, as Marx’s saw 
himself, capitalism is a global system demarcated by an international division of labour. Thus, 
the countertendencies have a global dimension when countries are connected via the world 
market, meaning that the US’s ARP is heavily influenced by various countertendencies 
(overpopulation, increased exploitation, etc.) in peripheral countries. More often than not, 
Marx’s law of profitability is temporarily arrested within “advanced” countries that hold 
hegemony over the world market – such as the US – due to countertendencies which emerge in 
other countries. This is yet another limitation with the data; that Marx’s law and the capitalism 
system is a global system, but national income data is restricted to the nation/state level.  
*** 
Although, over 150 years have passed since the publication of Capital and Marx’s initial 
observations of the working conditions of 19th century industrial capitalism in Germany, France, 
and England, the ideas of Marx and Engels are astonishingly more pertinent today than ever 
before. But the system of ideas known as Marxism is constantly falsified and misrepresented by 
the apologists and defenders of the ruling social order. Marx’s genuine struggle for human 
freedom, for socialism, for worker democracy, have been tendentiously and dishonestly 
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identified with its polar opposite. The defenders of the bourgeois order smeared Marx’s name in 
the defense of bureaucratic dictators, ruthless state apparatuses and poor conceptions of “human 
nature.”316 What the critics miss is that bureaucratic dictators, ruthless state apparatuses and poor 
conceptions of “human nature” are all products of capitalist ideologues and agents, not Marx, 
and certainly not the future world that he envisioned.   
And although a work of science, many firmly believe that the  literary dimensions of 
Marx’s Capital should not be overlooked as it stands out amongst the giants of the 19th century – 
a literary giant, which reads like a lengthy ‘gothic novel whose heroes are enslaved and 
consumed by the monster they created’. 317 As its subtitle declares, the work of Capital is a 
critique of classical political economy; and as such, it remains today an ‘inexhaustible source of 
stimulation’ to those who seek a deeper, scientific understanding of social reality, illuminating a 
path out of our current predicament and into a new egalitarian-socialist world.318 And as the 
object of its critique is ever evolving, the work of Capital will always remain incomplete. Hence, 
the work of subsequent Marxists is to pick up and continue where Marx and Engels left off.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
316 Smith 1998.  
317 The Guardian July 8, 2006; Spencer 2013, p. xxiii.  
318 Mehring, quoted in Smith 1984, p. 3. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Part A: Data Sources and Methods 
Primary data was collected from the US National Income Accounts (NIA): https://apps 
.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&1921=survey, 
from both NIPA and Fixed Assets tables; US Bureau of Labour Statistics; Saez-Picketty 
(2015); Anwar Shaikh (2016); and Michael Roberts (2017).  
 
1. Constant Capital Stock (C): The current-dollar value of non-farm, Net Capital Stock in 
Private Fixed Assets (inclusive of the productive and unproductive spheres), NIPA Table 
6.1, line 2. Non-FIRE assets, line 14.  
 
Historical Cost Valuation of Net Capital Stock in Private Fixed Assets (inclusive of both 
spheres), Table 4.1, line 1. FIRE assets, line 33.  
 
Figures imputed for each year correspond to the end of the prior year (i.e., 1949 figure is 
imputed for the 1950 year).  
 
2. Annual flow of Surplus-Value: The sum of profits, interest, rent and elites’ salaries 
measured as after-tax domestic corporate profits from NIPA Table 1.14, line 33, plus the 
after-tax earnings of the top one-tenth of national income (the top 0.1%), the latter drawn 
from Saez-Picketty (2015). Before-tax, line 32.  
 
Non-FIRE s: before-tax, line 37 and after-tax, line 38.  
 
‘Normalized’ s (i.e., s less fictitious elements embedded in FIRE-profits): following the 
procedure in chapter three, in order to better ‘capture’ the actual performance of surplus 
labour I attempt to formulate a more accurate estimation of surplus-value by normalizing 
annual financial profits. ‘Normalized surplus-value’ is the sum of after-tax corporate 
profits + the top 0.1% income and minus what is estimated as FIRE sector’s FC.  
 
3. Annual flow of Variable Capital (v): The after-tax income (total wages and salary 
accruals) of all ‘productive workers’. Hence, v is taken from NIPA Table 6.3 A B / C D 
minus SNUL and minus the top 0.1% by income. In turn, this yields the closest 
approximation that I know of the productive labour force.  
 
Tax-Rate: All data on wages are recorded before-tax, so a crude tax rate was necessary. 
Average annual taxation was applied to before-tax wages and incomes by using an 
‘approximate tax-rate’ measured as personal current taxes (Table 3.1, line 3) to current 
income (Table 1.14, line 4).  
 
4. Systemically Necessary Unproductive labour (SNUL/S): The after-tax income of those 
workers necessary for the system’s reproduction and employed by unproductive capital, 
including NIPA Table 6.3 wholesale, line 52 / 35, legal services, line 70 / 66, business 
services, line 65 / 75% of 68[*], general government, line 75 / 86, and miscellaneous 
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services, line 73+74 / see *.  
 
* is used as a proxy since NIA’s imputation changes in C and D listings. 
 
5. Annual flow of Constant Capital (cf): All other operating costs inherent to capitalist 
valorization (inclusive of taxation, inventories, the SNUL wage-bill, depreciation, energy, 
etc.), measured as non-farm total output (such as GDP or MGO) minus variable capital 
and minus surplus-value.  
 
6. Productive Capital: Unlike most others, I do not use manufacturing as a proxy for 
productive capital or labour. Instead, for productive capital, I include all non-farm 
domestic private enterprises in the corporate sector less general government, legal 
services, business services, wholesale, retail trade and the FIRE sector.  
 
7. Marxian Gross Output (MGO): or, “Normalized GDP” = GDP from NIPA Table 1.1.5, 
line 1, minus FIRE’s fictitious capital (FC).  
 
In constant 2009 dollars: NIPA Table 1.5.3, line 1 (index numbers). 
 
8. Capital Accumulation (CA): The current-dollar value of non-farm, Net Capital Stock in 
Private Fixed Assets (inclusive of the productive and unproductive spheres) in constant 
2009 dollars, NIPA Table 6.2, line 2 (index numbers).  
 
9. Elite/Top National Income Shares (i.e., top 5%, 1% and .01%): Saez-Piketty excel dataset 
Table A.1, row 2, 3, 5 (2015), retrieved from https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/. 
 
No 2016 data is available, so as a proxy the inflation-rate is added to the 2015 datum for 
the 2016 year. 
 
10. Finance capital (the FIRE sector): Inclusive of costs associated with Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate.  
 
11. Debt-Ratio: A nations debt-ratio is GDP / private debt. See Steve Keen 2012 at 
http://keenomics.s3.amazonaws.com/debtdeflation_media/2012/01/TheDebtwa 
tchManifesto.pdf.  
 
12. Kondratieff wave: Data for the Kondratieff wave-cycle (in price of gold) was taken from 
Shaikh (2016) 5.3 Data Tables, DATALRprices row x, retrieved from http://realecon.or 
g/data/.  
 
My forecast (in Fig. 27) followed Shaikh’s procedure of taking the average of the past 
two waves to approximate the next. Smoothing via 10-yr rolling average/ HP filter = 100.  
 
See below for Shaikh’s formulation (2016, p. 749) – or the figure 17.1 in excel sheet 5.3:  
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Source: Above.  
 
 
Part B: Supplementary Materials  
 
a) The rationale behind the underconsumptionist or “overproductionist” position on the 
question of crisis is that the US is a ‘consumer-based economy’ with over 70 percent of 
spending done by households. While employee compensation as a percentage of GDP did 
fall over the neoliberal period, it was supplemented by a massive expansion of relations 
of credit and debt to maintain and even increase consumer spending. In order to illustrate 
the relationship between rising levels of consumer spending and falling wages, the figure 
below by Michael Roberts shows that wages have declined while consumer spending has 
actually increased up to 2008. By the early 1980s, consumer spending shot up while 
compensation shot down; thus, consumer spending did not decline before the crisis. If 
anything, it actually accelerated, and thus it is impossible that the 2008 crisis was caused 
by a lack of spending. 
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Source: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2014/08/13/inequality-the-mainstream-worry/ 
 
 
 
b) Contrary to what Kliman argues, a more accurate representation of working-class wages 
is one which removes the top 5% by income, and this way ‘workers wages’ (blue) 
declines substantially over the period of study. In contrast, the top line (yellow) only 
removes incomes associated with the top 0.1%. 
 
Source: Author (NIA). 
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c) Example of Marx’s empirical work: take the figure below from the MEGA project of 
Marx’s empirical research in the wake of the 1857 crisis with an attempt to transcribe 
using modern computation.  
 
Source: Hecker (Berlin – PP), 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
